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by Sumanasiri Liyanage, 
Department of Economics, University of Peradeniya

During the last months or so, the discussions on the peace process have been focused on the issue of High Security Zones. At the second peace talks held in Thailand between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the LTTE dropped its demand for interim administration and the two parties had agreed to set up three high level committees.

After the failure of the UNF Government's attempt at amending the Sri Lankan constitution, the LTTE seems to have changed its conflict strategy from a competitive one to an accommodative one. The continuous presence of the 'common enemy syndrome' - the powerful Executive President outside the direct negotiation between the LTTE and the GoSL- appears to have explained the current behaviour of the parties in the process.

This has in fact given some stability to the otherwise fragile peace process. Three high level sub-committees decided to be set up are: (1) the sub-committee dealing with 'core' political issues; (2) the sub-committee on de-escalation and normalization (SDN) that is supposed to deal with High Security Zones (HSZs); and (3) the sub-committee for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs (SIHRN).

The focus and terms of reference of the second and third committees would definitely overlap since resettlement of IDPs and refugees need the withdrawal of the security forces from the areas occupied by them, thus allowing people to move back to their own homes and villages. For any observer who is travelling through these HSZs, the presence of HSZs is a depressing experience.

This will also be true to the space occupied by the LTTE. Just withdrawal of forces will not be adequate; people should be made to believe that there is no threat to their lives and property after resettlement in their own homes and villages.

People should see that tensions between two combatants have subsided and the thing would be improved in the future. In addition to the creation of the psychological condition, assistance should come to the people so that they can repair, rebuild their damaged or destroyed homes. Necessary infrastructure has to be built.

What I mean is totally different from the so-called three Rs strategy. Three Rs strategy of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation presupposes a presence of powerless people in the conflict-ridden areas or outside of the conflict areas after their displacement.

IDPs

The entitlement strategy, in my view, would provide a better theoretical framework for peace and development because it presupposes the courageous survival strategies of the people in conflict situation. There are two kinds of IDPs and refugees. The first group of IDPs and refugees has been evicted from their places of habitation by the security forces or rebel forces because the forces had moved into those areas for strategic reasons. Tamils in High Security Zones and Muslims in Jaffna fall into this category. The second group of IDPs and refugees were forced to leave their homes because of the fear and risk of military attack, either by the security forces or by the rebel forces.

Land mines might have been placed even in those areas. For peace to be a meaningful thing for them, a healthy and safe environment should be created so that they can voluntarily decide to return back to their original places of habitation. The current stalemate in the peace process has risen because of the fact that the conditions for resettlement and the security needs of the Government as well as the rebel forces appear to be in conflict.

This stalemate would not have arisen, had the two parties decided to begin with the resettlement of the second category of IDPs and refugees. This phased settlement would have avoided the conflict between the LTTE and the GoSL security forces.

However, when a committee was set up to deal with HSZs, it is natural that the removal of HSZs would be linked with the issue of resettlement of people thus mixing military issue with a humane issue. Thus Major General Sarath Fonseka, the Commander of Jaffna has viewed the removal of HSZs from a security perspective.

However, he made a blunder by referring to the fear of the people in the South that they would be unhappy and oppose such a move. It should be a matter that should be taken into account by the politicians, not by the military leadership. Major Fonseka's demand that the LTTE should be partly decommissioned shows the fear and suspicion still remains within the armed forces that the LTTE would move into these areas thus placing it in an advantageous position in case the armed conflict is resumed. In fact what comes to the surface is not an issue of resettlement, but an issue of strategic positioning that is associated with security concerns.

The LTTE spokespersons have said that decommissioning of heavy or light weapons at this stage is non-negotiatable.

According to the statement issued by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, the matter remains to be resolved. "The parties recognized that the situation with regard to the High Security Zones involves major humanitarian and security concerns for both parties. Recent controversies surrounding this matter were discussed in depth.

The parties did not reach agreement on the continuation of the work of the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN)." The LTTE has also decided to pull out from the committee on HSZs although it will continue to remain in the peace negotiations. This is definitely a welcome move. It shows that the LTTE or the GoSL security forces are not in position today to go back to a military confrontation. However, it has made the entire peace process a fragile one. How can this stalemate be overcome?

Peace Zones

This may be overcome by adopting two strategies. Two strategies are not mutually exclusive and may be implemented simultaneously. "One step at a time" may be a good method to proceed in certain circumstances, but when issues are interlinked and interdependent, it may not be wise to separate issues. Taking all the issues into consideration and dealing with many issues at once would be a good strategy for two reasons. First, issues cannot be separated and separation of issues may be tantamount to putting them in the back burner.

Secondly, two parties may give different emphasis for different issues. So it may be easier to reach a compromise when many issues are taken together. The first strategy is to begin resettlement outside the HSZs. In fact this was the agreement arrived at the fourth round of talks.

An Indian military expert will be hired to look into the phased- withdrawals of the security forces. However, the hiring of individual experts without any institutional affiliations may not be a good sign.

Secondly, HSZs can be transformed into what I call Peace Zones, meaning that both the GoSL and the LTTE forces stop carrying or placing arms, heavy or light within these zones.

This would satisfy both parties, the security forces and the LTTE. When these areas are declared arms-free zones, the security forces may find there is no threat even if it vacates those areas.

At the same time, the LTTE's demand that people will be allowed to be resettled can be met. However it is easier said than done. How can the idea of Peace Zone be implemented? This may need an implementing force and civil vigilance. It seems that the LTTE may not agree to have the Sri Lankan police force performing this task of supervision and implementation.

The supervision and implementation may be carried out by the SLMM so that its mission may be extended to peace-keeping in arms-free zones. The security forces and the LTTE can be given a time frame to remove their arms from these zones. So that the Peace Zones can be gradually expanded and resettlement begun. Peace Zones will also be a testing ground of the commitment of the two parties to the peace process.

The idea of Peace Zones resolves two problems. First, the security forces now do not need to raise a demand for decommissioning of the LTTE so that the more sensitive issue of decommissioning can be taken at a later phase of negotiations. Secondly, the LTTE demand for normalization of life in Tamil heartland can be met by setting up non-militarized zones. In fact that goes beyond the LTTE demand for normalization of life in the Jaffna peninsula.

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