CFA annulment creates broader space to achieve peace
The Ceasefire Agreement was signed six years ago by the then Sri
Lankan Prime Minister, without consultation of the elected Executive
President or even the Cabinet.
Though he could claim a mandate for initiating negotiations,
following the victory of his party in the 2001 Parliamentary Election,
the failure to consult adequately can be seen as one reason for a
structurally flawed document that contributed substantially and visibly
to the erosion of the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.
Kethesh Loganathan |
T. Maheshwaran |
It negated the Constitutional foundations that underlie the State of
Sri Lanka. It undermined the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka in that
it granted what seemed virtual immunity to a non -State actor, i.e. the
LTTE, from being subject to offensive operations by the armed forces
when performing their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
It also privileged one party in an apparent demarcation of certain
areas as LTTE held, thus preventing the Armed Forces and Sinhalese
civilians from entering such areas while LTTE cadres were given free
access to every part of the country.
Though the Preamble to the CFA states that the “overall objective” of
the GOSL and the LTTE “is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”, it was never seriously pursued because
the LTTE was not interested in a negotiated settlement, and withdrew
from negotiations just over a year after the CFA was signed.
The CFA limited discussions to being between the GOSL and the LTTE,
and thus denied opportunity to include others from the Tamil community.
In retrospect the CFA became a dead letter; an instrument to
negotiate a solution with an uninterested party who wanted to exclude
any others who might be serious about a negotiated solution.
In abrogating the CFA a path is now cleared to negotiate a solution
with a more representative Tamil delegation, in consultation also with
other minorities, as well as other political interest groups.
Lakshman Kadirgamar |
The CFA was honoured in the breach by the LTTE, which in the
considered judgment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (initially
composed of representatives from five Nordic countries) violated the CFA
3830 times vis -a- vis Govt. violations that amounted to 351. The
Ceasefire was never an impediment for the LTTE to engage in acts of
terrorism against civilian and military targets.
The CFA provided a veil for the LTTE to indulge in a game of
hypocrisy and to prepare for war under an effective cover of searching
for peace. It was able to strengthen its military potential manifold
during the CFA.
The LTTE took advantage of the Government adhering to the letter of
the CFA and ceasing all operations whether offensive or defensive
against the LTTE :
a) to murder dozens of unarmed and defenseless Tamils who were
opposed to the LTTE and were disarmed in terms of the CFA,
b) to murder Tamil informants,
c) to attack the Police Stations at Point Pedro and Valachchenai and
the STF Base at Kanchanankudah soon after the commencement of the CFA,
d) to sink merchant vessels,
e) to detain two SLMM Monitors against their will on board a LTTE
vessel on 14 July 2002, upon detection of communication equipment, when
they got on board a trawler which appeared on the territorial waters of
Palk Bay,
f) to destroy a LTTE ship on detection by the SLMM of smuggled arms,
which resulted in two SLMM monitors ( who discovered the hidden
explosives ) nearly losing their lives. They had to jump overboard to
save themselves when the LTTE set fire to the explosive laden ship on
detection It was originally intercepted by the SL Navy near the Delft
Islands on February 10, 2003,
g) to attack the Chinese Trawler “Fu Yuan Ya 225” on March 20th 2003,
h) to murder the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12 August
2005, i) to regroup, rearm and launch massive attacks on Government
forces in 2006. The LTTE itself called these attacks “Unceasing Waves -
Eelam War 4”,
j) the killing of nine SLN personnel in Chettikulam on 12 January
2006, which prompted the SLMM shortly after the election of a new
government to question the actual existence of the Ceasefire Agreement
in the SLMM Press Release issued on 13 January 2006 (The headline of the
Press Release was ‘ SLMM questions whether there is still a Ceasefire”)
k) to attempt to murder the Sri Lanka Army Commander General Sarath
Fonseka on 25 April 2006
l) to withdrew security guarantees given to the SLMM and the ICRC
with regard to sea monitoring and forcing the SLMM to suspend sea
monitoring on 11 May 2006, following the attack on the ship ‘The
Jetliner’
m) to attack a bus load of innocent civilians by detonating a
claymore mine killing 60 civilians at Kebitigollewa on the 15 June 2006,
n) to deprive thousands of civilians living down stream of the Mavil
Aru Anicut of water on 22 July 2006,
o) to attack, in the guise of civilians in a bus, the forces at the
checkpoint on the A9 leading northward into the Jaffna peninsula, and
launch thereby on August 11 2006 a ferocious attack which involved its
so-called head of the Political Wing, Mr Thamilchelvam, on the army
lines there, thus precipitating the closure of the road at that point
p) to murder the Deputy Secretary - General of the Peace Secretariat,
Ketish Loganathan on 12 August 2006,
q) to force the SLMM monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden to
withdraw by refusing to give them assurances of protection and
effectively truncating the Mission in September 2006,
r) to murder 98 sailors of the Navy by crashing an explosives-laden
vehicle into a naval convoy at Digampatana in the Habarana area of
Matale district on 16 October 2006,
s) to attempt to murder the Sri Lanka Defence Secretary Gotabhaya
Rajapakse on 1 December 2006
t) to engage in acts of piracy and loot ships e.g. Jordanian Merchant
Vessel MV FARAH III, in December 2006,
u) to attempt to murder an elected Tamil Member of Parliament and
Minister, Douglas Devananda, on 28 November 2007,
v) to refuse from 2006 onward to provide guarantees to the ICRC to
enable them to facilitate the smooth shipping of supplies to Jaffna, or
sea transport of civilians to and from Jaffna, all of which has now to
be accompanied by naval support to ensure safety and security
w) to expand the territory over which they exercised usurped power by
occupying Manirasakulam and fortifying Sampur to smuggle about eleven
shiploads of arms into the country
x) to refrain for several months from giving the required guarantees
to enable the A9 to be opened northward into the territories under their
control, in order to claim falsely that supplies were restricted, even
though throughout this period the government of Sri Lanka was ensuring
supplies whilst continuing to fund education and health and other social
services for all its citizens including those in LTTE controlled areas
y) to continue to recruit children forcibly into their armed forces
from 2002 to 2007 inclusive
z) to prevent the holding of local government elections in the East
when initially planned by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs
aa) to force the resignation of an elected Member of Parliament from
the Eastern Province Mr Kingsley Rajanayagam, on the grounds that he
supported the breakaway Karuna faction, and subsequently to assassinate
him on October 19, 2004 at Kalliyankadu, Batticaloa
bb) to build up an airstrip, having prevented the SLMM from
inspecting this in accordance with their monitoring requirements
cc) to claim on the strength of the CFA that they should not be
prosecuted for collecting and using finances internationally for
terrorist purposes
dd) to forcibly recruit one person from every family in the area
under their control in 2007, extending this even to the families of
those working with international aid agencies.
