Archives

Edited text of address by Former Secretary Minister of Ethnic Affairs, National Integration and Mineral Resources Development Prof. Gamini Keerawella at the round table discussion on 'Principle Approaches to Conflict Resolution' in September in Colombo. The discussion was jointly organised by Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project (GISP) and National Peace Council (NPC).

Having delineated the politico-historical context of Sri Lankan ethnic conflict I intend to pay attention to some issues pertaining to negotiations. Internationally, between 1988 and 2000 eight internal conflicts/civil wars were settled through negotiations-in El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, South Africa, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Northern Ireland.

In the first four cases political ideology and loyalties remained the key factors in the conflict and the changing power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in the last phase of the Cold War set the conditions for a negotiated settlement.

In the remaining four cases, ethnic/religious identities played a key role in the conflict and the fate of the last three settlements still hang on a delicate balance. It should be noted that reaching a settlement through negotiations is indeed rare in internal conflicts and civil wars than in inter-state wars. "Between 1900 and 1980, only fifteen percent of civil wars ended through negotiation; the remaining eighty'five percent were terminated by one side winning.

During the same period approximately fifty percent of inter-state wars were ended through negotiation. In the post-World War II period between 1945 to 1993 only 14 out of 57 civil wars were settled through negotiations.

Negotiation is an age-old practice in diplomatic bargaining between two or more states. It is employed to change or sustain each other's objectives to reach agreement over contentious issues. When we apply negotiation as a policy tool in internal ethnic conflict resolution it is necessary to have a more sophisticated understanding of its possibilities as well as its limitations. Stephen John Stedman observes that those who emphasize the effectiveness of negotiation and mediation as a strategy of conflict resolution in internal/civil wars base their thinking on rather questionable four assumptions:

(i) all civil wars are negotiable;

(ii) solutions can be found to address the needs of all warring parties;

(iii) leaders in civil wars are rational decision-makers who can be swayed by reason; and

(iv) negotiated settlements are morally preferable to military victory by one side.

Therefore, over-optimistic approach to negotiation is fraught with many pitfalls and it is a strategy to be adopted with due care. A Sinhala proverb, dena gena giyoth Kataragama: nodena giyoth ataramaga (you will reach Kataragama if you know your road; going without knowing the road ends up in stary) is valid in negotiation strategy in internal conflicts because it is not a panacea but a policy tool.

When we analyze the usefulness of negotiation as a policy tool in internal conflicts, it is necessary to identify different categories of internal conflicts. Very broadly, at least five types of internal conflicts can be distinguished; conflicts where the state and ethnic groups within the territory of the state are the conflicting parties; conflicts where groups in arms identify themselves in class-lines in which political ideologies play a catalytic role; conflicts where regions within the state irrespective of ethnicity or class constitute the contesting parties; industrial conflicts over specific issues; and last not least, conflicts between interest groups within the state.

The use of force and intensity of violence associated with the last two types is minimal. These two types can be dealt with within the gamut of the civil 'law and order' as they do not challenge the very fundamental existence and legitimacy and authority of the state. In contrast, ethnic conflicts are different. They challenge the very rationale of its existence, institutional expressions/apparatus of the state and its human and physical base. In the present international juncture, ethnic conflicts are not only widespread but also cause tremendous suffering. Therefore, the main concern in this discussion is how to employ the negotiation stragey in relation to burgeoning ethnic conflicts.

At the same time, certain differences between negotiations in inter-state conflicts and that in ethnic conflicts are particularly important to keep in mind. In the inter-state wars, parties to the conflicts are one or more sovereign states who are considered equal at least in theory. Negotiation between a sovereign state who is a recognized member of the world state system and the rebel group within the state is fraught with particular difficulties. The compromises that the state is compelled to make at the very beginning by according the recognition of the conflicting party within the state as a party to negotiation who are otherwise treated as terrorists are enormous. The states are very conscious of international and domestic implications in such a situation.

Compared to inter-state wars, civil wars and ethnic conflicts are more difficult to negotiate, as Stephen John Stedman vividly pointed out, for four reasons. First, political settlements require militant groups to disarm, to demobilize their soldiers and to give up their arms.

