Human Rights in Sri Lanka:
The true picture
Rajiva WIJESINHA
Since Sri Lanka is to be subject in a few weeks to the Universal
Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, it has been
the subject of a spate of attacks by many organisations with interests
in this subject.
Though many of them repeat the same points, with more or less
exaggeration and unwarranted generalization, it is sadly necessary to
respond in detail to as many of them as possible.
This paper will address the issues put forward by the Sri Lanka
Democracy Forum. Sadly its confrontational approach, beginning in the
very first paragraph with a sectarian characterization of the current
government that insinuates it is not concerned about all Sri Lankan
citizens, suggests that its assertions should be treated with care.
The second paragraph asserts that, following the abrogation of the
Ceasefire and the subsequent pulling out of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission, there has been a marked increase in the terrorizing of Tamil
and Muslim communities.
This smacks of wishful thinking, in a context in which repeated
terrorist attacks have led to the deaths of dozens of Sinhalese
civilians, though in at least one case a Tamil schoolboy was killed
along with his Sinhalese mates when they were victims of a suicide
bomber at a railway station.
Though the Government has continued with its struggle against terror,
civilian casualties have been minimal, as was the case during its
campaign to liberate the Eastern Province from terrorists.
The reports of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission makes it clear that,
except in the case of one incident, and another single individual, there
were no civilian casualties at all during military operations.
The massive publicity given to that one incident, which occurred
after firing based on mortar locating radar, makes it clear that any
civilian casualties would be highlighted. The relative paucity of such
media campaigns, despite the ongoing struggle in the North, makes clear
the caution exercised by the military with regard to all Sri Lankan
civilians, whether Muslim or Tamil or Sinhala.
SLDF goes on to criticize the LTTE in its third paragraph but then
claims that historically ‘the state has failed to protect the minorities
from armed non-state forces such as the LTTE and the Karuna faction’.
In such a context SLDF, if it is sincere in its criticism of the LTTE,
should be glad that at last Sri Lanka has a government which is willing
to take on the LTTE, and ensure that the terrorism SLDF attacks is
crushed.
Credit
At the same time no credit is given for the manner in which the
Karuna faction, consisting of many individuals brutalized from childhood
by LTTE practices, have now been brought into the political mainstream
and are participating in electoral politics, something the LTTE always
eschewed.
Reclaiming former terrorists is not easy, but the task is now
proceeding much more smoothly, with Karuna himself being in Britain
whilst leadership has passed to a younger generation which may be more
easily brought into a pluralistic process.
In this context it is also preposterous that SLDF does not accept
that the government, in expediting immediate political reforms, has made
clear that it agrees with SLDF about a political solution to the problem
of the minorities. This, as SLDF recommends, has been attempted through
significant changes to the current system of extreme centralization of
power.
SLDF has in parallel pronouncements blindly followed the assertions
of parties supportive of the LTTE and its claim to be the sole
representatives of the Tamil people, that the APRC proposals are
inadequate and an imposition by the President.
The fact that 13 of the 14 parties participating in the APRC signed
the proposals, and that all Tamil and Muslim parties freely engaging in
democratic politics have supported these, evidently means nothing to an
organisation that claims to be a forum for democracy.
Arguments regarding the positive nature of these proposals are
available elsewhere, but meanwhile it is absurd that the SLDF does not
realize that these proposals will ensure the ‘substantial devolution of
power to the regions’ that it advocates, and that such power will be
available to areas in the North and East, that have not had elected
representatives exercising any powers in those provinces for several
years.
With regard to the SLDF concern about ‘significant power sharing at
the centre, which would empower minorities at not just the regional
level but also at the national level’, this is a general concern, but it
should be noted that, while other minority parties were willing to
engage in discussions about a second chamber based on regions, the TNA,
the surrogate of the LTTE, declared that such discussions were
meaningless except in terms of a final settlement with regard to
devolution - which, going on past history, means an interim LTTE
authoritarian administration.
Not affected
Though abuses in this area occur, SLDF notes the difficult
circumstances under which the government operates, beginning with ‘the
assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by the LTTE’.
Shortcomings are not targeted specifically at minorities except in
terms of information that must be acted upon in the context of
terrorism, as to which precautionary measures are essential if the
population at large is not to suffer.
The incidents to which SLDF draws attention in Para 9 confirm the
determination of the government to operate according to the law in
enforcing security. In the first incident, a search operation was
conducted with regard to Tamils from other parts of the country who had
no reason for being in Colombo.
Thousands of Tamils ordinarily resident in Colombo were not affected,
nor were hundreds who could explain the rationale for being in the city
though they were ordinarily resident elsewhere.
However, expelling several of the rest, as done by some of the
security personnel involved in the search operations, was wrong and was
condemned as such by the Supreme Court, leading to prompt remedial
action.
