Moving out of the maze
Dr. Dayan JAYATILLEKA
Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka
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The ubiquity of the Tiger flags was the most dramatic aspect of the
demonstrations in London during the President’s visit for the Queen’s
Diamond Jubilee. The Diaspora Tigers were not a result of a vacuum in
Sri Lanka’s post-war policies. Several times the recent number
demonstrated in 2009, blocking access to the Mother of Parliaments in
the last weeks of the war.
A slightly stylised version of the Tiger flag, hardly distinguishable
from the original and replete with Tiger, bayonets and 32 bullets, is
now waved - and waved away - as ‘the Tamil national flag’. If a
soi-disant ‘nation’ chooses the ‘brand’ of a terrorist-secessionist
movement for its flag and generates no criticism within the
communitarian political spectrum, that surely tells us a great deal
about the collective consciousness of that ‘nation’. Why isn’t there a
‘Not in Our Name’ petition doing the rounds in the Tamil community?
Back home, there is a deadlock but it can be overcome. The TNA
refuses to participate in the Parliamentary Select Committee unless
there is progress in its dialogue with the government. The main
Opposition party the UNP echoes the TNA and says that it does not intend
to participate in the PSC unless there is progress towards an
understanding between the TNA and the government. Why the ‘alternative
government’ would make its participation in the PSC through which it
could arrive at a consensus with the incumbent administration on the
parameters of a solution to the ethnic question, contingent upon the
position of the TNA, is a bit of a mystery. One might have thought that
the UNP would be pleased to play a bridging role rather than that of a
fellow traveller, but that does not seem to be the case at the moment.
Positive dialogue
In the meanwhile, while well-intentioned and influential foreign
friends urge the early holding of an election to the Northern Provincial
Council, some strident local voices call for the repeal of the
legislation which makes for that devolved body. More prudent centrists,
such as this writer, caution that it is as dangerous to dissolve the
Council as it is to devolve power in a strategically sensitive border
zone to a party which has yet to criticise the Tigers for its terrorism,
and whose acceptance of the existing constitutional provision for
devolution (the 13th amendment) as the framework of negotiations,
respect of the unitary character of the constitution and the state and
rejection of secessionism, are to say the least, questionable.
A further complicating factor in the current situation is the absence
of an unofficial honest broker. A backstage role of this nature was
being played but has since been forfeited by a negative vote cast at the
UNHRC in Geneva this March, when a pragmatic abstention would have done
the trick of sending a signal. Post-March 2012, in the collective psyche
of the majority of Sri Lankans, the profile of a neighbouring honest
broker has been replaced by memories of a patron and partisan of one
side of the ethnic equation, heavily influenced by sub-regional ethnic
lobbies and electoral compulsions as in the ‘MGR’ years.
In this context, the cordial and positive dialogue between the
President Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and His Holiness Pope Benedict holds
out some promise, given that the Church is the only institution on the
island that has a constituency which cuts across the ethno-regional
fault lines.
A cautionary note: Sri Lankan conservative opinion must not react
negatively to the use of the term ‘global’ in the communique, because in
the French language and European discourse, ‘global’ does not mean
worldwide or international, but simply ‘total’ and ‘comprehensive’ ( the
term for global as in worldwide or international is ‘mondial’).
All-Parties Conference
UNHRC session in Geneva. File photo |
There is a conspicuous irony in the stances that the TNA and UNP have
taken, and their accusation that it is the government that is solely
responsible for the delay in a negotiated settlement. When there was a
clear chance of reconfiguring the Sri Lankan state in a more liberal
direction and resolving the ethno-national question, during the
presentation by President Kumaratunga of a draft constitution in August
2000, R. Sampanthan reneged on a promise he had made to Lakshman
Kadirgamar and refused to support the legislation while Ranil
Wickremesinghe and his UNP burnt copies of the draft in the precincts of
the House itself.
At least one of Sampanthan’s militant Tamil critics is still more
responsible for derailing a possible solution. When in the early 1990s,
President Premadasa presided over the All-Parties Conference (APC), he
strove to overcome the deadlock on the merger by urging the EPRLF’s
Suresh Premachandran and the SLMC’s MHM Ashraff to agree upon a
mechanism that could resolve the dispute between the Tamils and Muslims
over the Eastern Province.
He reiterated this to them both, while seated together at the
ceremonial opening of the parliamentary sessions. “Leave the Sinhalese
to me, I can and will convince them”, said Premadasa. Premachandran and
Ashraff finally agreed upon a formula, but (as I witnessed with dismay)
literally minutes before it was to be announced at the All Parties
Conference, Premachandran pulled out of the deal.
That was two decades ago, and whatever their transgressions, Mahinda
and Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the JVP, JHU, Wimal Weerawansa and Gunadasa
Amarasekara had nothing to do with it.
It is that which caused the APC to fail, and be re-routed by
President Premadasa into the Parliamentary Select Committee headed by
Mangala Moonesinghe, who miraculously pulled off an agreement for
devolution/autonomy to which Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Dinesh
Gunawardene affixed their signatures. In constant touch with Moonesinghe,
I had been tasked by the President with backstage negotiations, some of
which took place at the ICES.
The Mangala Moonesinghe formula was rejected (with a solitary
exception) by the Tamil leaders who are grouped today in the TNA and
complain that Mahinda Rajapaksa is wholly and solely responsible for the
stagnation in the search for a negotiated settlement of the ethnic
question.
Suresh Premachandran was being true to form. When Ministers P
Chidambaram and Natwar Singh came up with the December 19th proposals in
1986, it was not the Sri Lankan government that shot them down. It was
the Tamil parties based in India which spurned the proposals when
presented by Chief Minister MG Ramachandran.
Two years later, in late 1988, the EPRLF declared that the powers
devolved were inadequate, even before it had assumed office in the North
East Provincial Council and tested out that proposition. After and
despite a decade of comradeship and shared risk-taking, Premachandran
had denounced me with no little menace as a ‘Sinhala chauvinist’ simply
because I had called for either a referendum on the merger or a
re-demarcation of the merged North-East province, in a full-page
interview given to Kendall Hopman of the Sunday Times in November 1988
and followed it up at a press conference at the GCSU.
In 1990 that Council which had been set-up under the 13th amendment,
made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, with tens of thousands of
foreign troops on the soil of the area.
Who is to say that a future Council which is similarly committed to
going beyond the 13th amendment will not do likewise, only this time
with foreign troops being invited in by the rebellious Council? Why
would any responsible state take that risk?
How then to resolve this complex conundrum? Fortunately there exists
a legal and constitutional pathway: that of an interim administration.
An interim administration comprising of all parliamentary parties
currently representing the relevant (Northern) area, appointed in
proportion to their parliamentary strengths relevant to that area, may
be a provisional solution; a stop-gap measure. Any secessionist
temptation would be blunted by the presence of the constituent members
of more mainstream national blocs/coalitions.
The entire arrangement would be reminiscent of the executive
Committee system under the Donoughmore Constitution, which made for
cross-ethnic consensus and constructive politics.
What is the alternative? There is of course the option of permanent
polemics and accusations, a cycle of demands and rejections. Each side
may think that time is on its side and that the risk of delay is
affordable but they may both be wrong. A downslide to a dead-end would
be distressing but it could get worse, fast. |