The Man Who Destroyed Eelam- part 3:
Decline of Prabhakaran and Eelam dream
Continued
from yesterday
The from-the-very-beginning futile exercise
took its toll on three of the four LTTE delegates. Balasingham, the
“chief negotiator” was gravely ill and had to remain in Europe along
with Adele for his prolonged treatment. Karuna Amman (Vinayagamoorthy
Muralitharan), Prabakaran’s commander in the East, was being wooed by
peacemakers to part ways with his leader. Meanwhile, the global war on
terrorism was increasingly being read as the global war on Islamic
terror, which meant the international community was too preoccupied to
bother about non- Islamic outfits like the LTTE.
How then did an insurgency, that seized legitimate political
grievances as a foundation for terrorism and sustained martyrdom by
quasi-religious zealotry, fail in its objective?
Food for fight: Snacking at one of his safe houses in Jaffna |
From being credited as the world’s most successful and ruthless
terrorist to losing nearly all of 15,000 sq. kms of territory in two
years requires some doing. Both Prabhakaran and the government of Sri
Lanka have had their turns grabbing and then losing territory.
The Descent
In July 2001, marking the anniversary of Black July of 1983,
Prabhakaran staged stunning attacks on the Sri Lankan Air Force base and
the Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo, wiping out half the
country’s civil aviation fleet, in addition to a few military aircraft.
With Sri Lanka’s army in a deadlock, the navy restrained and the air
fleet neutralized, the success of this attack, once again, placed
Prabhakaran at the upper end of the plank that Colombo and he had been
see-sawing upon for two decades.
Barely two months later, the planes that brought the twin towers
crashing down in New York on September 9, laid the ground for the
emergence of a new world order where the world was divided into the good
guys rooting for a global war on terrorism and the bad guys who attacked
governments in pursuit of their evil goals. The seed was thus sown for
Prabhakaran’s decline and the slow destruction of Eelam. He was
beginning to get undone by an event thousands of miles away and over
which he had no control.
Powerful trio: Prabakaran, Adele and Anton Balasingham in
Mullaitivu |
It was not that Prabhakaran did not attempt to adapt to the new world
order. To shift the spotlight away from himself, he declared a
ceasefire, came out of hiding, without his moustache and his falling
hair dyed brilliantly black, sued for peace under Norwegian facilitation
and announced his first press conference in a dozen years. His many
websites removed all material that would be deemed offensive (virtual
training camps where one could learn to forge a passport or make a bomb,
for example) in the new environment, and wore safari suits to mould
himself in the image of Nelson Mandela, the statesman he was quoting
profusely on his sites and in his conversations.
His first and only international press conference (April 2002) at his
administrative headquarters in Killinochchi was a disaster. His
experience with the media, confined to a few one-on-one interviews with
select journalists, had not prepared him for this. He seemed bewildered
and clearly out of his depth facing a mixed pack of journalists whose
two-day uncomfortable wait was alleviated only by the non-stop screening
of LTTE propaganda videos. His image makeover, as a clean-shaven,
safari-suited statesman, failed to impress anyone. Announcing his idea
of peace involving the Norwegians as peacemakers, he first fumbled and
then chose the safer option of avoiding all questions - mostly related
to the murder of Rajiv Gandhi and his own demand for a separate state -
and passed on the microphone to his interpreter Balasingham. Balasingham
declared that his leader was the President and Prime Minister of Tamil
Eelam and that he and Mr Prabhakaran were the “same’’ and that he was
the LTTE leader’s “voice.” This set the tone for what was to follow.
Civil control: Cadres at their check post controlling
civilian movement in Kilinochchi |
After six rounds of talks for peace between September 2002 to March
2003, across four countries, Prabhakaran was back to what he had
perfected over the years since the Thimpu talks in 1985 - stonewall,
provoke and renege on an agreement and fully lay the blame for the
breakdown of talks on the other party.
The from-the-very-beginning futile exercise took its toll on three of
the four LTTE delegates. Balasingham, the “chief negotiator” was gravely
ill and had to remain in Europe along with Adele for his prolonged
treatment. Karuna Amman (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), Prabakaran’s
commander in the East, was being wooed by peacemakers to part ways with
his leader. Meanwhile, the global war on terrorism was increasingly
being read as the global war on Islamic terror, which meant the
international community was too preoccupied to bother about non- Islamic
outfits like the LTTE.
