Book review:
Gota’s War and the quest for peace
Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, MP
C A Chandraprema’s book on the war against the LTTE is an immensely
interesting read. I had wondered how effective he would be as a writer
of a sustained narrative, for his columns, though informative, can
sometimes be turgid and repetitive. But his book combines a racy
narrative with convincing detail, and I think makes clear the immense
achievement of the government in dealing with the LTTE.
He also makes clear the reason for his title, and the importance of
Gota, as he calls him, being in the right place at the right time. There
were several innovations Gota introduced, which proved crucial, such as;
a) Ensuring the forces were well manned and well equipped
b) Providing leadership that developed and maintained confidence
c) Introducing innovative strategies and encouraging flexible tactics in
the field
d) Establishing mechanisms for cooperation and the sharing of
information
e) Streamlining procurement and preventing wastage and corruption
The last of these was particularly important, because the forces had
been demoralized previously by the corruption that had become endemic,
with officials responsible for procurement using companies run by their
families. Unfortunately Chandraprema does not always name names, but I
believe a schedule of arms dealers with relationships to government
officials, should be made public. The way in which Gota changed the
system was impressive, and I recall the tremendous surge of confidence
which officers at Diyatalawa, generally amongst the brightest in the
Army, evinced when it became clear that arms were being bought for the
soldiery, not the dealers and their chums in the forces.
Military strategy
I don’t think Chandraprema goes into this question adequately, which
is a pity both because of the difference it made to the war, and also
because it was a beacon of decency in an increasingly corrupt world. I
have long argued that we can hardly blame politicians and officials who
do what everyone else around them is doing, given the need for enormous
amounts of money that our present electoral and educational systems
entail. However, while praying for reform in those areas, we must also
register the enormity of financial probity where it occurs, and how in
this instance it contributed to efficacy as well as confidence.
With regard to the other areas indicated above, Chandraprema is quite
thorough. There may be inadequacies in his narrative with regard to the
past, as Lalin Fernando has indicated, and I too wondered about the
omission of General Hettiarachchi’s name in the discussion of the Long
Range Patrols, but what is vital is the account of how these forces were
used in the last few years, and that is both informative and
interesting.
The meat of the book is indeed the account of the conduct of the war
from the time Gota took over as Secretary of Defence, until the fall of
Kilinochchi. That section is superbly done, and also balances the
brilliance of the military strategy with the political and diplomatic
pitfalls that were skillfully avoided. However the description of the
final months, though it covers the basics, seems sketchy given the
controversies that surround the conduct of the army in that period. I
suppose this was not Chandraprema’s purpose, but given his sources of
information it would have been useful if he had gone into greater detail
with regard to the manner in which the forces held back because of
civilians.
Terrorist attacks
The concerns with regard to hospitals even while the LTTE was using
them to fire from, the positive responses to ICRC interventions as the
ICRC has described them according to Wikileaks, the care taken about
sending supplies in, would have contributed much to the narrative.
Unfortunately the scope of the book perhaps meant that the accounts
of battles and the taking of territory had to be impressionistic. This
had certainly worked in what I would describe as the second part of the
book, the description of the war from the time the terrorists took over,
which can be dated to July 1983. Though, as Lalin Fernando has noted,
there are some alternative interpretations as to details - and again, I
too wondered about the relative downplaying of the role of Denzil
Kobbekaduwa - on the whole the narrative gives us a fair picture of the
relentless downward slide, with the occasional successes promptly undone
by changing perspectives and strategies.
The ruthless use made by the LTTE of our willingness to negotiate is
very clearly and convincingly described, and the manner in which it also
used every opportunity available, some created by government, to destroy
other Tamil forces.
Chandraprema is also very thorough in his account of the political
problems that led to the rise of terrorism, and he does draw attention
to factors that are sometimes forgotten by those of us who register the
failure of the Sri Lankan politicians to abide by agreements they made.
He records the various pronouncements made by Tamil leaders who
indicated, rather as R Sambandan has done recently, that their final aim
would never alter, and that compromises were only intended to take
things forward a little way, with more to follow later. This naturally
creates diffidence in those who negotiate with them, and ultimately
contributes to bad faith on all sides.
But while I think Chandraprema is right to draw attention to these
difficulties, he does not do justice to the enormities which led to
violence being seen as the only answer to political difficulties. His
descriptions of the violence perpetrated against Tamils in 1977, in 1981
and again in 1983 are cursory, and give great weight to what he
describes as provocation. He pays no attention to the evidence that much
of the so-called spontaneous riots were carefully planned. And his
description of the murder of Tamil prisoners in jail, twice over, is
quite preposterous - ‘What this means is that the Sinhala criminals in
the prisons were more ‘disciplined’ than the armed forces of the time,
who vented their fury on ordinary Tamils following terrorist attacks
whereas the Sinhala prisoners carefully separated the ordinary Tamil
criminals and killed only the terrorist suspects!’
Humanitarian norms
I do not think this is fair on the Armed Forces, who were not I think
responsible for what happened in Colombo and other places in the South
in 1983, nor for the excesses of 1981, though some individuals may have
misbehaved, and were indeed dealt with in a few cases as Chandraprema
has recorded. But more serious is the failure to record that the
perpetration of violence by state forces was the turning point in giving
some sort of legitimacy to the terrorist movements. And even though I
believe we have behaved much better since then, and have provided no
excuse for terrorism since, we must register that the events of 1983
still continue to reverberate in the psyche of many Tamils. To continue
in a state of denial about those events then raises questions about our
arguments with regard to recent years, in which I believe we can show
conclusively that the state was acting in defence, and that violations
of legal and humanitarian norms was almost exclusively the preserve of
the terrorists.
I was saddened by this omission in Chandraprema’s book, because it
takes away from the otherwise generally coherent narrative he presents
of the origins of conflict and its expansion into a war against terror.
Gota’s achievement was to destroy terrorist forces in Sri Lanka, but
unless we engage in more inclusive and sensitive politics, the
vindictive forces in the diaspora will create further problems for us.
We will be letting down the forces who fought with such dedication and
such concern for Tamil civilians if we allow animosity to build up
again. |