With regard to the incident in December 2007, the term detention is
inappropriate for questioning in which most were released on the very
day.
Again it was those who could not establish the rationale for their
presence who were actually detained, and most of these were released
within a few days. Though the action might seem harsh, it must be seen
in the context of bombs that had exploded and information received about
the infiltration of the city by several suicide bombers.
Responsibility
The ultimate responsibility of a Government must be to all its
citizens. Given a Supreme Court that has often found against the
government, it may be assumed that generally the government does not
violate fundamental rights, and that is will stand corrected when any
agent does.
The situation is a far cry from the days of impunity that
characterized the 1980s, when in the very few instances when the Court
ruled against the state the police officers concerned were promptly
promoted.
In this section SLDF reproduces a number of canards that have been
falsified by independent monitors such as those of the United Nations.
Certainly much displacement occurred during military operations in the
East during 2006/2007, but this was because the forces gave good notice
which led to virtually no casualties.
Unlike in similar situations all over the world, resettlement was
prompt after the East had been cleared of the LTTE, and this was
certified as such by the UNHCR report - ‘Our staff monitoring the
situation on the ground say the majority of people are eager to return
home, the returns are voluntary and in line with international
protection standards .... UNHCR will continue to monitor the returns and
report directly to the government on any problems regarding the
voluntariness and any deviation from the civilian characteristics of the
move’. (p 32).
Though several persons (though just about half the figure alleged)
are still displaced, this is because a few areas still need to be
cleared of the landmines laid by the LTTE. Only with regard to the
Sampur Security Zone are alternatives required, and this is for just
10,000 persons, as opposed to the original assumptions. Alternatives
within the same district have already been found.
SLDF is right to focus on the Muslims ‘“ethnically cleansed” from the
Northern Province in 1990 by the LTTE’.
The failure of successive Governments to address this issue is a
disgrace, and also testifies to the enormous influence of the LTTE,
which for many years presented itself as the only organization with whom
governments had to negotiate, thus forestalling firm action in this
regard.
The current Government is determined to remedy the situation, and
though many areas are still risky for return, it is hoped that soon
these displaced persons will be restored safely, if they wish it, to
their places of origin.
Propagates
SLDF again propagates the LTTE myth that the closure of the A9
southward from Jaffna is a horrendous act of the government. That had to
be closed because the LTTE, disguised as civilians, launched attacks on
troop forward lines, in gross violation of the Ceasefire. No government
can permit such risks to be repeated.
However, despite attacks on shipping by the LTTE (including on a
vessel carrying SLMM monitors), and a refusal to provide guarantees to
the ICRC so that food ships could proceed safely (as SLDF reports), the
government has ensured steady supplies to Jaffna.
The last report of the UNHCR on Jaffna Welfare Centres testifies that
most items, and all essentials, are not only available but also
affordable.
Another canard relates to free movement southward. Earlier the LTTE
had tried to suggest that the government was restricting this, but in
fact it was the LTTE that had refused earlier to give guarantees to keep
the checkpoint open all week.
Though as SLDF notes the LTTE has tried to prevent civilians ‘from
fleeing areas where there are military attacks, with the aim of using
them as human shields’, it is apparent that now the LTTE’s reign of
terror is ending, and that the people of areas still under LTTE control
are asserting themselves more and more, albeit only gradually.
SLDF begins by noting the problems in this respect caused by the
LTTE, but after half a paragraph about these it has seven and a half
that are critical of the government. Certainly prosecutions in Sri Lanka
are slow, but this is a problem, if not a fault, derived from the system
of justice that it has inherited from the British.
Without making odious comparisons, we must realize that slowness in
what is often considered a model of justice, and what seems comparative
impunity, as in the Abu Ghraib cases, are part and parcel of a system
that insists on particular procedures and high standards of proof before
conviction.
Sri Lanka also has problems of capacity and technical skill, as have
been pointed out by a Scotland Yard review that was commissioned by the
government with regard to a particularly worrying case, that of the MP
Mr Raviraj. In that case the Yard commended what the police had done
with what was available.
It should be noted that, in this case, identified suspects, though
initially thought to be associated with a political party in government,
have fled to territory controlled by the LTTE.
To make up for worries with regard to several well-publicized cases,
the government has instituted a Special Commission of Inquiry, with
observation by an Independent International Group of Eminent Persons.
Though some of the prestige attached to this group has been vitiated
by the procedures adopted by their representatives on the ground, who
made no secret once of wanting to issue a report in time for the
meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the system adopted
showed that the government appreciated the difficulties and the lack of
confidence that could result, and was attempting to make up for these.
It should be noted that amongst the cases to be considered are the
assassination of the former Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, who
was bitterly opposed by the LTTE. No one could be more anxious than the
government to bring the culprits to book in this instance, but the
failure to solve the case has to be endured.
