A UPFA/TMVP victory - best option for the East

Given the Sri Lankan political culture, it seems that the election to be held on May 10 would place the recent development programme and the prevailing relative equilibrium in the Eastern province at stake.

After the Government Security forces succeeded in re-capturing the area in the Eastern Province previously held by the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka has launched many a development programme in order to improve the condition of living of the people in the province.

So the election results would affect these development programmes as well as the government's political strategy.

Sumanasiri Liyanage

In this article, I use scenario development techniques to project scenarios that may emerge in the aftermath of the Provincial Council Election in the Eastern Province to be held on May 10. Whatever the criteria used, this would be an election of great importance for the future of Sri Lanka for many reasons.

First, this is an electoral competition between two political fronts after the Presidential election in 2005 in a pluri-national context. Eastern province is pluri-national not only in demographic sense but also in political sense.

Three national groups through their political organisations assert their political claims with regard to land, political representation, self-identity, and security almost on equal footing.

Political legitimacy

Secondly, pluri-national electoral formations are testing their political legitimacy in almost 20 years after the first provincial council election in 1988. We have seen the formation of Horowitzian pre-election coalitions rather than Lijphartian post-election coalitions.

While President Mahinda Rajapaksa was able to form a grand coalition comprising parties representing all three major communities (UPFA + NUA + TMVP), the leader of the opposition succeeded in forming two-party mini-coalition (UNP + SLMC) without explicit Tamil representation. TNA, more or less a LTTE proxy, refused to field candidates for the provincial election with the usual excuses.

Thirdly, given the Sri Lankan political culture, it seems that the election to be held on May 10 would place the recent development programme and the prevailing relative equilibrium in the Eastern province at stake.

Development programme

After the Government Security forces succeeded in re-capturing the area in the Eastern Province previously held by the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka has launched many a development programme in order to improve the condition of living of the people in the province.

There is no doubt that these development programmes are part and parcel of the political strategy of the Government.

So the election results would affect these development programmes as well as the Government's political strategy.

Two post-election scenarios may be easily envisioned on the basis of election results that would bring about either UPFA + NUA + TMVP coalition (scenario 2) or UNP + SLMC coalition (scenario 1) into power.

Forecasting on election results has been made difficult by the LTTE-TNA factor as it is not easily predictable how this vote bank would behaves at the forthcoming provincial election. As a result of the LTTE split and the emergence of TMVP as a significant actor in Tamil politics, how Tamil people would vote in the election is not clear.

The Local Government elections held earlier showed that there was a shift in the way in which Tamils in Batticaloa vote as a substantial number of Tamil voted there for TMVP.

Politics

If this tendency prevails, we may envision the emergence of new kind of Tamil nationalist politics in the country that is substantially different from confrontational politics that have been hitherto adopted by the Tamil politicians.

The Eastern province is ethnically polarised as a result of constant military engagement between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). This partly explains the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the mid 1980s. A SLMC + UNP victory has to be looked at within the context of SLMC + UNP broader political strategy, namely, the overthrow of Mahinda Rajapaksa regime at the centre.

Hence, it is highly unlikely that the SLMC + UNP led coalition in the Eastern PC will adopt cooperative strategy with the centre. The SLMC + UNP with the support of the Colombo civil society will continue with confrontationalist politics to prove the "international community", i.e. Western Powers, that the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government is not really interested in devolution of power and not genuine when it promised the full implementation of the 13th Amendment.

It would be natural that the Central Government would respond in the same manner by cutting the development projects commence under "Negenahira Udanaya" and using Central Government structures, the Governor, GAs and Pradeshiya Sabha Secretaries to scuttle the elected PC and its activities.

International community

Sajith Premadasa said that if SLMC + UNP coalition wins, it will not seek money and resources from the Centre to develop the Eastern Province but will mobilise the direct assistance of the 'international community". This statement signifies what the confrontational politics that the SLMC + UNP PC is going to adopt if it wins the election.

Moreover, it also signifies the attempt at the SLMC + UNP coalition to make the Eastern Province a colony of the Western powers.

Secondly, a SLMC + UNP coalition victory would increase tension between Tamils and Muslims in the province in two ways. In order to woo the Tamil supporters/ sympathizers of the LTTE/ TNA, it will go against the TMVP. Since the TMVP will see the SLMC + UNP regime as a threat to its existing political power, it could adopt disruptive policies vis-a-vis the PC.

This would be detrimental to ethnic peace especially in Muttur, Kinniya, Valachchanai, and coastal belt of the Ampara district. So scenario 1 will be characterized by conflict between the centre and the PC, discontinuation of Eastern development projects, increasing tension between Tamils and Muslims, increasing involvement of the Security Forces in provincial administration, TMVP activities against the SLMC + UNP politicians, re-emergence of the LTTE in the Eastern Province, and internecine warfare between the LTTE and TMVP. This would affect adversely the day-to-day life of the people in the province, increase child recruitment and insecurity.

Nothing would significantly change if the UNFP + TMVP coalition wins the election. This coalition as I noted above is more pluri-national than the UNP + SLMC coalition. It has also given Tamil constituency a hegemonic status in the coalition. Similarly, its power equation also gives a significant place for Muslims because of Hisbullah-Ameer Ali factor in addition to the usual vote base of NUA.

Of course, there will be a tension between TMVP and Muslim representation. How the TMVP responds to this tension would determine the potential of the TMVP as a regional political party.

Victory

As the centre would act as arbiter in any possible tension situation, some equilibrium may be envisioned. The victory of the UNFP + TMVP + NUA would pose a real challenge to the implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in two principal ways.

First, who is responsible in carrying out development programs in the east after May 10? Is it the PC or the central government? How could a strategy of cooperative governance cam be designed? Secondly, TMVP as well as Muslim parties have to show to their respective communities that their interests as well aspirations for self-rule can be achieved substantially through the politics of negotiation.

So scenario 2 would be characterised by a healthy competition between the centre and the PC, less political tension between Muslims and Tamils, and the continuation of development projects with more local participation.

This consociational type of arrangement would eventually provide a space for TMVP to enter fully democratic politics with a new Tamil nationalist political strategy and to reduce eventually the number of human rights violations and the PC could succeed in minimising the LTTE activities in the province.

Although, the second scenario is not free of contradictions and conflicts of interests, in the given situation, that would be the available best option for the people in the East. The writer teaches political economy at the University of Peradeniya.