Promoting contacts, preserving confidence - Part II:
Relations in the past
Extracts from a presentation by Prof Rajiva
Wijesinha, MP at the Indo-Sri Lankan dialogue held at the Indian
International Centre, New Delhi on October 21-22, 2010
But before we look to the future, let us review relations in the past
and the generally positive tenor of interactions. In the first decade
after independence there were some slight tensions, caused I believe
largely by our own adherence to an Old Commonwealth model of
independence and suspicion on the part of at least one of our leaders of
the emerging idea of Non-Alignment. I should note however that Nehru’s
effortless superiority may also have contributed to a sense of
resentment, as may be seen in the retort of Sir John Kotelawala when
Nehru remonstrated with him for his unabashedly pro-Western speech at
Bandung.
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Prof Rajiva
Wijesinha, MP |
Upbraided for not having consulted Nehru beforehand Sir John
responded that Nehru had not consulted him before his own much more
significant speech.
Fortunately that situation changed with the election of SWRD
Bandaranaike whose approach to international relations was much more in
line with Nehru’s. Personal affinities continued when Mrs Bandaranaike
took over and in time her own relations with Indira Gandhi took
cooperation between the countries further.
Thus we had Sri Lanka able to offer itself as a peace-maker during
the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and also maintaining the trust of India
despite providing refuelling facilities to Pakistan during the 1971
Indo-Pakistan conflict, when India disallowed Pakistan flying over her
territories to what was then East Pakistan, soon to become Bangladesh.
Sirima-Shastri Pact
Those days saw too the Sirima-Shastri Pact which provided a mutually
acceptable solution to the problem of the then stateless labour which
the British had brought over for their plantations, as well as a
determination in favour of Sri Lanka of the status of Kachchativu, an
island in the Palk Straits between the two countries. Underlying the
generally benevolent Indian approach to Sri Lanka then was I believe
total confidence that we would support Indian interests in any
international forum.
All that changed with Jayewardene’s Cold War adventurism following
his election to power with a massive majority in 1977. Relations were
also soured by his personal attitude, beginning with his belief
following Indira Gandhi’s defeat in the Indian General Election at
around the same time that both countries would be governed by
pro-Western parties for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately for him,
while he was able to destroy democracy in Sri Lanka, with the tacit
support of the West, India was more resilient and its old freedom
fighters, even if pro-Western, fundamentally more decent.
Parliamentary democracy
India continued then to have a vibrant Parliamentary democracy and
free elections, and Mrs Gandhi was soon back in power, her personal
suspicions of Jayewardene fuelled by the various manoeuvre noted above.
Hence her Government’s support for terrorist forces, an initiative that
was given moral authority by the vicious attacks on Tamils and Tamil
sentiments that elements in Jayewardene’s Government engaged in, almost
certainly with his support in 1981 and 1983.
Jayewardene’s ridiculous efforts to put off the inevitable between
1983 and 1987 only saw the terrorists get stronger and his own
reputation internationally plummet.
Even though Mrs Thatcher continued to advocate support for Sri Lanka,
for instance when Jayewardene sent his Foreign Minister to inquire
whether he could invoke the 1947 Mutual Defence Treaty in case India
invaded, British officials convinced her that this was not practical. By
1987, with his refusals to compromise having led to heightened terrorist
activity, India was able to get a resolution passed against us at the UN
Human Rights Committee (moved by Argentina, since Sri Lanka had been one
of the few countries to back Britain over the Falklands War). Thus, it
was with certainty that the world would not oppose her that India
intervened during the 1987 Sri Lankan military offensive against the
terrorists in the North.
Internal problems
Jayewardene finally realized the game was up and compromised with his
most effective enemy. Sadly, while this involved some conciliation of
the terrorists, he took no steps to conciliate the Sinhala Opposition in
the form of Mrs Bandaranaike. The result was that violence within the
country exploded.
The Tigers were dissatisfied with the compromises offered and though
the Indians fought against them resolutely on Jayewardene’s behalf, they
were able to take advantage of other internal problems in both countries
and survived to fight another day. Meanwhile there was even worse
violence in the South, alleviated only after much bloodshed and after
Jayewardene had at last been forced, by his own party as much as anyone
else, to give up power.
The next decade and a half saw a bizarre tendency in Sri Lanka on the
part of parties in Opposition to treat the Tigers as much misunderstood
little lambs. President Premadasa and President Kumaratunga both came
into power in the conviction that they could negotiate peace with the
Tigers and, though both were soon disabused, this approach did much to
strengthen the credentials of the Tigers during this period.
It also suggested to them that, however blatant their suppression of
other Tamil voices, all would be forgiven them in the immense
gullibility, or else political manoeuvring, of Sri Lankan politicians.
Ranil Wickremesinghe indeed went further and continued to play ball with
the Tigers even when it was patently clear that they were abusing his
Ceasefire Agreement to an appalling and incredibly dangerous degree.
Hostility towards India
During this period India behaved with forbearance and in the first
two cases was justified in the rapidity with which the two Presidents
realized that they could rely on India much more than on the Tigers.
It is a measure of President Premadasa’s immense capacity to learn
that, though he had entered into power with a mindset of hostility
towards India, he was soon able to mend fences, with the assistance of
distinguished diplomats such as Neville Kanakaratne.
The general professionalism of the Indian Foreign Ministry also
contributed to this and I believe contributed immeasurably to President
Kumaratunga becoming confident enough in 2003 to check the indulgent
excesses of the Wickremesinghe Government, when he forgot as Prime
Minister the constitutional authority of the elected President.
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