FIRST FAILURE IN GENEVA :
TRAP, BLUNDER OR MODEL?
Dr Dayan Jayatilleka
However fraught Sri Lanka’s external relations are, they have yet to
hit the nadir that they did under President Jayewardene in the 1980s.
The first ever resolution on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka
adopted in Geneva by the Human Rights Commission was in March 1987,
while the first decision, which it ‘recalls’ in the resolution, was in
March 1984, as was reported in the Lanka Guardian at the time (Vol 9, No
23, April 1 1987, p18).
This episode, which in a lead story in the same journal three months
later was derided by its Editor as a “roasting”, has recently been
disinterred and touted as nothing less than a model of professional
diplomacy which should have been looked up to as a lodestar by Sri
Lanka’s representatives in Geneva May 2009.
A persistent attempt at a revisionist history of Sri Lanka’s
diplomacy posits our performance at the UN Human Rights Commission (the
predecessor of the Human Rights Council) in Geneva in the period
1984-1987, as the acme of professionalism. What the record shows is that
1987 is indeed a performance to be remembered, but not exactly as an
achievement, still less a model, but rather for the contrary reasons.
Political reality
A close, ten-point analysis of Geneva March 1987 in the Lanka
Guardian of April 1, 1987 (Vol 9, No 23, p.16) was presented in an
article billed on the magazine’s cover as ‘Human Rights: Examining the
Geneva Resolution’ and carrying the by-line Susantha Dias.
The opening paragraph of the ten point critique has startling
contemporaneity given the recent attempts at revisionism, shedding light
on spin-doctoring and myth-making. It reads:
“The thrust of official propaganda on the subject has been, that a
covert Indian attempt to gain acceptance at the CHR for an
Argentine–sponsored Resolution which was politically motivated and
blatantly one-sided and intended to blacken Sri Lanka’s name in an HR
context, was thwarted by SLG’s diplomacy, which brought about a watered
down Resolution accepted by consensus with SLG’s acquiescence. The
political reality seems somewhat different”.
Points three and four of the analysis help us nail down exactly when
it was that Sri Lanka was first placed ‘under probation’ in Geneva.
Sri Lankan situation
“The Resolution was set firmly within an HR framework for, in its
preamble the CHR claimed to be guided by universally accepted rules of
international humanitarian law, and in its operative section the CHR
called on SLG specifically to cooperate with the JCRC in disseminating
and promoting such law. The CHR has thus gone on record that there is an
adverse HR situation here which requires cognizance and comment, whilst
identifying the SLG specifically and alone as requiring to upgrade its
HR performance.”
“The Resolution is to be seen as the outcome of a three-year watching
brief which the CHR has maintained over the HR situation here, because
it recalls the CHR's decision of 1984 and notes the Reports of its
Special Rapporteur on torture and of its Working Group on enforced or
involuntary disappearances (both presumably in respect of the Sri Lankan
situation). That is to say, that the CHR now deems the situation to have
so deteriorated during that 'probationary period' as to warrant
inscription of a resolution.”
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Lakshman
Kadirgamar |
So what really happened in Geneva in 1987? Point 5 leaves no room for
doubt:
“The prospect initially facing SLG was acceptance by a majority of a
highly critical resolution damaging to SLG's in international standing.
The outcome claimed to represent a diplomatic victory, has been a
consensual resolution which, as will be spelled out below, is not only
critical of SLG's HR performance (vide paragraphs 3 and 4 above) but
undermines the foundation of SLG's position, that it is engaged in
fighting a terrorist threat to law and order. Moreover, the Resolution
as adopted implicitly recognises the validity of the Tamil claim that it
is engaged in resisting (even if violently) a diminution of its HRs and
fundamental freedoms. It is a moot point, whether or not it is
preferable to be called by some ‘a scoundrel’ whilst a few others
testify to your goodness, or be said by all to be 'a cad'.”
Points 6-8 of the forensic piece nail down the extent of the
strategic diplomatic defeat and the damage involved. “The Resolution
calls upon "all parties and groups", without identification or
distinction, to forswear violence and negotiate a peaceful settlement.
Inasmuch as there are only two parties to the internal conflict
situation under reference, SLG and the Tamil militants, this equates the
two in terms of responsibility for violence, and undermines the
'terrorism - law and order’ argument.”
International community
“It also calls on all parties and groups to pursue a negotiated
political solution "based on principles of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms". In as much as it is the State or Government (SLG)
which has the role and responsibility to uphold and apply HRs and
fundamental freedoms in respect of all its citizens, and the only other
combatant in the conflict situation is a militant armed section of the
Tamil community, the implication is inescapable that the conflict itself
is deemed by the CHR to constitute a diminution if not violation of HRs
and fundamental rights of Tamils.”
“The only comfort the SLG may draw from the Resolution is that the
CHR has called on the Tamil militants ALSO to desist from violence and
negotiate a peaceful settlement.”
In his conclusion, the analyst sums up the Resolution:
“(a) That the CHR has gone on the record, having watched the
situation for three years, that there is an adverse HR situation here
which warrants cognizance and comment by it. (b) that this situation
stems from an internal conflict between parties it equates in respect of
responsibility and (c) that the conflict lies within a context of
diminished or violated HR’s and fundamental freedoms which require to be
restored by a negotiated political solution.”
What is most devastating is the author’s evaluation, and as it turns
out, an accurate pessimistic prognostication of the consequences of the
professedly grand diplomatic outcome by Sri Lanka in Geneva ’87. He
argues that it sets the stage for subsequent action by India, opining
that:
“India could not have wished for a better preparation of the
diplomatic ground, as it were, in respect of any future initiative she
may contemplate on behalf of the Tamils. One must then ask: might it not
have been a clever diplomatic move by India to work for a toughly-worded
resolution, which could then, in bargaining, be exchanged for a milder
but consensual one, committing the entire international community in
support of her perception and approach?”
Foreign policy
Just a few months later that ‘future initiative’ turned out to be the
air-drop, the accord and the projection of Indian kinetic power onto Sri
Lanka’s soil, in the form of 70,000 troops. March ’87 in Geneva had
indeed prepared “the diplomatic ground”.
Mervyn de Silva in his lead article in the Lanka Guardian of June 15,
1987 (Vol10, No 4) entitled ‘Diplomatic Front: Sri Lanka’s Moment of
Truth’ wrote of the aftermath of the Indian airdrop: “Sri Lanka,
although the victim, suffered a near-total diplomatic isolation in the
international community, a stinging indictment of the UNP’s foreign
policy”.
Mervyn significantly concluded “As for the UN, it was no less a
person than the UNP’s first appointee to New York...who advised ...on
the futility of going to the Security Council, warning that it would
‘internationalise’ the issue--something we can ill afford, especially
after the roasting we got at the Human Rights Commission meeting in
Geneva three months ago”.
What is particularly lamentable is that such abject and myopic
diplomatic masochism is presented as something that would have had the
blessings of Lakshman Kadirgamar.
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