The CFA (Ceasefire Agreement) went into cold limbo. Skirmishes broke
out and violations of the agreement accumulated. The Scandinavian
countries comprising the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission recorded 3,830
violations by the LTTE against 351 by the Government of Sri Lanka
between 20 February 2002 and 30 April 2007.
In March 2004, Prabhakaran tried averting the crisis he saw coming
his way by summoning Karuna to Jaffna on an official pretext. Karuna had
learnt his lessons from the Mahathaya experience. He ignored the summons
and split the seemingly monolithic outfit, taking with him a big chunk
of the battle-hardened fighters he had trained. With the East in
turmoil, Prabhakaran saw his Eelam beginning to shrink. Months later,
the tsunami further breached the LTTE’s wall of impregnability, damaging
its bases along the northeastern coast.
Killing time: Cadre with a deck of cards |
Chandrika Kumaratunga, then heading the government after having
survived a suicide bomber attack, quickly learnt from Prabhakaran’s
successful diplomatic offensives. She dispatched her Tamil Foreign
Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, to world capitals on a mission to get the
international community to act against the LTTE’s interests in their
respective countries. Kadirgamar was beginning to notch up diplomatic
successes, having got the United Kingdom to proscribe the group in 2001.
He was killed by a LTTE sniper in August 2005 just when he seemed on the
verge of getting some more countries to proscribe the group.
And when the elections came the following year (2005), Prabhakaran
compounded his earlier mistakes. He ensured - by forbidding Tamils to
cast their vote - the victory of somebody who, he believed, was yet
another politician even more infirm of purpose than his predecessors and
therefore of immense value to his plans, little realising that he would
finally be meeting his nemesis in the Rajapaksa administration. Peace is
inimical to Prabhakaran’s existence. The new government started office,
as all new governments in Colombo were wont to do, with a call for
peace. After one round of ceasefire talks in 2006, Prabhakaran was back
to business. His woes of the three previous years in his new avatar of
‘statesman politician’ were proving to him that he just was not cut out
to be a man of peace.
In his 2006 November annual speech, after his attempts to assassinate
the Chief of the Army and the Secretary of Defence in Colombo, he rued,
“We postponed our plan to advance our freedom struggle twice to give
even more chances to the peace efforts, once when the tsunami disaster
struck and again when President Rajapaksa was elected.”
He set out to reassert his authority over the East - and faced an
army that was well-armed and well-trained and motivated as never before
and one that was working with unprecedented intelligence provided by his
breakaway commander, Karuna. Prabhakaran lost the East - and from there
on, he lorded over an unending series of military defeats.
From among the many reasons being attributed to his incredulously
rapid downfall, the one that would without any trouble resonate with
those who have dealt with Prabhakaran would be his sense of supreme
self-importance. He is seen as a megalomaniac who hijacked the
legitimate grievances of the Tamils to gratify his vision of himself and
failed to see that the switch from guerilla band to conventional army
would be disastrous.
For the sanguinary among us - the chief reason for his downfall was
the failure of his legendary Black Tiger suicide bombers and his
celebrated Intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.
For someone who pioneered the use - and masterminded remarkable
innovations - of suicide bombers, Prabhakaran’s Black Tigers seemed to
have reached a dead-end. President Chandrika Kumaratunga was the first
miracle of the Eelam war - as the first ever survivor of a Black Tiger
attack, at an election rally in December 1999.
Then came the failures in 2006 that cost him everything - General
Sarath Fonseka, Commander of the Sri Lanka Army became the second
survivor of a suicide attack in April. Prabhakaran’s trusted tool of
political persuasion, the Black Tiger, was beginning to let him down.
And when Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of the Defence and the
brother of the President escaped a suicide attack in December, it was
curtains for Prabhakaran. The last two failures led to his destruction.
Clearly, Prabhakaran was facing a short supply of efficient Black
Tigers. He was desperate enough to use recruits whose mental aptitude
didn’t match their ferocious commitment. A woman bomber sent to kill the
Tamil Cabinet Minister, Douglas Devananda, in his Colombo office in
November 2007, triggered her bra bomb when she discovered her target was
not available for the day, killing herself and the Minister’s secretary.
