Redefining civil-military balance
Sumanasiri LIYANAGE
A combination of several factors in synergy has contributed to
unleash since 1977, a process of increasing militarization of the Sri
Lankan political and social landscape. Among them, three main factors
are of great significance.
First, the market-oriented economic policies introduced in 1977 were
put into practice with the notion that democratic engagement of trade
unions has to be restricted and semi-oppressive labour regime needs to
be put in place.
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Terrorism has urged the State to beef
up security. File photo |
The dominance of this view was expressed in explicit terms in the
series of actions taken by the Government in suppressing the General
Strike in July 1980. Army and Police were used widely and the trade
union leaders were imprisoned and tortured. Government-backed
subterranean groups were used to obstruct pickets and public meetings.
Secondly, the armed contestation of the Sri Lankan State by the
secessionist LTTE and nationalist JVP had made it necessary to increase
the strength and the fire power of the Sri Lankan Security Forces.
Powers of military
This has in turn increased the powers of the military elite in the
process of decision-making process through setting up of new mechanisms
and institutions. As a result, at the time of the comprehensive military
defeat of the LTTE the Security Forces emerged a quasi-independent force
with substantial support of the Sinhala segment of the population.
Thirdly, the introduction of executive presidential system without
corrective checks and balances has also facilitated the process of
militarization of the Sri Lankan political landscape with
government-backed subterranean groups operating side by side with the
police and Security Forces. Although these factors operated in synergy,
it may not be possible to give all these factors an equal weight and
importance. There is no doubt that the prolonged armed conflict between
the Government and LTTE was the key independent variable with higher
parametric value in the equation.
The relationship between the process of militarization of the
political landscape and country’s deep-rooted democratic institutions
and mechanisms is complex, tense and dialectical. On one hand, the
process of militarization of the political landscape has resulted in
weakening the democratic institutions, mechanisms and values as
democratic institutions and mechanisms were constantly fashioned and
refashioned according to the needs of the former.
Resistance
Hence, the qualitative nature of the Sri Lankan democracy has also
changed significantly and the democratic values were redefined by the
laws of the market and the powers of the State.
However, on the other hand, Sri Lankan democratic institutions have
had substantial resilience so that they had resisted against this
militarization tendency using their limited capacity, resources and
power especially at the time of short-lived peace in 1990, 1993-4,
2002-mid-2006.
Although their definition of democracy is exceedingly limited and
contracting, the civilian political leadership was always careful in
ensuring that military does not pass beyond a certain threshold point.
Thus the architecture of the war machine is designed carefully placing
civilian leadership in between the civilian executive president and the
upper echelon of the Security Forces.
Appointment of Lalith Athulathmudali as the first National Security
Minister was not only to make the war effort more effective but also to
strengthen civic monitoring over military affairs.
The same role was subsequently played by Ranjan Wijeratne and
Anuruddha Ratwatte under President Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika
Bandaranaike respectively.
Civil-military balance
Ranil Wickremesinghe disrupted this equilibrium almost completely
during the peace talks. When Mahinda Rajapaksa decided to defeat the
LTTE rather pressurizing it to come to a negotiated settlement using
military methods, he had to redesign the military architecture not only
to maintain civic-military balance but also to intensify military
operations. Conducting a war does not follow democratic principles
particularly in the context of internal armed conflicts. It was totally
incorrect to interpret the appointment of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa as the
Secretary to the Defence Minister as an example of increasing nepotism.
In the view of high level of intense military engagement, the
architecture of the war machine had to be redesigned not only to
maintain civic-military balance but also to maintain the balance between
Three main Forces led by very efficient leaders who were expected act in
synergy but at the same time not making a space for them to gang up
against the civilian leadership. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa using his
sophisticated military and technical skill has established himself as
the central wheel of the war machine.
However, the way in which the Security Forces achieved comprehensive
military victory over the LTTE and the media coverage given to it in
both print and electronic media had made the Security Forces popular
particularly among the Sinhala segment. An effective military action
needs that day-to-day military operations should be freed from civilian
political decisions particularly in a context in which civilian
political leadership is subject to re-election.
Influences
So the intense military operation had given not only a relative
independence to military hierarchy but also made it possible for them to
influence decision-making even in activities that were not directly
related to military operations in the war zone. So the relative
independence of the military elite, their ability to influence
decision-making in general and its popularity among Southern Sinhala
population may have had an effect on the way in which military elites
tend to think about the country’s future.
General Sarath Fonseka in his letter of resignation to the President
Mahinda Rajapaksa informed he had reason to believe that the upper
echelon of the Government had suspected that he would try a military
coup to capture power. We have no evidence to substantiate his
speculation that some people had suspected that he would try a military
coup to capture power.
We have no evidence to substantiate his speculation that some people
had suspected the possibility of a military coup led by General Sarath
Fonseka. At the same time, no substantive evidence exists to support the
view that General Sarath Fonseka himself was planning such a coup.
However, given the circumstances described above, one may not, at least
in abstract theoretical domain, deny the presence of some critical
drivers leading towards a military coup.
When the war came to end with a comprehensive defeat of the LTTE, it
is natural for civil leadership to avoid any kind of military takeover
redefining the civil-military balance while addressing the issues of
continuing security concerns.
Changes introduced in the military hierarchy immediately after the
war may signify a first step towards demilitarization.
Demilitarization operates in different levels. For both economic and
political reasons reduction of the number Armed Forces is not possible.
Sarath Fonseka at his new position as the Chief of Defence Staff
sought not only the co-ordination of the activities of Three Forces and
Police but a full control over them. It seems that this effort was
thwarted by the Defence Ministry Secretary. So, Fonseka was dissatisfied
as his plan of taking over the command structure of the Security Forces
and Police to his hands did not materialized. He had to find other means
and found the leadership vacuum in the opposition circle. That was the
context in which General Fonseka took a decision to enter politics.
Although his support base was amorphous and internally contradictory,
they all have had one objective in common, overthrowing Mahinda
Rajapaksa from power. The JVP has seen its support base getting
increasingly weakened as the United Peoples Freedom Alliance was able
gradually in attracting youth in the periphery. Mangala Samaraweera was
able to penetrate into already weakened UNP offering a shortcut to power
that many UNPers were seeking for their own benefits. In the past three
years, the SLMC almost lost its support base in the Eastern Province.
Western imperialist countries are also unhappy about Mahinda Rajapaksa
regime because of the change of orientation of its foreign policies.
However some rhetoric has to be articulated in bringing all the varying
internal forces under one umbrella. Hence came the promise of abolition
of Executive Presidency that does not go beyond usual rhetoric.
Tissa Attanayaka has recently informed that a bill would be presented
to Parliament one month after the Presidential Election. There will not
be a major change in the Parliament even the result of the Presidential
Election would be in favour of the UNP. So one may even wonder as to why
UNP did not bring such a bill before the Presidential Election. It is
clear that what General Fonseka seeks is what he was not able to achieve
as the Chief of DS.
He has already informed that he was unhappy because he was given not
controlling power but only the power of co-ordination while the Three
Forces and Police would operate under their own command structure. From
the point of civil rule, the existing structure is much more democratic
and barrier for possible military coup. The LTTE was comprehensively
defeated.
Time has come to reverse the process that had developed in the past
25 to 30 years. The removal of the danger posed by General Fonseka would
be a first step although the first step would not be adequate in
reversing a process that has been at work in the past three decades.
The writer is a lecturer in Political Economy at the Peradeniya
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