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The LTTE's ISGA proposal and the peace process - part 2:

The demand for a `new, innovative structure' for the North-East

by Prof. Gamini Keerawella

(Continued from June 12)

Minister G.L. Peiris was reported to have stated that 'the government was in consultation with the opposition members to secure the two-thirds majority in Parliament required for the amendments to become law'.

LTTE women cadres - a claim to “equal partnership”

The peace talks did not take place in May despite Minister G.L. Peiris' assurances. The UNF government was under high pressure to deliver goods as promised. But the LTTE was not keen to commence the peace negotiations.

The situation began to change after Minister Milinda Moragoda had discussions with Anton Balasingham in London on July 27, 2002. This was the first direct meeting between a Minster of the Sri Lankan Government and the Chief LTTE negotiator, Anton Balasingham.

At this pre-talk discussion held at the Norwegian Ambassadorial residence in London the question of an interim administration was discussed for the first time in addition to the issues regarding the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and preparation of direct talks in Thailand.

Once again the Minister Milinda Moragoda and Anton Balasingham met in Oslo on August 14. This was a continuation of the first meeting and the parties decided to commence formal talks in Thailand between September 22 and 27.

A day after the announcement of dates for peace talks, BBC world Edition reported: Asked by journalists how the government had convinced the Tamil Tigers it could actually implement any political solution, Prof. G. L. Peiris said "I told you we will change the constitution so we will do it and show them that we can do it. That is the best way of proving that one can do it'.

Those who anticipated that the LTTE would demand an interim administration at the first round of peace talks held in Sattahip, Thailand were taken by surprise when the LTTE agreed to establish a Joint Task Force for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities.

Instead of raising the issue of interim administration, at the talks the parties expressed 'their willingness to work together towards the establishment of a provisional administrative structure for the North and East'.

According to the agreement at the first session, at the second round of peace talks held in Thailand during the period from 31 October to November 3, parties took steps to establish a Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN).

In October 2002, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka struck down the two constitutional amendments initiated by the UNF government.

The court declared that the conscience clause of the 19th Amendment is unconstitutional and the provisions for reducing powers of the President relating to the dissolution of Parliament needs two-thirds majority in the Parliament and approved by the people in a national referendum. After the Supreme Court judgement the environment of the peace talks began to change.

The changed atmosphere was reflected when the LTTE announced its decision to withdraw from the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization after the 4th round of talks held in Thailand from January 6 - 9, 2003.

The 5th and 6th rounds of talks held in Berlin and Hakone respectively did not make any new initiatives and the talks appeared to have bogged down over the issue of HSZ. Meantime, the SLMM made a proposal for preventing incidents between the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and the LTTE at sea where it proposed to 'recognize the LTTE Sea tigers as a de factor naval unit', to demarcate areas at sea for 'live firing exercise' by Sea Tigers and 'neither SLN nor the LTTE Sea Tigers will conduct offensive or aggressive operations and movements at sea'.

The SLN strongly rejected the SLMM proposal. On April 21st, Anton Balasingham informed the Prime Minister of the decision of the LTTE to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. He further stated that the LTTE leadership has decided not to participate in the international donor conference to be held in Japan in June.

It is true that immediately behind the LTTE withdrawal was the exclusion of LTTE from the preparatory aid conference in Washington.

However, in addition to the exclusion from the Washington conference, Balasingham mentioned continuous suffering and hardships experienced by IDPs and deprivation and marginalization of Tamils in the macro economic policies and strategies of the government as reasons for the LTTE withdrawal.

In this letter he did not make any reference to interim administration. The Washington aid conference was more in the nature of a seminar and the LTTE decision was really a calculated move taken after a thorough strategic analysis on its part.

It became evident to the LTTE that international involvement in the process, especially in the international donor confab, would result in creating conditions and obligations to the LTTE too. Still they were not ready for it.

Hence, the LTTE wanted to avoid conveniently any situation that compels it to be a signatory/party to an international declaration that emphasizes and endorses 'effective promotion and protection of human rights of all people, norms against the recruitment of child soldiers, the recognition of diversity in the East and parallel process towards a final political settlement'.

