Archives

250 DAYS OF PEACE

Sri Lanka's peace process after Thailand

by Jayadeva Uyangoda

The first round of direct talks between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers has produced some positive outcomes that will have a direct bearing on how the conflict resolution process will unfold in Sri Lanka in the months to come.

As anticipated, no major issues of disagreement emerged through the talks. Neither was there a settlement accord as such, signed by the two sides. Those who designed this negotiation exercise - the process designers - were obviously careful to send out positive messages through the substance as well as symbolism of talks. At the negotiation table, there were no flags. Nor were there contentious or controversial statements. The negotiation agenda in this first round does not seem to have included any controversial theme either. The so-called 'core issues' were not on the agenda. At the press conference held after the conclusion of talks, the two negotiating teams as well as their Norwegian interlocutors appeared relaxed, positive and committed to moving forward.

In the statements made at the opening ceremony of September 16 as well as at the press conference of September 18, it was Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, who made the politically most significant points. Balasingham's repeated assertion that the Tamil Tigers did not operate on the categories of a separate state is obviously the most noteworthy idea to have emerged from Thai talks. Although this statement may not have surprised the close watchers of LTTE politics, it represented a crucial development in the conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka.

Balasingham's elaboration of the LTTE's commitment to autonomy and autonomy-based self-determination is the first official admission by the LTTE leadership that the so-called 'sole representatives' of Sri Lankan Tamils have in fact reviewed and revised their original, maximalist goal.

This transition from secession to autonomy is indeed an outcome of twenty years of a bloody war, combined with political-strategic sensitivity to radically new circumstances of global, regional and national politics.

It is worth noting that the LTTE's chief negotiator waited till the end of the first round of official talks to make the autonomy announcement. Even that was in response to a question put to him by a journalist. It may be possible that during, or even much before, the official talks, the Tiger delegation may have divulged this political 'secret' to the Colombo government.

The primacy of economic reconstruction in a process of peace is another significant point made by the two sides. It appears that both the UNF Government and the LTTE have come to the conclusion that normalization of life in the North and East through economic reconstruction and the further development of the economy in the rest of the island are intertwined.

Balasingham at the press conference hinted at an extremely interesting turn in Sri Lanka's North-South relations: the North needs the South to come out from destructive consequences of the war and the South needs the North to come out of its economic crisis.

Both sides have linked peace to economic imperatives. This is where Sri Lanka's present peace process might look qualitatively different from previous attempts: the peace project is internationalized in a global economic sense. It is no accident that Sri Lanka's Prime Minister was meeting investors in New York when the government and LTTE delegations were negotiating in Thailand. Ministers Peiris and Moragoda left Thailand on September 18 only to fly to New York to join the Prime Minister's campaign of 'invest in peace'.

Signs are that eventually, some of the LTTE leaders might also join with the Government team to seek global support for peace through economic reconstruction. But linking peace to the flows of global capital is not a hazard-free process, although rapid economic recovery is integrally connected to Sri Lanka's challenges of emerging from a protracted civil war.

It is quite interesting that both the Government and the LTTE delegations downplayed the importance of the idea of an interim administration. The pre-negotiation speculation in Colombo was that the talks would primarily focus on working out the modalities for a Tiger-controlled interim administration for the Northern and Eastern provinces.

There were probably two reasons why the interim administration issue was de-emphasized. Firstly, the two sides probably avoided decisions that could have immediately generated controversy and resistance in the Sinhalese South. Secondly, as Balasingham himself asserted at the press conference, the LTTE is more interested in transforming its own system of administration into one entrusted with the task of reconstruction, rehabilitation and economic development. Political consolidation at home and recognition as well as legitimacy abroad seems to be at the top of LTTE's current priorities.

Some of Anton Balasingham's remarks at the press conference also demonstrated the depth of the complexities that are to emerge in future rounds of talks. The path to regional autonomy for the Northern and Eastern provinces entails the task of incorporating to the existing state of Sri Lanka, the military, administrative and other structures set up by the LTTE. However, the question of the political and constitutional framework within which this incremental change can occur will, sooner than later, have to come to the center of the negotiation agenda.

That will actually be the real core issue around which the negotiation trajectories in future may revolve.

This is where Sri Lanka is very likely to provide an attractive experiment in constitutionalizing autonomy claims that are already laid out on the ground.[back]

News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security
Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries |

Produced by Lake House
Copyright 2001 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager