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Emerging security architecture in South Asia
THE impact of the changed international environment after the Cold War is not quickly apparent in South Asia at first glance and one gets the impression that same old perceptions accompanied by the earlier security architecture are continuing in South Asia in the post-Cold War phase too.
However, careful analysis of the emerging trends along with changing priorities in the defence thinking during the last decade in South Asia does not fail to reveal that South Asian security architecture, its regional security environment and defence thinking of the security community are slowly but steadily changing. At the regional structural level, South Asia is gradually moving from the earlier asymmetrical bi-polar conflict formation to a new configuration based on uni-polar hegemony of India. The climate of external environment of the South Asian regional security is now determined by a new set of variables linked to changed global security agenda. In this context, continuing crisis in Afghanistan, the US-led international alliance against cross-border terrorism becomes more important to set the parameters of South Asian external security environment. The challenges to power and legitimacy of the state internally and security implications of the political mobilization of ethnicity and religion have a considerable impact on the defence thinking and convinced the political leaderships and security communities in South Asia the importance of taking into account non-state units and non-military sectors into security analysis. The antagonism between India and Pakistan constituted the main element of the regional power relations in South Asia during the Cold War. The strategic rivalry between the two main protagonists entered into the post-cold war phase too. After 1998, the nuclear explosions and subsequent formal declaration of the acquisition of nuclear weapons added another dimension to the rivalry of the main protagonist of South Asia. India and Pakistan were born into an environment marked by mutual antagonism and locked into a multiple-level conflict relationship as to the dispute over territory, balance of power, threat perceptions, mutual accusation of interference in each other's domestic affairs, rival foreign policy approaches, etc. However, fundamental to the conflict between the two states is the contradictory ideologies upon which the two states are based. From very outset, the ideological rationale of the Pakistan state has been homeland for Muslims in the Indian sub-continent. Based on avowed secularism, the founders of the Indian state asserted multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic state based on a federal constitution to maintain unity of India's diverse social patchwork of collective identities. The organizational ideology of the state of Pakistan is antithetical to Indian state which provides ethnic and religious groups in India of formula for dismemberment. From the perspective of Pakistan, the organizing ideology of the Indian state is a rationale to reunite the subcontinent. In the words of Barry Buzan, "(T) his constitutional tension provided fertile ground for securitization of national identities on both sides, and governments found it convenient to cultivate threat perceptions of the other for their own domestic political purposes". The other issues relating to the conflict relationship provided the opportunity to surface the antagonism. The conflict relationship between the two states led to three wars in 1947/48, 1965 and 1971. The dismemberment of Pakistan aftermath of the 1971 war decisively tipped political balance in favour of India as it undermined the rationale and founding idea of the Pakistan state-the two nation theory. After 1971 there were numerous skirmishes, bringing the two states to the brink of war in 1984,1987, 1990 and 1999. The complex Jammu and Kashmir issue was the casus belli between India and Pakistan: it continues to be the same in the post-cold war phase too. India maintains that the accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 by the Maharaja was 'final and irrevocable'. Pakistan continues to present Kashmir as an unfinished business of Partition and insists that it should be resolved in accordance with the UN resolution to have a plebiscite to grant Kashmiris the option of choosing between India and Pakistan. India adamantly opposes any third party intervention over the Kashmir issues while Pakistan is eager to internationalize the issue. India's position in this regard is loud and clear: any third party involvement in this issue will be regarded as a move against its national interests. After signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972, the ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control dividing Indian and Pakistani Kashmirs but the issue of Siachen glacier remained unresolved. India claims that the Saltaro range is on its zone of Kashmir but Pakistan refuses to accept it claiming that it was seized by India prior to signing of the Simla Agreement. India moved its forces into the areas in 1984. Since then, the Siachen remains the highest battleground on the earth where frequent skirmishes between India and Pakistan are reported. In the post Cold War context there was no immediate fundamental change in the Indo-Pakistan conflict relationship which has now become a socially constructed phenomenon in the both countries. However, time after time the scenarios of the Indo-Pakistan conflict relationship constantly change from hostile rhetoric and border skirmishes such as the Kargil border war in 1999 to the high-level talks and de-escalation of tension such as one took place under the Gujral Doctrine in 1997 and also under the Vajpayee administration. One element conspicuous in the post-Cold War phase is the competitive attempt to acquire missile capabilities and other forms of delivery capabilities. India's first test of surface-to-surface missile (SSM) was reported in 1988. In the 1990s indigenously developed missile systems were added to its armoury which included the short-range SSM Prithvi, the medium range SSM Agni and a submarine-launched cruise missile SLCM Sagarika. In response, with Chinese assistance Pakistan developed short-range and medium-ranged SSM Ghauri in addition to the Chinese built M-11 SSMs which it had already. The formal declaration of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan after 1998 did not substantially change the strategic environment in South Asia. It was only the crossing the Rubicon as they had this capability for a quite long time. The attempt on the part of the two main powers in South Asia to use the superpower links in line with the regional bi-polarity has enmeshed their external relations with the global power relations during the Cold War period. Changing external environment There were ups and downs in Pakistan's relationship with the United States; but Pakistan wanted to be the staunch US alley in South Asia. Being conscious of the implications of the arms race between India and Pakistan, however, the US was more constrained in her relations with Pakistan. In addition to her association with the US, Pakistan maintained a strategic relationship with China. China used its Pakistan link to check India. Pakistan's Chinese link is particularly significant as it got the missile technology from China. In response to the Pakistan-China-US axis, India formalized its military - strategic relationship with the Soviet Union in 1971 by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Even though the external relations of the two main powers of South Asia got securitization in the context of the Cold War they must be understood in terms of regional security dynamics. As far as extra-regional relations are concerned China is the main Asian power who got involved with South Asian security. However, China entered into the South Asian security framework in the face of inter-regional compulsions and not in the context of the Cold War. The annexation of Tibet by China in the early 1950s brought China into the doorstep of India. Even after the annexation of Tibet, the Indo-China bai bai phase continued some time but the relations deteriorated with the ripening of mutual threat perceptions. The unsettled nature of the border between the two countries resulted in war in 1962 and another crisis situation in 1987. The end of Cold War did not have any substantial impact on the Chinese relations in South Asia in general and in Pakistan in particular. It continues to adopt the strategy of supporting Pakistan to maintain bi-polar conflict formation in South Asia. "This was a realistic strategy which meant that to the extent that India could distract by Pakistan's challenge, it would be diverted from making trouble for China. China continued to back Pakistan's attempt India's achievements in nuclear and missile technology, and India continued to cite the threat from China, more than Pakistan, as the justification for its nuclear and missile programmes". However, the future of this strategic relationship is somewhat uncertain. In the face of the internal instability of Pakistan, the Islamization of its domestic politic and spillover of the 'zone of chaos' of Afghanistan into the Pakistani soil, there is a strong possibility for China to scale down its strategic alliance with Pakistan. The emerging Sino-Indian rapprochement is visible with the mutual high level visits between India and China in addition to the moves taken at the direction of de-militarizing the border. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India lost its superpower strategic partner who provided her with necessary diplomatic support in relation to the Kashmir issue at international fora including the UN and also military hardware. In view of the messy state of affairs prevailing in post-Soviet Russia, it is not possible, at lest for time being, for India to count on for diplomatic and military support on Russia as in the case during the days of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, India and Russia are in the process of cementing their relationship concentrating on continued arms supply to India from Russia. On the other hand, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan Pakistan lost its earlier significance as a frontline state to the Americans the strains beneath the US- Pakistan relationship surfaced. (To be continued) |
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