Et tu Brute

Special correspondent

A leader is a leader only when he has a team and a mission to be shared with his team. The inseparable bond between the leader, team and the mission is fundamental to all leaders whether he is a ring leader or a national leader. What makes one a national leader, is the nobility of his mission. He who wants to be a national leader must commit himself to a mission that benefits the whole nation. When a leader detaches himself from the mission as well as from his team and decides to follow a path leading to self serving purposes, his leadership comes to an end.

Unfortunately in this country, we have seen many leaders once respected by all were later reduced to mere disrespectful figures because of power politics. The reason is quite clear if one looks closely how things had transpired in the lives of such ill-fated leaders. It is the replacement of a noble mission with self serving one. The saddest part of their stories is that most of them have met their fate because they let others to exploit their weaknesses and to drag them blindfolded to make wrong decisions. The pandemonium about General Sarath Fonseka coming into politics as the common presidential candidate can also be seen in that context, perhaps among many other views.

The writer of this article is neither a great fan of General Fonseka nor a panegyrist of the Government. Yet, he was a key role player of a unit, though little known to public, provided a very valuable service to the team that rescued the nation from horrors of terrorism.

He uses the word TEAM, with a great emphasis because the whole operation that brought the victory to the Motherland was indeed a team game that no one can claim individual credit. It was a perfect combination of individual competencies synergized by a compelling vision that transpired beyond self serving needs. It was a battle worth fighting for, an opportunity to reach the highest self-efficacy, and a fulfilling of duty of the manhood. It was fought for the future generation, our children, to give them the peaceful, terror - free country that we had not seen during our childhood.

This effort is not to find fault with General Fonseka or to question his right to compete for the presidential election. The writer truly wishes that he would never have to pen this out. This is written out of desperation knowing the dire implication that would be caused on the Armed Forces, and the whole nation by a single wrong assumption made either by General Fonseka or by the citizens of this country. The victory over terrorism is certainly not General Fonseka’s individual achievement.

Thus, no soldier, sailor, or airman, in this country wants to be a political football to be kicked over and over by selfish politicians. This effort is purely to prove with the facts why one should not betray such a great team that he was once part of, purely because of selfish objectives. If he does so, he is not only betraying the noble mission, but also desecrating the sacrifices made by all in accomplishing the mission.

As mentioned earlier, the humanitarian operation that brought freedom to the country was a team game. Yet, contributions made individually, certainly have their differences. Principally, there are four levels of contributions can be identified as the core success factors of the whole operation; 1. The President and the Commander in Chief, 2. The Secretary Defence, 3. The Service Commanders, and 4. The Servicemen. All these levels were equally important but unique in the way that they helped the success of the mission.

Servicepersons

If one needs an answer to the question: who fought the battle? Clearly it is the brave men in our Armed Service. It was them who fought the actual battle but not the President, Defence Secretary or the Service Commanders. Even General Fonseka never travelled beyond Vanni (Vavuniya) and Jaffna (Palali) headquarters throughout the operation, except for ceremonial occasions. Therefore, if it was not for their commitment for the mission, strong discipline and valour that made them fighting selflessly, none of those who try to claim ownership for the victory could be seen around today.

However, it should be not forgotten that these Servicemen had been fighting the enemy for over 20 years without success. Even Three Service Commanders and the Defence Secretary were once in the frontlines. What made our Forces to show a dramatic change in their performance within just three years? The answer to that question is something that all discernible citizens of this country must know without doubt. Yet, the answer would come with the sad truth that all Sri Lankans have to admit; our Forces were always with the ability to defeat the enemy and we could have ended this misery long time back.

The Service Commanders

The Service Commanders were the three main line authorities responsible for implementing operational plans. They were carefully selected to their roles purely based on their competencies. The authority that devised the grand strategy knew the behaviour to be expected by the three main operational commands and selected them accordingly irrespective of their seniority or political views.

All three commanders played equally important roles in the success of the battle though the media attention was not equally distributed for their achievements. When General Fonseka is concerned, he was a well experienced General, and an extremely ambitious individual, who was indeed the perfect match to lead the Army to a mission that cannot be delayed any longer.

Yet, he was far from perfect; he had no career prospects in the Army by the end of 2005. Though the writer does not wish to make further elaboration in this aspect, at least for the moment, it is quite clear that General Fonseka would have been another retired General unless his usefulness was correctly identified by the grand strategist of the national defence.