Despite these grave provocations, and continuing suffering for the
Tamil people in LTTE controlled areas, the Government Forces stuck to
the ceasefire and took limited remedial measures only after the attack
on the Army Commander in April 2006. After the full scale assaults by
the LTTE on two fronts in August 2006, the Sri Lankan forces decided in
the interest of national security to ensure that such offensives could
not be repeated. It was only then that the operation to clear the East
conclusively began.
SLMM Rulings
Select Excerpts:
1) The Assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12
August 2005 - “SLMM strongly condemns the brutal assassination of
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The barbaric act is a huge blow to
the peace process as a whole. Such brutal violence creates, fear,
distrust and insecurity within society, and therefore represents a
serious threat to the ceasefire”.
2) Violation of the CFA with LTTE sea movements and attacks on the
Sri Lankan Navy - 11 May 2006 - “The SLMM takes these threats very
seriously and would like to remind the LTTE of its responsibility as an
equal partner to the Ceasefire Agreement to do everything in its power
not to jeopardize the monitors’ safety”.
3) LTTE claymore mine attack on a civilian bus near Kebitigollewa-15
June 2006 - ‘This is not only the bloodiest attack on civilians since
the Ceasefire Agreement was signed in February 2002, but yet another set
back in the peace process in Sri Lanka”.
4) Closure of the Mavil Aru anicut -22 July 2006 - “The findings made
by and provided to the SLMM show that the measures taken by the LTTE to
close the Mavil Aru sluice gates on 22 July 2006, whether with or
without the help of or on behalf of the people of the Verugal area, as
well as the continuation of keeping the gates closed, have led to
* the creation of a humanitarian crisis in the area surrounding and
being dependant on the Mavil Aru dam, and thereby
* the creation of a situation conducive to direct conflict between
the two Parties.
* Putting the civilian population in severe physical danger as the
possibility of them being caught in crossfire greatly increased with the
escalating tension and violence, as well as
* Constraining the possibilities of rational discussions and
negotiations towards a solution to the conflict. “
5) Assassination of Deputy Secretary General, Kethesh Loganathan on
the 12th August 2006 - “There are no words strong enough to condemn this
vicious and cold blooded murder of yet another statesman living for
peace.”
6) Attack on the Jordanian ship Farah III on 28 December 2006 - “SLMM
strongly advised the LTTE to respect International Law and the sovereign
rights of Sri Lanka in the territorial waters surrounding the
island.....with regards to the Jordanian ship FARAH III, the LTTE acted
contradictory to its commitment to the CFA”.
Norwegian Minister of International Development Erik Solheim says:
LTTE’s request for the removal of Monitors from the EU countries-
September 2006
“The LTTE’s demand that SLMM monitors from EU countries be replaced
is deeply regrettable and will weaken the SLMM in a critical period,”
says Norwegian Minister of International Development Erik Solheim ( key
facilitator of the peace process)
Other verdicts of the SLMM will continue to be available through
their website, which will be linked to that of the Royal Norwegian
Embassy website in Colombo.
Comment
The annulment of an ill-conceived and unsustainable ‘agreement’ does
not in any way fetter the Government of Sri Lanka from seeking a long
lasting solution that addresses the genuine grievances of all sections
of the people, and in particular the Tamil community in the North and
East of this country. The Government has already begun the recruitment
of Tamil policemen, on a targeted programme never attempted by previous
Governments.
Though entry was always open to Security Forces for all Sri Lankan
citizens, minorities were not actively recruited, and in recent years
Tamils, facing the threat of execution as traitors by the LTTE, were
slow to apply. This has changed, following the liberation of the East
from the LTTE, and recently 175 police men and women passed out at a
ceremonial parade in Batticaloa. The Government is now secure in the
knowledge that there is a broader space available to interact with all
sections of the Tamil community, including elements of the Tamil
diaspora, most of which sections were left out of a participatory role
due to the highly restrictive and limiting scope of the Ceasefire
Agreement. In annulling the CFA the Government affirms its commitment to
all its citizens in the democratic dispensation that it is now free to
promulgate.
(Peace Secretariat) |