Confronting false dichotomies

Terrorist front organisation phenomenon is not a Sri Lankan problem alone. It remains a fundamental problem that all nations big and small, developed and developing, rich and poor, militarily powerful and weak, in all corners of the world have to confront, if we are to succeed in what is referred to as “the fight against terrorism”.

Contemporary counterterrorism efforts as an instrument for attaining peace, have been described as a global ‘public good’. It is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, and its benefits reach across borders, generations and population groups and once accomplished, the whole of humanity benefits.

It is for this reason that for the purpose of this discussion, I posit the issue of the need to take action against terrorist front organisations, as a public good.

The ‘front organisation phenomenon’

Not only are these front organisations a problem as they serve terrorists and contributes to the mayhem they create, they also effectively exploit the generosity and decency of civic-minded people in your countries. Additionally, they undermine your financial systems, particularly at a time when it already is in deep crisis.

It is widely known that what sustains terrorist organizations the world over is money, and that while freezing terrorist funds have proved to be an effective means of disrupting terrorist activity, following the money has enabled investigators to uncover previously unknown links between terrorist operatives and even to thwart such activity.

Fund channelling

A major channel for its supply are the respective Diaspora, who may be mobilized through ‘front organizations’ that take many forms - religious, cultural, humanitarian, women, youth, students and sports.

Front organisations by their very definition, are entities set up and controlled by another organisation, but which espouse the objectives/policies of their parent body. The advantage front organisations have is that they can act for the parent group, without the actions being attributed to the parent group.

In the political sphere, such front organizations can increase the legitimacy of the causes they represent, neutralizing the stigma that might be attached to already discredited organizations which espouse the same cause.

Until recent times, it is mostly charities and non-profit organisations that were regarded as playing this role.

However, in more recent times, following the advances in ICT and banking technologies in a globalized world, we have witnessed companies, media outlets, religious centres and even educational institutions serving as front organisations for terrorists.

It is in the above context that front organizations become a valuable vehicle through which terrorist groups could continue their activities, inspite of proscriptions and serious limitations imposed upon them, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11.

Confronting terrorist front organizations

While charity remains a value of paramount importance to donors and recipients alike, illicit actors have amply demonstrated that the charitable sector is vulnerable to abuse.

Devising policies that protect charities from abuse, even as they promote charitable giving, remains a major challenge.

There are a number of modalities that have been operationalized which provides for dealing with the problem of charities and other bodies serving as front organizations, that contribute towards the perpetuation of terrorism.

These include -the UN’s Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1373, the US Executive Order 13224 and sections of the UK’s Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006. While conscious of the work being done by the EU, through the UN and also within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the OECD, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, I am not aware of any commensurate specific collective measures operationalized by the EU, that sufficiently address the specific phenomenon of terrorist front organizations, with the efficacy this ‘moving target’ demands.

Counter-terrorism

This seems unfortunate for an institution that has been considerably pro-active in counter-terrorism and since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1999 has adopted numerous measures to develop the European criminal law-enforcement area, along with agencies such as Eurojust, Europol and SitCen.

Within months after 9/11, the EU adopted Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (which lays down the criteria for listing persons, groups or entities involved in terrorist acts and identifies the actions that constitute terrorist acts) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (which provides for freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic resources belonging to the persons, groups and entities concerned).

On June 22, 2002, the EU adopted framework decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism. On November 24, 2005, Council decision 14781/1/05 spelt out an EU strategy “for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism” and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy unveiled on November 30, 2005 lists as key priority initiatives “to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally” while continuing to “support the efforts of Member States to disrupt terrorists by encouraging the exchange of information and intelligence between them.”

As part of its Action Plan to combat terrorism, the EU has also taken measures to improve cooperation among the intelligence services, national authorities and emergency services of member states to adequately assess terrorist threats.

More recently, on July 17, 2008 the EU proposed a revised strategy on terrorist financing, and on November 27, 2008 through 15139/08 and 8807/08 the European Council adopted a framework decision amending framework decision 2002/475/JHA, to extend the offense of ‘terrorism’ to include three new offenses in EU legislation: Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence (including dissemination of terrorism propaganda through internet), recruitment for terrorism, and Training for terrorism.

To be continued