It is a Generally accepted norm in the services that military commanders have to be officers and gentlemen. A skilful commander is essential to win a battle, but if he is only a gentleman that he would recognize the contribution of all and shares the credit with them. Unfortunately, General Fonseka’s tongue has never been flexible to thank the support he received from other services, particularly the Navy.

It was the Navy that destroyed arms supply chain of the LTTE, and enabled the Army to have a free reign on the ground in terms of weapons. If it was not for the effectiveness of the navy blockades, all senior LTTE leaders were now happily living in some foreign country.

The fact has already been established by the statements of KP that LTTE could not ship any arms in or take its leaders out via sea due to the naval defence during the whole operation. On the other hand, it was the Air Force that paved the way to the Army in LTTE areas by neutralizing LTTE threats with effective bombing. Close air support, helicopter operations, casualty evacuation, and transportation were crucial for the Army’s success. Yes, it is the valiant soldiers who advanced into the LTTE dens and liberated the ground; but for the victory, all Three Services made equal contributions. General Fonseka was at the helm of the Army just like Admiral Karannagoda in the Navy and Air Chief Marshal Goonatilake in the Air Force.

Like in the case of the Servicemen, all Three Service Commanders during the humanitarian operation were not new recruits to the Forces. They had already completed 30 years in the services that failed to prevent a gang of murderers growing in to a world’s most ruthless terrorist organization. None of them were charismatic commanders like General Kobbakaduwa or Janaka Perera who had been known to the public for their battlefield successes, though they never became Service Commanders. What was the force that enabled the Service Commanders to achieve such tremendous success in their tenures? Clearly it was the same force that made them celebrities that even enabled some to dream about presidency in the country.

The President

When people of this country elected Mahinda Rajapaksa as their president, they made a very clear choice between two very distinctive ideologies. One was characterized by pusillanimity and uncertainty whereas the other was characterized by bold action and clarity.

Never in his campaign had President Rajapaksa tried to promote himself as a business genius, economic savvy, or an expert in international relations. He simply said he would free the future generation from the burden of terrorism. It was this compelling vision that made people believing in him and ultimately enabled him to do the impossible. Thus, the contribution of the President in the victory against terrorism was paramount.

President Rajapaksa was the only opponent in the whole team that LTTE had not met before. He was the team leader, creator of the vision, and the only national leader out of five Sri Lankan Presidents dealt with LTTE terrorism, who could convert his vision into action. He was the buffer against international pressures, master politician in bringing out political stability, and the leader who could unite the nation to believe in one single vision. He held the nation together amidst the global economic crisis, ever increasing cost of living, and unprecedented political conspiracies. Above all, he even managed to start huge development programs in the country against all odds.

He is the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces or the top line authority of the whole operation. He headed the Security Council, weekly he sat with the top brass in defence, monitored the operational progress, reviewed plans, listen and understood the concerns of the defence officials, made bold decisions, solved problems, gave confidence and motivation, provide advice and issued orders. In simple terms, he managed the whole operation. Thus, if one wants to answer to the question who led the operation, it can be no one else but him, President Rajapksa.

Yet, President Rajapaksa was not the only President who wanted to rid the country of terrorism. President JR Jayawardane tried it hard but failed miserably. It was during his time that LTTE grew into a mass murdering terror outfit. President Premadasa took the challenge to fight with it, but had to pay the ultimate price for the wrong assumptions he made.

President Wijetunge took a bold stance against terrorism but was not strong enough to convert his vision into action successfully. President Kumaratunge had to retire without an eye during her endeavour. How Prime Minister Ranil tried it, is not even worth mentioning. A politician once considered to be a potential President ended up as a clown to the nation. How President Rajapaksa did outperform his predecessors in fighting terrorism? The answer is the bridge that helped him to link his vision with the action.

Defence Secretary

Having worked as a junior staff officer in the nation’s top most defence authority under two presidents, the writer identifies one key factor that made the nation incapable of winning the war against terror for a quarter century. That was the lack of understanding between the executive power and the military. These are the two most important instruments of nation’s powers, in the domain of national security.

During the early days of the conflict, both executive and the military were headed by barely Sri Lankan individuals who had very little understanding over the situation they were handling.

