A race to woo the undecided voter

by V.S. Sambandan

Midway into the Sri Lankan election campaign, the focus of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is on wooing the uncommitted Sinhalese voter.

As a poll-weary country weighs its choices, the personalities of the two main Presidential candidates, the perceptions surrounding them, and the precedents set by them are factors that can tilt the scales on November 17.

The waning of federalism from the conflict-resolution discourse, the electoral outbidding by the two main candidates through promises of economic populism and the potential of parties to stir passions do not augur well for a healthy debate on how the country should be run for the next six years.

Winning over the uncommitted Sinhalese voter is critical given the island's ethnic mix. In the divided polity, the majority Sinhalese (76.59 per cent) are split nearly equally in their loyalties between Rajapakse's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Wickremesinghe's United National Party (UNP). A large majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils (10.96 per cent), Muslims (9.18 per cent), and Tamils of Indian origin (1.16 per cent) are disenchanted with Rajapakse's alliance partners.

The candidates, hence, would have to go the extra mile to win the uncommitted Sinhalese voter to reach the required 50 per cent of the valid votes to win the election. With no visible swing yet in favour of either candidate, the campaign currently lacks the lustre that should surround the most vital democratic exercise for any nation - directly electing a constitutionally powerful Executive President.

The reasons for poll-weariness are obvious. To start with, the November 17 exercise would be the sixth island-wide election in six years. The December 1999 Presidential poll and the Parliamentary polls held in 2000, 2001, and 2004 and the Provincial Council elections of 2004 saw every possible issue debated from every conceivable angle.

The scepticism of the electorate about the promises made by the two major contestants is best understood against this backdrop. Two factors seem set to dictate the electoral prospects- economic conditions and prospects of lasting peace.

Of these, popular concerns over economic conditions have engaged the greater attention of the voters. It is not so much that peace is no longer on the agenda of the voter, but in terms of priority, it appears to have slid a notch below compelling economic issues.

That the manifestos of the two main candidates devote extensive space to economic issues makes it even more evident. This, however, does not mean that expectations of lasting peace and concerns over violence are not far behind.

The dominating theme of the Wickremesinghe campaign has not yet struck a chord among the Sinhalese majority electorate, based on the assumption that "peace has arrived." The character of the alliances struck by Rajapakse and Wickremesinghe also engages the minds of the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils and Muslims.

While the uncommitted minority vote has moved away from Rajapakse, he has not yet fully consolidated the non-partisan Sinhalese vote. It is here that the electoral swing becomes critical. With a nearly equally divided committed bloc of Sinhalese voters for the SLFP and the UNP, the key for past Presidential victors was their ability to win over minorities and sway the floating Sinhalese votes with a winnable election plank.

For instance, the late Ranasinghe Premadasa's twin promises of "expelling the Indian interventionists" and "talking peace to the Tigers," and Chandrika Kumaratunga's peace package of "devolution and constitutional reforms."

In the absence of a swing, the November 2005 Presidential election is all about the three P - Personality, Perception, and Precedent. On all three counts Rajapakse and Wickremesinghe are as different as chalk and cheese.

The Prime Minister carefully maintains the image of a people's person. He dresses traditionally, with a flowing red sash around his neck, reflecting his left-of-centre political ideology, and portrays himself as apey Mahinda (Our Mahinda) of the majority Sinhalese.

Wickremesinghe is dressed in slacks, quite often wears a designer jacket, and also talks directly to small groups of the electorate along the campaign trail. He is seen as one who is "friendlier with the Tigers and wants to do business with them" a negative when it comes to the uncommitted Sinhalese voter.

Rajapakse comes across as one who plays the nationalist tune to consolidate the Sinhalese vote - a negative among the uncommitted minorities. In terms of the precedents set by the two, Wickremesinghe is credited with "stopping the war" - a definite positive across the island and signing the ceasefire agreement, a move that evokes strongly mixed emotions, particularly whenever the LTTE strikes in Colombo.

Rajapakse has little to show on conflict-resolution and economic policy. An even more significant precedent is that no President has won without the support of the ethnic minorities - at least significant sections of them.

Even in 1999, when President Kumaratunga lost most of the Sri Lankan Tamil vote, she had the support of the two other key minority parties - the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the Ceylon Workers' Congress, both of whom are now aligned with Wickremesinghe.

As the poll pendulum of an emotional electorate sways, the major determinant would be the manner in which the two extremes of Sri Lanka's polity - the LTTE and the JVP assert their positions. Much of the undecided Sinhalese vote would be swung by incidents or pronouncements that trigger an emotional passion that is absent for now.

(The Hindu)