This would create security dilemmas and worrisome military vulnerabilities as they fear that it would provide opportunities for the state to take advantage of the settlement to "gain a monopoly of power and use of coercive powers of the state against them." Thus, some arrangement to ensure sufficient protection to overcome these security dilemmas is a necessary condition in a negotiated settlement.

Second, in ethnic conflicts, as in the case of civil wars, each other believe that the character and policies of "their adversary is a cause of the war and only way to end the war is by eliminating their opponent. This creates survival stake for the combatants, who fear that defeat will mean death. In the final analysis, fundamental issue in the ethnic conflict is the political power in the given geographical area - who must govern the area. It is draped with ethnic belief systems and collective identities. As a result, the conflict is defined in ethnic language and sustain myths, enemy images and distortion of facts. History is the first casualty of this process.

As Eric Hobsbawn noted, "(T)he past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element in these ideologies. If their is no suitable past, it can always be invented". Since issues of power and rule are pivotal some political arrangement to share power is essential in a negotiated settlement. Third, pathologies of leadership and totalistic perception of war aims make ethnic conflicts difficult to negotiate.

Leaders in ethnic conflicts, in Stedman's words, "can suffer from pathologies that prevent them from changing their preferences. A leader's paranoia can render it impossible to assuage his fears of a negotiated settlement". However, impermanence of leaders and their positions can not be ruled out. History is replete with examples of changing positions and behaviour by most dogmatic leaders and parties. The Nationalist Party in South Africa and IRA in Northern Ireland can be cited as examples.

Fourth, many ethnic conflicts are prone to be total wars. The rhetoric of total war increase fears that even when one party agrees to accept a compromise settlement whether the adversary would be satisfied with less than complete victory.

Two issues are involved with this; first, a party that repeatedly pledges to fight to end will find it difficult to send different signals and the other party who often hear very strident language from its opponent now difficult to determine if the different voice is sincere; second, when the leaders and groups who were publicly earlier committed to total victory enter into negotiations and express to compromise with the adversary can create problems between leaders and followers. It is equally applicable to all the leaders of the ethnic divide who air rhetoric of total war.

When negotiation is perceived not as a panacea but a policy tool to reach a settlement, it is necessary to be mindful of the 'other' purposes of one entering into negotiations. It is quite possible that contending parties may agree to enter into negotiations without any intention of reaching an compromise agreement by changing each others aims and objectives but for other purposes. They may find 'other' benefits perceived in a different paradigm other than finding a mutually acceptable solution. Militant groups who are considered parayas by diplomatic community may view negotiation as means of obtaining international recognition and also to get publicity to their course.

Therefore, a realistic assessment is required whether negotiation is exploited by the other party for propaganda and to influence the international opinion rather than changing the bargaining position of its opponents. As Kal Holsti aptly points out "persistent use of slogans, epithets, vague phrases, and repetition of totally unacceptable positions indicate that bargaining is not the real purpose of the discussions". A very clear example of using negotiations for propaganda was the Paris negotiations on the Vietnam war where the Vietnamese envoys used post-session press briefings very skilfully to justify their position vis-a-vis Americans.

Parties to internal conflicts from time to time propose peace talks and express willingness to negotiate simply for international consumption while having no intention at all of a negotiated settlement.

The strategy of negotiation can be employed to gather information about opponents commitment to the declared objectives and positions. Mussolini's intention in conducting talks with the British and the French prior to his invasion of Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) was to assess and gather their response to his military adventure.

The British and French offers under the Hoare-Laval plan where both powers agreed to accede a large chunk of Abyssinia as exclusive economic zone for Italy and a Abyssinian sea corridor in the negotiations convinced Mussolini that the British and French would tolerate his military move against Abyssinia.

Further, a party to the conflict may initiate a negotiation for the purpose of creating the illusion that they are really interested in bargaining even though it actually desires no negotiated agreement. The Soviet negotiations with the Imre Nagy regime after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 is a good example of negotiation for deception.

The Soviets agreed to negotiate with the new Nagy government about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary just in order to buy time for military action to crush the Nagy initiative. Even in internal conflicts, though parties are not really interested in a negotiated agreement to settle the conflict, they propose a cease-fire and initiate negotiation process to regroup their strength for a renewed round of hostilities.