They spoke the same language but it was foreign. They did not understand the root cause of the conflict and therefore the implications of their actions and lack of action. They failed to control the anti- Tamil riots in 1983, or the bloody village massacres by the terrorists. They could not stop LTTE bombings targeting civilians. In the writer’s view, they did not really care, for they never felt the pain.

Then came the era when military started getting individuals with better understanding of the situation to its top positions. Unfortunately, the executive remained the same and the two instruments of national power started distancing themselves. The executive learnt to live with the war, whereas military top brass withdrew to the comfort zone, until they became mere “yes men”. The synergy of the effort between the two instruments was lost for almost forever. There was no genuine interest in either party in wining the war.

The most unfortunate scenario was how this distancing affected the military ranks. First the executive stopped participating of military functions, and then the service commanders were not to be seen even at officers’ passing out parades.

There was a time when the battle commanders had the orders not to disturb the sleep of their respective Service Commander even during military debacles. Helicopters were allocated to bring snacks from Hilton to Trincomalee for the top defence officials’ meetings when soldiers were dying in the battle without proper casualty evacuation. During President Kumaranatunge’s time the Security Council meeting was the day that junior staff officers like the writer had to learn fasting since she always arrived six to seven hours late.

That was the kind of interest she had for the national security. The Servicemen lost the pride of their profession, they were called “broiler chicken” when they come home, it became a war no one interested in that they had to fight.

The vital factor

The lengthy explanation above is considered necessary for an ordinary citizen to understand the most vital factor that the enabled Sri Lankan Armed Forces to achieve, what was deemed impossible. It is the contribution made by Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa. He was certainly not the one who created the vision and led the operation but he was the grand strategist, the facilitator, advisor, and the man who looked after the people behind the weapons. Simply, he was the man who bridged the gap between the executive and military and enabled the President to convert his vision into action.

He was the person who selected the Service Commanders including General Fonseka and even defended them during the difficult times they had. The key strategic decision, which was to destroy the LTTE with force, was taken even before General Fonseka was appointed Army Commander. He did the planning and made strategic decision, and General Fonseka becoming, Army Commander was just one of those decisions.

He being a battle hardened soldier himself talked same language of the soldiers. He being the brother of the President knew how to establish the two way communication and trust between the two instruments of power. He knew the people commanding, and the weaknesses they have.

He supported their strengths and compensated their weaknesses with his own strengths. He looked after the welfare of the war heroes, uplifted their morale, resurrected their pride, and made them confident that they where fighting an ending battle. The welfare programs he started for war heroes are unprecedented.

His scope of strategic planning for the national security was very much wider and important than of an individual Armed Service. For instance, General Fonseka did not have a clue how the LTTE armada in the seas were tracked and destroyed, how the international pressures were handled, how LTTE propaganda was defeated , how the national intelligence was managed, and etc.

Hence, if one wants the answer to the question who was the mastermind behind the success of the whole war effort, he is no one else but Defence Secretary Rajapaksa himself. He was the factor that had been not there before with the previous commanders in chief who dealt with the LTTE. He was the man who outwitted Prbhakaran, and his far more intelligent allies around the world and brought the terror Tigers to their feet.

Finally, it is an irony why General Fonseka is thinking that he is the only hero of this war and deserves more than the rest of the team. Maybe it is because of his ignorance of the realty or he being pandered to the mean-spirited politicians who once sought to destroy him. He might have been engaged in a mission something like “Saving Private Ranil” even without his knowledge.

The writer still remembers the day when the news of Prabhakarn’s death came to the Defence Ministry. It reached the Ministry even before it reached General Fonseka. When the writer inquired from Defence Secretary whether to release the news, he had only one thing to say “let General Fonseka tell it to the nation on TV”. That was the kind of leadership Defence Secretary Rajapaksa gave to the team.

General Fonseka has been given what he is really deserves. He was made Chief of Defence Staff, the senior most staff authority in the Armed Forces. Even the position of the Defence Secretary is a staff authority. General Fonseka’s desire to take the line authority of all Three Forces or to hold an appointment like “Three Forces Commander” is hilarious for any discernible military person.

Nevertheless, General Fonseka’s battle ended on the day that LTTE leader died but not the rest of the team that he was once part of. If he thinks he can be the President by marketing his part of the contribution to war, the writer truly wishes him success. Yet, if he tries to cheat the people by beating the others’ drums, it would be a serious mistake on his part. May he would be wise enough not to make that mistake!