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by Prof. Birty Gajameragedara, Dept. of History, University of Peradeniya

Tamil citizenry - they enjoy commonalities with the majority

Sri Lanka today is in a historically unprecedented crucial national and international conjuncture. The central challenge for the leaders of this country is to handle it judiciously with utmost circumspection, devoid of petty party politics. The international situation is extremely favourable for a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict. Our fundamental task is to articulate the domestic policy alternative. Technical problems relating to the peace process should not jeopardize the task of reaching this goal.

The signing of the cease-fire agreement in February 2002 by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is of historic significance. Their courage is admirable. It has placed the country at cross roads. Right now clearly we have only two alternatives, namely, to continue with the peace process or revert to war. The second alternative is suicidal. It can plunge the country into chaos, anarchy and barbarism, once again touching the lowest ebbs of human civilization.

For an agreement to be successful both sides should feel that they have gained from it. Successful political settlement of the ethnic conflict will lead to enormous gains on the part of both the Government and the LTTE. Neither the Government nor the LTTE should attempt to gain tactical advantage from the cease-fire agreement. Such an attempt will be tantamount to a strategic blunder. Ethnic peace is the greatest necessity of the people of this country. They are war-weary. They detest political violence. What they mean by peace is ending the North-East war. They are not concerned about nuances relating to victories and defeats in the battlefield. The continuation of the conflict by military means is inconceivable. There is no basis in modern strategy to sustain a military alternative to resolve the conflict.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is largely political and partly socioeconomic. This means any attempt to solve the conflict should address these root causes. Socio-culturally, the vast majority of the people of this country are Hindu-Buddhistic. As far as the physical attributes are concerned they are the same. The only factor that divides them is language. But the langauge by itself cannot be the source of the conflict. Paul E. Brass, in a study of ethnicity and nationalism in the Soviet Union and in India, points out "the absence of any inevitable connection between language differences as such and ethnic and nationality movements". He goes on to say "in fact, it appears that lanague differences themselves are almost never the basis of such movements, which require instead the presence of one or more other factors.'

Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm, a distinguished historian, points out that "at all events problems of power, status, politics and ideology.. lie at the heart of nationalism of language".

Ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are not constants; they vary depending upon the political and socioeconomic factors. The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is of recent origin; its history does not go beyond the 1920s. Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country. It merely adds to the glamour of the society of this island country. The ethnic conflict does not "over determine" the country's political balance of forces. On the contrary, opportunistic class politics, in particular its petty bourgeois variation, have contributed to the deepening and aggravation of the ethnic conflict. Today, the people of this country want a peaceful settlement. The electorate of this country has repeatedly rejected the extreme manifestation of Sinhalese nationalism. It would not be any different in the current context.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka would be what the leaders of this country, the LTTE leaders included, want it to be. The signing of the cease-fire agreement is undoubtedly a bold step in the right direction. The UNF and the LTTE can take their own time to come to a final settlement. Both should have the necessary time to iron out their differences. The task of transforming a twenty-year battleground to an arena of peace will not be easy. A bipartisan approach is very necessary. It is the desire of the people of this country. In the absence of bipartisan consensus an agreed settlement can be presented to a referendum. The judgement of the people of this country will certainly be positive Sovereignty lies with the people.

The greatest obstacle to the peace process are the mutual suspicions and misunderstandings on the part of the Government and the LTTE. In this context, the Norwegian facilitatory role is indispensable. It should be noted that Norway is supported both by the West and Japan. Norway consults New Delhi, quite appropriately. This brings us to the linkage between Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and the external powers.

Sri Lanka's internal strife is fully globalized. The entire world watches the developments relating to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka with a great deal of interest. The way in which we are going to resolve the ethnic issue will be of considerable international significance. India and other regional powers support a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The support of India is vital and it is readily forthcoming. And indeed the entire balance of forces in the region is very favourable for a political settlement. The world balance of forces too is also very favourable. The United States is a major actor in the international environment of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Needless to say that America fully supports a political settlement in respect of Sri Lanka's conflict.

The support of the European Union and Japan is unequivocal. The support and sympathy of China and Russia are also readily forthcoming. The solidarity of the entire Third World will be there spontaneously as Sri Lanka is a leading member in the Non-aligned movement. The international support for Sri Lanka to evolve out a political settlement in this crucial period of her long history is overwhelming.

But everything depends on how the leaders of Sri Lanka are going to handle the issue. This is the crucial variable. In the final analysis, our greatest challenge is to strike a right balance between the changing world balance of forces and our domestic structures. This is a truism.

The LTTE too has to take into account the overall situation in Asian and the world. No one can either defy or bypass the global and regional conditions. The greatest drawback on the part of the LTTE is that it does not appear to have a clear political program. However, in the recent past there has been a definite attempt on the part of LTTE leaders to transform their fundamentally military organization into a political party. There has to be an advanced political consciousness on the part of the LTTE to replace its militarism. The path towards a political solution to the ethnic conflict right now is wide open. The LTTE should realize that the greatest necessity, both nationally and internationally, is for a political settlement.

There are no grounds whatsoever to doubt Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe's commitment to bring about a peaceful settlement to the ethnic conflict. In a speech delivered recently at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, D.C., the Sri Lankan leader made the following observation.- ".....we have to look at the underlying grievances which ignite and fuel terrorism to be able to understand how to fight the common enemy. Look at any place where terrorism raises its head. You find poverty, injustice, insecurity and fear". Mr. Wickremesinghe has repeatedly stated that he is concerned about the "discriminations" encountered by the Tamil people of Sri Lanka.

