Inconvenient questions answered
Col R HARIHARAN
In the last few weeks I have received a number of questions from
readers for which there are no simple answers. I have tried to answer
some of these inconvenient questions, although my answers may not
satisfy all.
Q: You have been writing only about the war situation, in
utter disregard to the humanitarian crisis. And your analysis is also
based upon Sri Lanka defence sources' reports. Don't you think it would
mislead the readers?
A: There are three issues involved in my writing:
Col. R. Hariharan |
* I am basically a military analyst. I am commenting upon the
military performance of the two sides. And war is not a cricket match.
It is basically an inhuman exercise. It is a fight by the two sides to
eliminate each other and survive. And I have commented upon the inhuman
nature of war and its humanitarian implications in many of my articles.
But as I am not a human rights analyst - many experts in that field are
doing excellent work - my comments on humanitarian issues are included
in my analysis as relevant in forecasting the developing military
trends. But I also believe war can be still prosecuted more humanely; so
I am against small arms proliferation brought about by insurgency and
war as well the use of inhumane and dangerous weapons. I had devoted an
entire article on the subject of small arms proliferation and
insurgency. Similarly, I had also condemned the reported use of cluster
ammunition.
* Sri Lanka Security Forces have been providing detailed and regular
battlefield reports and most of the analysts have been using them with
caution, particularly regarding the number of casualties. On the other
hand, the LTTE had been giving reports in bits and pieces with no
logical coherence - perhaps due to problems of communication after the
destruction of its infrastructure including TV broadcasting facility
were destroyed during the war. And the LTTE has not regularly reported
on the fall of its defences creating doubts about its selective
reporting. In war, possession is three fourths of law and the Security
Forces achievements are there for all, including the LTTE, to see. There
is no point in not recognizing the reality that the Security Forces have
performed better than LTTE. So the question of misleading the readers
does not arise.
* Lastly, as far as possible I am avoiding what other commentators
are writing in their own expertise on political, sociological and
economic issues related to war. So I have been confining largely to my
area of specialisation - intelligence analysis and assessment. So there
will be limitations in content on issues not directly related to the
overall assessment. As this war is being commented upon with inadequate
independent sources of battlefield information, commenting upon every
incident is not possible.
Q: From your writing you appear to be against a ceasefire that
would provide relief to the trapped civilians. Even the UK and Canada
have called for it. Please explain.
A: Ceasefire in war is not a purely military issue. It is a
political issue also; in the case of Sri Lanka, there is a strong
international element also. So, although ceasefire is not wholly in my
domain let me attempt to answer the question from the point of view of a
military man.
I am not against a ceasefire. But to expect a ceasefire to come into
force when one side is routed and the other side is winning in a hot war
is not realistic. This applies to any war. I believe in writing on what
is possible. And my writing on Sri Lanka is no exception.
Even if theoretically, the Government agrees to a ceasefire it will
not be able to survive the political upheaval that is likely to follow.
Moreover, if a ceasefire comes into force, the LTTE would be the gainer,
not the Government. The LTTE would survive to carry on the fight as
before another day. So for Sri Lanka to seriously consider ceasefire as
an option instead of war, there has to be an incentive - say a LTTE
promise to denounce armed conflict to gain Eelam. Protagonists of
ceasefire call should take their own call seriously and work on how to
achieve a ceasefire; mere sloganeering would not do. And they should
work on both the warring sides to get results and not focus on the
Government only.
Yes, the well-meaning souls in power in the UK and Canada have called
for an immediate ceasefire. Although I don't doubt their humanitarian
intentions, it sounds a little hollow as there is suspicion their eyes
might be on the Tamil expatriate votes while making the call. So, if
they are to be taken seriously they can come with some concrete
suggestions on how Sri Lanka can go about doing it without a loss of
face. One suggestion is that they can offer a sanctuary to all the LTTE
militants on their soil to start with.
And for a lasting ceasefire, the question "what after the ceasefire?"
also needs to be examined in advance. That was one of the reasons for
the failure of the ceasefire of 2002 to hold. Ceasefire has to be linked
to a political process. I don't see any such move in the horizon in Sri
Lanka or elsewhere.
Q: "Prabhakaran is a clever military strategist. So even if
the LTTE is defeated now, he would rise up once again and vanquish the
Sinhala Army". Your comments please.
A: There is no doubt that Prabhakaran has a natural talent for
military strategy. But progressing a war is a dynamic process and one
cannot be victorious at all times. In the present Eelam War IV, he has
been outwitted, outgunned, and out-strategised. And that has hurt the
LTTE grievously. It will take a long time for the LTTE to recoup from
the war wounds. That process requires safe havens, funds, arms, and a
lot of loyal supporters who would forgive LTTE's failure and be ready to
sacrifice the lives of the next generation of Tamils. So even though he
might still be capable, Prabhakaran has to run the gauntlet of issues I
have raised to rebuild the LTTE literally from the ashes. At the age of
52, it will be an ordeal of fire for Prabhakaran to do so. But now his
immediate priority is to survive the war that has not ended yet.
In this context, I am reminded of the life of Mustafa Barzani
(1903-1979), the legendary political and military leader of Kurdish
revolution. He fought both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments to carve
out an independent Kurdish nation all his adult life. Although a
short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was created in Iran in 1945, it
lasted only a year. He went into exile in Soviet Union after the
Iranians overran the Republic. He did not give up; he revived the
Kurdish struggle and negotiated peace with Iraq but ultimately all
failed because Iran and Iraq bartered away Kurdish autonomy to suit
their mutual rapprochement efforts. He died in exile in Washington. And
an independent Kurdistan never came into being; it exists as a province
in Iraq with a measure of autonomy thanks to the support of the US.
(Courtesy: transcurrents.com)
(The writer is retired Military Intelligence
specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the
Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with
the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.)
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