At the same time, the LTTE capitalized on the situation to achieve international recognition by creating conditions for international actors to come and beg the LTTE to participate in the Tokyo aid conference.

The LTTE strategy worked well. Subsequent to the LTTE decision, many internationally reputed diplomats went to the Wanni jungles and waited in the queue to meet the LTTE hierarchy to urge them to attend the conference.

The demand for an 'interim administrative structure with adequate powers to undertake North-East re-construction and development activities' was brought to focus by Pirabakaran once again on May 15, 2003 when he met Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson when he went to the Wanni jungles to persuade the LTTE to attend the Tokyo aid confab.

With no time the UNF governments responded to the LTTE demand by proposing a North East Development and Reconstruction Council.

The Government response was spelt out in three separate documents - a Draft Agreement, an informal paper on 'Elements of a strengthened and Expanded Mechanism for Development of North and East' and a letter suggesting the use of locally elected bodies as a basis for development activities.

In his letter dated May 21, 2003, Balasingham flatly rejected the UNF government's proposals and urged the Prime Minister to respond to the LTTE proposal for an interim administration and urged 'to establish a new innovative structure for the reconstruction and development in the North and East.

Nevertheless, he kept the issue open and stated: "A positive and constructive response from the Prime Minister setting out his ideas and proposals in clear and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to take a crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks and participation at the donor conference in Japan'.

Being so impatient about getting LTTE participation in the Tokyo donor confab, the UNF government presented another set of proposals on May 27, 2003, in response to the LTTE request for 'the establishment of a new innovative structure'.

In this proposal 'regarding Administrative and Financial Arrangements to Expedite Efficient Implementation of Programmes and Projects Relating to Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the North East' the Government offered a three layered structure with 'a Apex Body (Council) for decision-making in regard to all immediate and medium-term rehabilitation, reconstruction and development work in the North East and advising on policy development'.

Just in 48 hours the LTTE rejected the second set of proposals claiming that it was far short of its expectations. In his letter to the Prime Minister dated May 30, 2003 Balasingham further stated.

'... our sense of equal partnership in peace building and reconciliation suffered a severe blow when the main international and regional players continued to treat the LTTE shabbily as a proscribed entity with a terrorist label to be excluded from international forums.

We are also concerned over the growing involvement in the peace process of international 'safety net' to bring undue pressure on the freedom of our people to determine their political status and destiny'.

The subtle diplomacy of the Norwegian and Japanese peace envoys to bring the LTTE to the Tokyo aid confab bore no fruits and it took place as scheduled without the LTTE participation. In the face of the intransigency of the LTTE the peace process seemed struck in limbo.

In this context, on July 17, 2003, the UNF government presented its third proposal - 'Provincial Administrative Structure for the Northern and Eastern Province'. The government claimed that the new proposals were basic 'discussion document' aimed at drawing at LTTE response.

Legal and constitutional advisors of LTTE met in Paris in mid-September and again in Northern Ireland to chart out their responses. The LTTE response was the presentation of its desired version of an interim administration - ISGA.

The chronology of events clearly reveals how the UNF Government unwittingly played in to the hands of the LTTE because of its apparent desire to link the peace process to its own political survival while ignoring all the calls from the President for a bipartisan approach.

ISGA proposal is a well structured and carefully crafted document to indicate in no uncertain terms the type of interim arrangement the LTTE wanted in line with its future political objectives. It is prefaced with a long preamble and it provides the conceptual foundations, the political philosophy, the framework and parameters for the proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA).

The preamble is utilised to rationalise the armed struggle and a contractual arrangement to set-up an Interim Self-Governing Authority.

Therefore, it is necessary to read the paragraphs detailing out the ISGA in the light of its preamble.

(To be continued)

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Resettlement of internally displaced North-East Muslims

by M.I.M. Mohideen

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has had effect on the Muslims, particularly in the North-East. The forcible eviction of more than one hundred thousands Muslims, attack on un-armed Muslim civilians, the attack on the mosques and murdering of hundreds of Muslims while in prayer, the confiscation of lands, houses, business and cultural premises have caused insecurity among the Muslims in the North-East.