Even if there is no real hope of a genuine bargaining for a mutually acceptable agreement by any party protracted negotiations can be carried out as means of maintaining contact and to induce the opponent towards an agreement at one point.

Early phase of talks between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Apartheid regime could be cited as an example. The importance of the East-West negotiation on Berlin in the early 1960s was viewed in this genre. On the Vienna talks with Nikita Khrushchev in 1961. John F Kennedy observed "(N)o new aims were stated in private that have not been stated in public on either side. The gap between us was not, in such a short period, materially reduced, but at least the channels of communication were opened more fully".

Under what conditions do parties in the conflict who pledge to fight to the end opt for negotiations to reach a compromise settlement? Generally this will happen under three conditions: under external pressure; under internal pressure; and in a situation where sustained military confrontation is not possible due to different reasons. In some cases, parties agrees to negotiate with their opponents under the influence of external factors. It may be direct or indirect. External agents who influence contending parties to come to the negotiation table vary from world powers, neighbouring states and regional organizations to international donor agencies and financial institutions. The change of Soviet strategy in early 1989 and termination of the supply of Soviet arms influenced FMLN in El Salvador to agree to a negotiated settlement. El Salvador is not an isolated example.

one point to negotiate when their external patrons made it clear that they were ready to cut off military assistance if they did not negotiate. During the election in October 1994 in Mozambique Afonso Dhalakama and his RENAMO threatened to pull out of the peace agreement but under the pressure of South Africa and Zimbabwe they adhered to the commitment to the accord. The states who are highly dependent on foreign aid and loans are more susceptible to the pressure of international donor agencies who generally include negotiated settlement as part of the conditionality to aid packages: in many cases, however, states find some means to evade it.

Internal pressure for warring parties to reach an agreement can come from different quarters - business community, professional bodies, peace lobbies, various interest groups and general public (widows/mothers' fronts etc.) Their impact can be more diverse and diffused but important. In South Africa the role played by such groups, especially the professional bodies, in creating a congenial condition for a peace process is very significant. The Track-Two Political Dialogue and the activities the Northern Ireland Center in Brussels, grass-root initiatives taken by Corrymeala Center and the activities of the Londonderry Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland can be cited further.

However, the more important factor that contributes to the entry into negotiations is the feeling and understanding of their inability to continue fighting any more due to various reasons. The continuous military pressure compel them to agree to peace initiatives. In Zimbabwe Bishop Abel Muzorewa agreed to a negotiated settlement in the face of losing the war in 1979. Parties agree to peace talks to reach an agreement not really because they love peace and reconciliation, but because developments in the military front and other conditions compel them to stop fighting. Like conflict dynamics, peace itself generates its own dynamism; once peace and normaly is really established it is difficult to reverse the process.

If a party is very adamant and not ready to consider to move from their positions even an inch how could that party be induced to reach a negotiated agreement? In this situation, according to Holsti, one "must somehow make the other realize that any agreement or settlement is preferable to the status quo of incompatible positions or nonagreement or, conversely, that the consequences of nonagreement are more unfavourable to (them) than the consequences of agreement". Military pressure plays a very important role in this situation. Parties do not explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement until their military alternatives are in doubt. As long as the LTTE is certain that it is possible to achieve its goal by military means why should they come to negotiations.?

The strategy of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga after 1994 to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, namely, pursuing military maneuvers against the LTTE while advocating a negotiated settlement and peace talks, needs to be explained within this strategic contour even though some unfriendly critics try to ridicule it as 'war for peace'.

Sri Lankan government's some what lukewarm response to the LTTE offer of cease-fires should be explained in this vein. Except in the Cambodia Peace Settlement, in all other cases, namely Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Nicaragua, no cease-fire was in place before the agreement and fighting continued while the parties negotiated. If a cease-fire is not a part of a general strategic plan, it would "dampen the sense of urgency surrounding the situation and provide the warring parties with an opportunity to regroup and resupply troops in anticipation of further combat."

The purpose of negotiation is to find a common ground in order to reach an agreement by changing each others positions through bargaining. It can be a long and laborious process. At the start all the parties begin negotiations presenting their maximum demands. Before commencing the bargaining all the parties should have a clear idea about each others unconditional, minimum (bottom-line) positions and some realistic assessment of how far their adversary would be willing to pull back.

This range may be changed with the progress of the bargaining process. There is no clearly spelt out and accepted formula for negotiations. Strategies and processes adopted in negotiation are different from one to the other. The form and the process of negotiation is decided by a number of factors: scale and intensity of fighting; issue areas of the conflict; the character of the actors; the geo-political context of the conflict; and external involvement. In general, four elements are involved with the process of successful negotiations. They are:

a. Set out the stances and to establish the commitment to these principles and positions;

b. Identify areas where concessions can be made to the other party;

c. Presentation of threats and rewards;

d. Convince one's endurance to the other party.

First of all it is necessary to establish certain principles and points fundamental to your position. For example, the stand that division of Sri Lanka into the two sovereign units like the Czech and the Slovak Republics will not be tolerated and any political settlement should be within the united Sri Lanka is a fundamental position of Sri Lankan Government. When the LTTE suspects that the government is not deeply committed to its bargaining position they will be inclined to ask more concessions.

Therefore, it is necessary to convince the LTTE why the position cannot be compromised beyond a certain point. Once the fundamental minimum positions are defined it is necessary to present your data and information to argue your position and illustrate the rationality of your position.

In order to identify areas where the granting of concessions is possible we need to have hierarchical order of issues involved with the conflict. In 1940 during the negotiations between the Soviet foreign minister Molotov and his German counter part Ribbentrof, the key concern of the Soviet Union is the Balkans. The Soviets knew quite well the Nazi invasion of Soviet Union is imminent after sending the Wehrmacht into Romania and Finland.

Since all other issues in the east and orient were secondary to the Balkan issue for the Soviet, they were willing to grant any concessions to Nazis to divert their attention from the Balkans. To Molotov, Issac Deutscher writes, "one Balkan bird in the hand was worth all the oriental birds in all the bushes of the British empire."

Presentation of threats and granting of rewards are a very important part of negotiations. Promise of reward is an inducement that offers some future advantage in return for agreement or for abandoning certain territorial demand. The guarantee of a specific place in the interim arrangement or assurance of a preeminent position and power for a specific period in the post-conflict political arrangement for rejection of violence and force may be viewed within the frame work of reward. At the same time, such a guarantee will reduce the fear of the consequences of settlement.

The promise to withdraw criminal charges, especially murder charges against the leadership, internally or abroad for more tangible positive reciprocal move is another example for the ploy of reward in the bargaining. Threat is the opposite of reward and there is, sometimes, an unity in opposites.

If you do not comply to the demand X we will initiate action Y to harm you is the essence of the ploy of threat in bargaining. The range of ploy of threat may vary from economic embargoes, boycotts, direct military actions to break off negotiations and requesting external military help.

The effectiveness of the threat depends on the capacity to execute it and its credibility. You need to have a realistic assessment of weapons of threat at your disposal. In the bargaining you are compelled to do calculated gambles.

When a party shows any hurry and it wants an agreement quickly the other party definitely exploits this impatience to derive more concessions. It is worth mention here that the Soviet and the Western negotiators met over 400 times before they reached an agreement on the status of Austria after the Second World War.

Generally, parties in conflict do not go to the negotiating table with full trust and confidence with each other. Further, they may enter into negotiations with dimentrically different perceptions about the conflict and vision of peace. The enemy perception of 'the other' changes very slowly. Therefore, every move is viewed with suspicion and fear by each other. In this situation mutually acceptable external involvement can help to reduce these fears by setting the negotiation table, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the settlement.

The role played by Britain in conflict in Zimbabwe is a positive example for an interested third party pushing negotiation ahead to a successful outcome. The success of the external involvement depends on commitment of the international community, stamina of the external powers and the fair-mindedness of dealings.

Civil society has a role to play. Articulated elements in civil society from all sides irrespective of ethnic divide who opposes extremes can facilitate the negotiations by combating totalistic rhetoric and creating a lobby for peace. Dialogue between different groups and access to information can play a vital role in changing the stereotype-type enemy image.

Nevertheless, it is also important to be conscious of the inherent limitations of civil society, especially in a contracted social and political space.