It becomes obvious that the Sri Lanka Prime Minister, like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1958 and Dudley Senanayake in 1965 is bent upon eradicating such Tamil grievances. He should never succumb to extreme manifestations of Sinhalese nationalism. It seems that the LTTE too is bent upon a political solution to the ethnic conflict, although it tends to doubt the extent to which leaders of the South are committed to bring about such a solution. At his press conference in Kilinochchi, Parabhakaran said: ".... There are three fundamentals. That is Tamil homeland, Tamil nationality and Tamil right to self-determination. These are the fundamental demands of the Tamil people. Once these demands are accepted or a political solution is put forward by recognising these three fundamentals and people are satisfied with the solutions we will consider giving up the demand for Elam".

This statement resemble The Thimpu Principles. But the LTTE leader provides a leeway for a negotiated settlement by saying that the LTTE would "consider giving up of the demand for Eelam". In this way Mr. Prabhakaran obviously deviates from the Thimpu Principles. Ultimately what it signifies is an attempt on the part of the LTTE to strike the best bargain possible in the forthcoming negotiations. This is very much a political position. Even the Thimpu principles themselves are negotiable.

Right now everything depends on the negotiating positions of the Government and the LTTE. They will not be able to achieve what they have failed to achieve in the battlefield. On the one hand the Sri Lanka Government could not "eliminate" the LTTE.

On the other hand, the LTTE has failed to establish a separate state by resorting to force of arms. The resultant situation is one of deadlock. Unfolding this deadlock presupposes a negotiated settlement to the conflict. A conceptual framework if very necessary to grapple with the problem. This presentation in various ways attempts to identify a such conceptual basis. In the absence of a conceptual framework, we may shy away from the heart of the problem and simply beat around the bush.

Ideas do not come from the sky. They are in this objective world to identify and apply. Every ethnic conflict has its own speficity (See Chester A. Crocker, "How to think about Ethnic Conflict", Orbis Fall 1999). The necessary solution to the current conflict is determined by its recent past. To arrive at a reasonably good agreement, the following components of a possible peace settlement can be identified:

1. Drastic devolution of power to the provinces as suggested by the August 1995 package. Its shortcomings and controversial aspects can be a subject to negotiation, Such devolution of power should be brought about only in respect of the North and the East. Other provinces should be managed according to the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.

2. Power sharing only in respect of provinces can strengthen separatism. There has to be power sharing at the level of the centre as well as in the periphery. Power sharing at the centre has to be in line with what the UNP proposed when it was in the opposition. Firstly a mutually agreed number of cabinet ministries for the representatives of the North and the East. Secondly there has to a second chamber, comprising among others, of an agreed number of representations for the North and the East. Thirdly there has to be a vice president representing the North and the East.

3. The East and the North should be merged. The LTTE and other Tamil parties are of the strong view that the Northern Province and the Eastern Province have to be merged. If the LTTE gives up the demand for a separate state, Sinhalese opposition to a merger will be lessened. Similarly, the urgency for the merger on the part of the LTTE and other Tamil parties will also be lessened.

There has to be constitutional provisions for the protection of the rights of the Muslim community within the context of the merger. The implication of a possible separate territorial arrangement for the Muslim community can have adverse implications for the inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. The East has to be looked upon as an arena of ideal harmonious ethnic relations. 4. An agreement along these lines should come into operation within a context of a pluralist democracy so as to facilitate the democratic and human rights of the people in the North and the East. It seems that the leader of the LTTE is inclined to have such an arrangement.

At the Kilinochcihi press conference, Mr. Prabhakaran made the following statement. "We can assure you that other political parties whatever their policies may be, will be allowed to function in the North-East and participate in the democratic political process".

In view of the above, the LTTE has to give up the demand for separate state. Any solution short of separation is acceptable to the vast majority of the Sinhalese people. The crux of the problem seems to be working out self-determination for the Tamil people in the East and North within the context of united Sri Lanka. The reforms on the lines suggested above can lead to such an outcome: that is, an internal self-determination.

The basic outcome of the reforms thus suggested would be the deepening of Sri Lanka's democratic political process. Minority rights are a part of democracy. It is as simple as that. Sri Lanka has every potential to become one of the best democracies in the Third World. It also can be a basis for a mutually agreed honourable settlement of the ethnic issue. The Tamil people of this country want such an honourable settlement. It also can be an honourable basis of working out a bipartisan approach to the conflict. The negotiations concerning an interim administration and the discussions on the substantive issues are dialectically interrelated. It cannot be taken away from the peace process which is determined by local and international conditions. The interim administration, among other things, is intended to facilitate the formal participation of the LTTE in the negotiations on an equal footing. It should not contravene the negotiations on the substantive issues.

The constitutional reforms that are brought about by a solution to the ethnic conflict should be accompanied by the replacement of the executive presidential system by parliamentary democracy. That system represents an aberration rather than a manifestation of the normal constitutional development in our country.

There was no compelling reason for us to go for an executive presidency in 1978.

When there was a need in the country for a decentralization of power we have instead gone for a centralization of power. Economic development accompanied by a dictatorship is not now acceptable to the West.

In the final analysis the reforms that are needed for the solution of ethnic conflict necessitate a change in the structure of the state in Sri Lanka which is rotten.

The notion of ethnic conflict on the global scale is a myth. The relative prominence of the ethnic conflict in the recent past was a result of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As a global issue it is only of a passing significance Sri Lanka should not be an exception to this.

A negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can lead to a new era of friendship between the Tamil and Sinhalese people.

There is a necessity for a dynamic view on the country's peace process.

Peace debate

Readers are invited to send in their responses to this article for consideration for publication on our 'Peace Quest' page which is published every Saturday. Contributions of not more than 1500 words, should be addressed to:

The Editor,
'Peace Quest',
C/o 'Daily News',
ANCL, Colombo 10.
or e-mail to [email protected]
fax no. 429210

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