Comments on the cultural insensitivity etc of the police are
understandable given that, though applications have always been called
from all citizens of the country, for various reasons, including
diffidence caused by previous language policies, very few Tamils have
joined in the recent past.
More recently, there have been fears amongst Tamils, given the
terrorist approach that Tamils serving in security forces were
specifically to be targets of attack, being denigrated as traitors.
Reason
Precisely for this reason, the Government has begun a practice that
successive governments in the past did not think of, which is
recruitment specifically of Tamils. The first batch of these, dedicated
to service in the predominantly Tamil speaking Eastern Province, passed
out last month, and recruitment of several more is planned. Concerted
efforts in language teaching have also commenced, at all levels of all
the security forces.
The assertion of SLDF that authoritarianism is on the rise suggests
complete ignorance of the current situation as well as of the sufferings
of the past. First and foremost, the country has independent courts
which have not hesitated to give verdicts against the government, in
particular with regard to human rights applications.
With regard to the national Human Rights Council, efforts of the
opposition to make a political issue of the Constitutional Council, the
full membership of which had not been recommended as required by the
Speaker until very recently, have led to international assistance not
being forthcoming to strengthen it as requested, despite a UNDP
Stocktaking Report affirming the need for this.
The failure of Civil Society members to attend meetings of the
advisory committee set up by the Ministry of Disaster Management and
Human Rights confirms what government has begun to worry about, that
concerns are expressed more to obtain publicity than with a genuine will
to correct things.
Clearly the government will have to proceed with reforms on its own,
but this it has now planned to do, with a revitalization of advisory
institutions, in particular regional ones, through strengthened civil
military liaison in key areas.
The categorical assertions regarding engagement with international
actors also seem self-contradictory. The continuing stress on Sir John
Holmes’ comments on the country being a dangerous place for aid workers
ignores his acknowledgment that that comment was an isolated remark, and
also that it was based on a single incident which needs further inquiry.
He has failed to respond still to the point that the agency concerned
had not acted according to UN principles in unnecessarily exposing local
employees to a dangerous situation without the safeguards expected, at a
time when all other agencies were evacuating staff.
Criticism of the government in this respect is based on the response
of a single Minister which the government made clear did not represent
the government position.
However, until very recently, when employees of the UN make untoward
remarks that do not represent the UN position, no apologies or
corrections have been offered. This situation has now changed, with a
new set of senior UN officials in place, which will help to avoid the
impression of association with oppositional forces that previously
characterized some individuals.
The issue of child soldiers is vital, but SLDF has also fallen into
the trap, first perpetrated by the LTTE, of equating the LTTE abuse of
children with that of the Karuna faction.
It is clear from detailed reports that this was systemic in the LTTE.
Naturally the Karuna faction, which broke away from the LTTE, still has
individuals who see nothing wrong with the practice, particularly in the
context of the LTTE having begun to re-recruit all those disbanded by
the faction soon after it split from the LTTE in 2004.
However, with a change of leadership in the Karuna faction, which has
shown itself anxious to enter the democratic process, it is hoped that
old habits will die and the Eastern Province at least will be cleaned of
this scourge.
The main problem however requires more concerted action, and the
tolerance displayed by the international community, not only to defiant
violation of norms but continuing forced conscription, must stop
forthwith, without hiding behind a cloak of balance.
The idea that freedom of expression is threatened in Sri Lanka is
ridiculous, when international agencies actually provide funding to an
online paper that talks about Sri Lanka as ‘a country at war and
democracy that’s hostage to the whim and fancy of a President and his
coterie of murderous brutes’.
Censorship
The amount of criticism of the state and its organs that is contained
in print and electronic media would astonish anyone who had to live
through the massive censorship and controls of the eighties.
There is however danger for Tamil language journalists, in particular
in Jaffna, which is a legacy of the internecine warfare between the LTTE
and former militants, whom it ruthlessly eliminated at the beginning of
the Ceasefire period.
The government is committed to stopping this phenomenon, but this has
not been easy in the context of continuing action by the LTTE.
Certainly there are problems in Sri Lanka and the government welcomes
assistance to overcome these, through training of relevant personnel,
through the development of local institutions and in particular regional
branches of these, through assistance with better maintenance of
records.
But most useful of all would be assistance to destroy the scourge of
terrorism and of forced conscription.
That would allow for relaxation of restrictions that have proved
essential in the face of enormous and ruthless terrorist power.
Certainly no government facing such power has as good a record as the
Sri Lankan government and its armed forces, and the failure to
appreciate the great regard shown for civilians, as compared with what
occurs in conflicts elsewhere, it most regrettable.
The writer is Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating the
Peace Process |