Because of security risks, Muslims are unable to cultivate more than 100,000 acres of agricultural lands and occupy nearly 22,000 residential houses, business and cultural premises belonging to the North-East Muslims.

The losses suffered by the Muslims were estimated to be more than US $ 110 millions. Responding to the question at the LTTE International media conference on April 10, 2002, whether he has taken any concrete steps to allow the displaced Muslim people living in refugee camps for the last 12 years to come to North, Velupillai Pirabaharan said that "proper objective conditions should be created for these people to come back. After these conditions are in place, I will make an appeal for the Muslims to come back."

The main focus of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at the peace talks was on the urgent humanitarian needs, to improve the day to day lives of the North East people.

To this effect the parties have agreed on an accelerated resettlement program of the internally displaced people.

However, the proposal submitted by the Sri Lanka Government to the Oslo Donors Conference on November 25, 2002, for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation support did not mention the losses suffered by the Muslims and the funds required for the rehabilitation and reconstruction work in Muslim areas.

The proposal submitted by the Government of Sri Lanka gave the impression that it was only the Tamils who have suffered in the North East conflict.

The international donors conference held in Tokyo-Japan had pledged US $4.5 billion for rehabilitation work in the war affected North-East and other infrastructure and development work in Sri Lanka.

The Muslims are entitled to our share of the aid to reconstruct the Muslim areas destroyed in the conflict and resettle the 102,867 Muslims forcibly displaced, regain our agricultural lands, residential properties and business and cultural premises.

This would also give an opportunity for the Muslims to prove the Government of Sri Lanka as well as the international community, the feasibility of reconstruction, development and administering of the predominant Muslim areas in the North-East independently by the Muslims.

Urgent works that had to be carried out in the Muslim areas prior to the commencement of the resettlement of forcibly displaced Muslims for the North-East.

1. Demining - Manner district, Musali DS division, Chilavathurai, Kondachchi, Mannar DS division, Thalaimannar Pier, Manthai DS division, Vidathalthievu, Periyamadu and Minuka, Mullaithievu DS division, Mullaitheivu Town, Hijirapuram, Jaffna District, Pommaveli, Mankuman and Chavakachcheri, Trincomalee district, Muttur, Kinnya, Kuchchaveli and Pudavaikattu, Batticaloa district, Karadiyanaru, Pulujumalai, Ampara district, Thirukkovil, Thambiluvil, Sagamam, Wammiyadikulam, Rufaskulam and Kanchikudicharu, ;

2. Clearing of unlawful occupants from all residential commercial and industrial buildings belonging to Muslims;

3. Clearing of unlawful occupants from all Muslim religious and cultural buildings;

4. Clearing of all unlawful occupants from all Muslim agricultural land and preparation of such land for cultivation;

5. Clearing of shrub jungles in the residential premises;

6. Clearing of the shrub jungles on the access road and internal lanes;

7. Renovation of tanks and irrigation channels,

8. Reconstruction of all residential, commercial, cultural and religious buildings;

9. Reconstruction of infrastructure, electricity, water, roads etc;

10. Reconstruction of civic centres and public buildings, schools, hospitals, market, bus stands, post offices, police stations and secretariat offices;

11. Puttlam-Mannar western coastal highway and bridge should be repaired and opened immediately;

12. The railway tract from Medawachchi to Thaialimannar should be repaired and the train services should commence immediately;

13. The bridge connecting Mannar Island with the main land should be reconstructed;

14. The causeways in Mannar, Muthur and Kinniya should be reconstructed;

15. The road from Mankulam to Mullaitivu should be reconstructed;

16. The A15 Road and the bridges from Palathopur to Trincomalee should be reconstructed;

17. The road from Akkaraipattu-Paddiyadipitti/Puddampai to Sagam Tank/Kanchirankuda Junction should be reconstructed.

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