Meeting his match
The other factor that led to his precipitous defeat is that
Prabhakaran did not count on the troika (the President, the Army Chief
and the Defence Secretary) calling his bluff. His elaborate deceptions
of invincibility had begun cracking - first, with the exit of Karuna and
then by the steady inroads that the specially trained units of the Sri
Lankan Army’s commandos were making. The chronic political one-upmanship
in Colombo over the Eelam war between the two national parties - the UNP
and the SLFP - which had contributed largely to the growth of the LTTE
and the prolongation of the war, was contained by the Rajapaksa
administration. The Rajapaksa brothers pulled out a page from the Bush
counter-terrorism doctrine - niceties be damned.
With international assistance - material and moral - for the war on
terror pouring in from China, Pakistan and the US, the defence budget
was increased dramatically; state of the art equipment procured, and
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency training enhanced. By mid-2006,
Canada and the European Union joined the growing list of countries
proscribing the LTTE. This clogged Prabhakaran’s supply lines and fund
collection and contributed to diminishing his ability to fight back the
surge of a newly professionalised force. In the Rajapaksa brothers,
Prabhakaran finally met with an enemy as ruthless and unswervingly
committed in their goal as he.
As he presides over the destruction of his dream, Prabhakaran must
already be plotting his next move even as he plans his escape from the
ever-shrinking space he is left with to hide in. Staying alive, going
back to the basics and brushing up on Sun Tzu. His financially
formidable supporters among the Diaspora will be told that it is only
territory that has been lost and as long as they are behind him he will
deliver unto them the dream he has been promising them. Until then,
Eelam will, like Khalistan, continue to live on in the virtual world.
His long-term objective, however, will be to foil every effort made
by Colombo to redress Tamil grievances and also ensure that he, and only
he, remains the sole leader of the Tamils. No moderate Tamil leader or
group will be allowed to take his place. Any attempt to nurture a new
leadership will be foiled by assassinations and acts of terror - just as
he had, in the mid-80s, done the biggest disservice to the Tamil cause
by systematically wiping out the leaders of the other militant Tamil
groups that existed and decimating their organisations in a move to
emerge as the sole representative of the Tamil cause. Elections will be
prevented by violence. Prabhakaran will patiently wait for complacency
on Colombo’s part and any ensuing security lapses to stage devastating
acts of terror. In essence, he will start all over again and could
potentially claw his way back if allowed to.
The key to ensuring that Prabhakaran goes down the same road and
fades away as Idi Amin did lies in the sincerity, determination and
tenacity of the Rajapaksa government (and every other that follows it).
Rolling back every discriminatory law and practice against the Tamils
and guaranteeing them equal rights and opportunities would need to be
its first priority. Ignoring the Tamil Diaspora, however much it may
rankle, would not be beneficial for Colombo. Colombo only has to
remember that the rise and dominance of Prabhakaran was largely
dependent on Colombo’s policies and attitudes.
As an immediate goal, [the ghost of] Prabhakaran will be counting on
the few Black Tigers lurking in Colombo to blow up at least one of the
troika. This would give him a respite, however brief, and save him from
biting into the vial he sometimes carries around his neck.
And should he be forced to feed on the cyanide, it would mean the
absolute destruction of his fantasy and the organisation he has so
brutally cultivated around himself. His death would splinter the group,
leaving his surviving lieutenants scrambling for the throne and the vast
financial empire Prabhakaran has industriously built across three score
countries.
His son and heir apparent, Charles Anthony, is not considered a
serious contender for the top job.
In this hour of unprecedented defeat, the bluster and the belief in
his personal immortality will not have dimmed. I wonder if Prabhakaran’s
handshake has changed.
For an answer to that, over to the friendly Arakan rebel in Myanmar
or the sympathetic politician in Europe, whose extended hand welcomes
Prabhakaran ashore as he searches for a sanctuary. In all likelihood,
Prabhakaran - with all his chips down-would impress his saviour with a
firm, masculine shake of the hand.
The author is a former photo-journalist, currently teaching media and
international relations at NTU, Singapore. |