To sum up my argument I reiterate that negotiation is not a panacea; it is just a policy tool. Therefore, negotiation must be viewed as a part of a broader policy framework that should invariably be a multi-dimensional one with alternative options and different fallback positions.

On the part of Sri Lankan government, the ultimate objective of this multi-dimensional strategy is to create conditions for LTTE to lay down arms and agree upon a political settlement within a united Sri Lanka. The Strategic importance of negotiations should be understood within this broader policy framework.

Finally, may I spell out some of the practical elements which I consider to be fundamentally relevant in any negotiated approach to the solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. First, we need to have a confidence and determination that the conflict can be resolved and that can realistically be done through mutually acceptable negotiated settlement. It is not easy in view of the recalcitrant nature of the LTTE and the path would be a rugged one.

A multi-prong strategy to make LTTE abandoned the Eelam flank and accept a political arrangement within united Sri Lanka need to be pursued with a clear understanding of its intricacies. Rather simplistic view and casual approach to negotiations with the LTTE would be hazardous. At the same time, we need to get out from the psyche of fatalism and the feeling of powerlessness. The feeling that nothing can be done to change the situation is disastrous. Second, it is not possible to find a lasting solution if it is based on a complete victory or defeat of one party.

Reference to a negotiated settlement invariably implies to talk.

When and under what conditions the talks should be commenced need to be carefully decided and it is to be decided after considering a number of variables.

Third, in order to strike a realistically effective agreement we need to do it with the parties who matter. In the present situation it is not possible to have a negotiated settlement to the conflict without talking to the LTTE. The LTTE should not only be a party to the settlement but also to the implementation of the settlement. In a situation of ethnic crisis many ethno-political entrepreneurs, "self-aggrandizing politicians seeking to build constituencies for attaining political power, emerge from all sides and invest in and exploit ethnicity to ensure themselves a place in the political sun. These quarters may matter only in numbers in the parliamentary political calculations.

It is necessary to look beyond the heads of these ethno-political entrepreneurs who are interested in maintaining ethnic enclaves for their own advantage. A willingness to consider a broader structural change in the system of power and governance to ensure national integration is a key aspect of this approach; but it is something more than the accommodation of narrow ego-enteric interests of ethno-political entrepreneurs. Forth, in a situation where mutual suspicion and mistrust are so great between the conflicting parties, a third party involvement would be very helpful in bringing the parties to the negotiating table.

The role and functions of the third party mediators are found important in creating conditions for conflicting parties to meet, bargain and reach a settlement in a number of cases in recent times. Fifth, in the negotiations compromise and accommodation is necessary on the part of both sides.

It is not realistic to expect only an ex-parte compromises and accommodations.

Sixth, in a realistic and futuristic approach, the attention should not be on combat strategies adopted by the both sides in the past. Instead, the focus should be on the actual and perceived factors and conditions linked with the causes of the conflict. Seventh, it is very essential that peace negotiations should proceed on a graduated scale and it is not healthy to lump all the issues on the negotiating table at once.

As the talks are set in motion other parties and stakeholders could be brought into the negotiations whenever necessary. And eighth, very fundamental to a credible approach is the adoption of a practical non-partisan approach to the negotiations. In that manner a wider acceptability to the new approach could be forged to entrench the negotiated settlement through bi-partizan approach in the south.

I highlighted all these aspects to emphasize the need for a more sophisticated and serious approach to negotiations. For that it is essential to have a clear understanding about the possibilities and difficulties associated with negotiation and mediation in resolving the ethnic conflict.

A single wrong move in the negotiations can be more disastrous than that in the military front in the long run. Some tend to portray a very placid and over-optimistic view of negotiations.

It should be pointed out that settlements were successfully negotiated to civil wars in Cambodia, Liberia, Angola, and Rwanda in the period 1991-1994, but they all fell apart during the implementation phase. We should not forget that the negotiation path is more difficult than the war path.

Military outcomes are generally easier to predict because they are zero-sum; as negotiated settlements are multi-sum a high degree of uncertainty generates caution. However difficult it may be the sweating in peace is definitely better than the bleeding in war.

News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security
Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries |

Produced by Lake House
Copyright 2001 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager