Why high fuel prices may be good
by Spectator
At an academic and specialist level there is a considerable body of
literature and views that makes the general case for high domestic taxes
on fuel as being in the public interest. There are two strands to the
argument.
First, unbridled fuel usage has a damaging effect on the environment.
It is self evident that usage from fuel guzzling motor cars, power
stations, buildings, appliances is much more when energy taxes and
prices are low than high.
Indeed it is an everyday experience, especially in countries where
fuel prices are low, to witness fuel wasteful bumper to bumper traffic
at rush hours, and for pedestrians to walk through pervasive, unhealthy
gusts of vehicular smoke on the roads made even more hazardous by
congested motor traffic. The worst affected from these features of
everyday life are the least affluent in society.
There is little dispute that high taxes (and high prices) of fuel by
deterring consumption of fuel would improve the quality of life of the
population in so far as it reduces traffic congestion, air pollution and
making the roads safer. High taxes (and retail prices) provide more than
such “negative” benefits, valuable as they are, to improve the life
style particularly of the poorest.
Innovation
They encourage technological innovation in the development of
alternative fuel efficient inexpensive substitutes including those based
on renewable resources e.g. fuel efficient motor vehicles, wood burning
stoves, wind power.
None of these can take-off profitably without incentives. The
incentive would be provided by low taxes on alternative fuels and high
taxes on oil.
The second strand springs from the fact that fuel consumption is so
large in most countries that for any given tax levied on fuel the
revenue collected is huge. It constitutes an important component of
government revenue. Moreover it is easy to collect.
For example, in major industrial countries (United States, Canada,
Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom) fuel tax revenues averaged
470 billion dollars (470,000 million dollars) a year from 2002-2006.
Moreover the tax as a percentage of c.i.f. oil prices between 2003 and
2007 was higher than 100 per cent in most if not all the Western
European countries. In 2003 the tax as a percentage of c.i.f. oil prices
was Japan 118 per cent, France 229 per cent, Germany 213 per cent, Italy
226 per cent, United Kingdom 326 per cent.
Subsequently, world market prices of oil rose every year until 2007.
However, domestic taxes in all these countries remained above 100 per
cent in every year except Japan (from 2004) and Germany ( in 2007). For
2007, when c.i.f. prices had risen significantly, the tax rate was 62
per cent in Japan, France 124 per cent, Germany 97 per cent, Italy 122
per cent and United Kingdom 201 per cent.
Although tax rates fell with high oil prices, the overall tax revenue
did not fall simultaneously as lower tax rates were based on rapidly
increasing oil prices. Likewise for tax revenue when oil prices were low
and tax rates high.
Fuel tax rates
The fuel tax rates in other Western European countries are similar to
those mentioned above. In the United States fuel tax rates are much
lower than in Europe, about 30 per cent-55 per cent of the c.i.f. prices
in the 2003-2007 period.
However, there has been a vigorous public policy debate on the need
to raise fuel taxes and prices. The arguments advanced include: to
reduce global warming, to develop alternative fuels, to spur fuel
thrifty hybrid cars, to prompt consumer demand for more fuel efficient
vehicles, to depress imports from politically unstable countries, and to
reduce the huge budget deficit of the US Government.
Some have even gone to the extent of advocating a wartime special
fuel tax to pay for the cost of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. What
is evident from the figures in developed countries is that when oil
prices are low the tax rate rises because government’s wish to maintain
revenue, and vice versa always with a revenue target in view.
If any of the above mentioned governments had a maximum oil price tax
rate, total revenue from oil taxes of governments would be low when oil
prices are low and high when oil prices are high assuming the maximum
tax rate is imposed throughout.
The size of fuel tax revenues suggests that governments do not look
at taxation of fuel in isolation, or what the limits of fuel tax rates
should be in the public interest. Taxes are imposed in a broader context
of revenue collection in order to achieve the economic, military and
other objectives of governments.
Public interest
Most governments of oil importing countries view public interest of
the distribution of oil tax revenue in a national context, rather than
in terms of the interests of oil consumers. Indeed, fuel taxes are
generally central to improve the revenue and spending balance sheets of
governments.
Without relative stability of revenues from fuel taxes something
would have to give, in other words reducing expenditures of Governments
in the social sectors, the military or other areas of government
expenditure.
Of course, if revenue from fuel taxes fall because of tax rate
ceilings and declining oil prices, governments have the option of
keeping expenditures unchanged, and raising other taxes or indulging in
greater deficit financing. Both of these options have economic
consequences affecting the public interest.
In some countries, revenues from fuel taxes are ring-fenced for
specific purposes. In Switzerland, revenues from fuel taxes can be used
primarily to improve transportation. In several other countries, there
are differential tax rates for different uses of fuel and for different
types of fuel. Retail oil prices for industry and agriculture are
generally much less than for motor cars.
All increases, reductions, ceilings of tax rates, including on fuel,
are political acts in the sense that there are always gainers and
losers, either directly or indirectly, from tax changes and limits. For
example when c.i.f. fuel prices fall fast, governments could pass on
all, or a proportion, of the fall in fuel prices to the consumers. That
is widely followed to a greater or lesser extent in developed countries.
A free market approach is to pass oil price falls to all consumers
without discrimination. It goes without saying that some consumers
benefit more than others. For example, the monetary benefit of across
the board lower fuel prices is far greater for the individual motor car
owner than the bus traveller.
Should governments offset the loss in oil tax revenue because of
reductions in retail prices (say following declines in world market
prices and fuel tax ceilings) by cutting subsidies and other government
expenditure on public transport, such transport may deteriorate to the
detriment of the bus traveller.
On the other hand, an interventionist or managed option when oil
prices fall fast, is for governments to maintain retail prices, and
allocate the unexpected windfall profit (over and above budgeted
profits) with or without a special fund in a targeted manner.
This sum could then be used transparently to fund alternative energy
sources than imported oil, improve public transport and transportation
in general, or give reduced retail prices only for the functioning of
special categories such as three-wheel vehicles and public buses. Or,
for example, the windfall profit could be used to reduce the budget
deficit and thereby reduce inflation. |