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by Sumanasiri Liyanage, University of Peradeniya

Commenting on the present situation, the US Ambassador for Sri Lanka, Mr Ashley Wills is reported saying that the peace process has slowed down a little bit and that the talks may not be possible in the next couple of weeks.

Tamil Register has informed that talks may not take place until the late July or early August. Initially it was told that peace talks would begin in Thailand in April or May. Prof G L Peiris, the Minister who was named to head the team representing the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) at the peace talks in Thailand said that ``we are not unduly concerned about the slight delay; what is important is the stability of the peace process, not speed.'' Ashley Wills also expressed the view that "the slowing down of the process might be a good thing as it would give both sides more time to sort out their positions in the peace talks." Although the timing, agenda setting and preparation are of great importance for a successful interim peace process, it is true that one or two months delay will not change the peace trajectory in a substantial way in the present phase. So Prof Peiris is right when he emphasized that his administration was "doing everything possible to start direct talks, but not at the expense of a thorough preparation." However, the parties should be careful not to give room for distrust during this period of delay.

Mr Lakshman Kadirgamar, spokesperson for the PA on peace process has already expressed his suspicion about where the process is heading. He is reported to have said: "The process of allegations and counter-allegations is taking center stage. .. One cannot discount the possibility that the parties will never sit down to talks." Although Mr Kadiragamar's judgment seems to be a bit premature and politically motivated, the peace process in the last months or so has shown some kind of lull and a growing mutual suspicion. The problems involved in moving to the next phase are summed up in the Editorial of Tamil Guardian (June 13, 2002) in following words: "The Norwegian peace initiative is in the doldrums. The - unnecessarily - much-hyped direct talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers are not going to occur in June. In fact, they are not expected anytime soon - as all actors now acknowledge. The reasons are starkly simple. Firstly, and most immediately, Sri Lanka has reneged on its written pledge to restore normalcy in the Tamil areas by demilitarizing the region.

Secondly, it abandoned the phased approach to resolving one of the world's most intractable conflicts and alarmingly gone for broke: instead of seeking an interim solution - the approach which had been accepted by all involved as the best, indeed the only viable one - the government about turned and said 'core issues' must be discussed at once. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's subsequent vague statements suggesting the interim administration was back on the cards have decidedly failed to allay the now intense suspicion among Tamils that Colombo is pursuing a duplicitous strategy through the Norwegian peace initiative".

Dr Jayadeva Uyangoda, an independent observer has made this observation: "Even a quick look at the news reports appeared during the past couple of weeks on Sri Lanka's peace process would give the reader the impression that not everything has been going well in the negotiation front. The two sides, the government and the LTTE, have been sending signals that they have opted to a strategy of hardening their positions on a number of key issues".

This is not a healthy development; hence steps should be taken by both parties, GOSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to take corrective measures. At the moment, as Mr Kadirgamar puts it: "We are now in a state of a hiatus; no one knows what is going on." It's not delay that should be a matter of concern, but the absence of proper agenda setting, timing and preparation. In this article, we will focus on preparation on the part of the GOSL while forthcoming articles would deal with timing and agenda setting. We are particularly concerned here about the issue what Prof Peiris meant when he talked about "through preparation" and the question that the GOSL is actually ready for negotiation.

Readiness and preparedness

Readiness for negotiation can be discussed at two mutually exclusive levels.

At the first level, the readiness of conflicting parties for negotiation is more or less conditioned by objective and external factors. This is usually discussed under the notion of ripeness. The situation for negotiation will be right and ripe when the parties begin to perceive simultaneously that the situation calls for a substantial change. In conflict analysis, the ripeness is explained by the notion of "mutually hurting stalemate" and external factors or combination of both. We believe the readiness in this sense is adequately discussed in the peace discourse since the capture of Elephant Pass by the LTTE. It is interesting to note that official / formal party usually realizes first the need for a negotiated settlement due to many reasons. Official party has to perform many other functions: maintaining a substantial economic growth; keeping inflation under control; protecting at least the majority of people and their property; keeping law and order; reducing crimes. The list may be expanded with other duties and responsibilities. Conflict always disturbs so-called normal way of life.

The state has to maintain its international stature as it has to enter and protect numerous international treaties and conventions. However, this cannot be inflated into a general rule although the logic in many instances supports this hypothesis. GOSL and the Sri Lankan entrepreneurial class need "peace" badly. But the readiness in the second sense is rather different from this readiness that comes out of objective need and pressure, both within and without. When Prof Peiris talked about "thorough preparation", he may have meant pre-negotiation planning that is one of the pre-negotiation essentials. On this second level of readiness, we have our doubts. On part of the GOSL, negotiation has been always action oriented affair, not a planned affair. On the other hand the LTTE may be ready in the second sense, but not in the first sense. This may be another dilemma; but we do not intend to deal with this issue in this article.

Pre-negotiation planning

Planning is an essential pre-negotiation requirement; it is the first rule of negotiation. As Lewicki et al put it, 'other things being equal, the negotiator who plans better does better." "Planning encompasses the considerations and choices we make about tactics, resource use, and contingent responses in pursuit of the overall strategy- how to proceed and how to use what we have to get what we want." However, it appears that most negotiators believe that 'negotiation success lies in persuasiveness, eloquence, cleaver manoeuvres, and occasional histrionics" than in proper planning and preparation. The experience since Thimpu has demonstrated that the GOSL engagement in pre-planning and preparation, if put in moderate language, had not been adequate. The GOSL had plunged into the negotiation seeking quick results mainly because of the fact that it wanted to demonstrate to the masses and to the international community that it is ready for a negotiated settlement. This action orientation hindered a selection of best strategy and correct understanding of the context, environment and the position and needs of the other party. Three reasons justify the time allocated for pre-negotiation planning. First, pre-negotiation planning aiming at formulating clear and precise objectives would provide a criterion by which objective evaluation of offers and packages may be made. Secondly, planning encompasses an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one's positions and arguments and recognition of the strengths and weaknesses in other parties' arguments. Thirdly, since negotiation outcomes depend not on being quick and clever during negotiations but also on the methodologies in dealing with the strategies, moves and tactical manoeuvres of the other party. Lewicki et al propose eight steps in pre-negotiation planning. The steps are: 1. Defining issues; 2. Assembling issues and data and defining agendas; 3. Defining needs and interests; 4. Consulting with others including the other party; 5. Managing goal setting; 6. Identifying your own limits; 7. Developing supporting arguments; 8. Analyzing the other party.

Has Prof. Peiris meant going through this exercise when he talked about the need of "thorough preparation"? Has the GOSL begun its homework? Does it possess a quickly available data base in relation to many contending issues, such as language, land, colonization, public sector jobs, various legislations? We have no answer to offer as we have no access to the government negotiation machinery. However, the past experience demonstrates that such things do not exist. The last PA regime did not even try to develop such a pre-negotiation planning mechanism and institutional set up.

One may argue that we all know many things about the eight aspects mentioned above. That is true. Nonetheless, that common sense and the associated pragmatism would not be of adequate assistance when it comes to tough negotiation, no matter it is distributive or integrative. The composition of the Peace Secretariat also indicates that pre-negotiation planning focuses more on administrative aspect of negotiation setting rather than on strategical and tactical aspect of negotiation.

The non-clarity of GOSL strategy in forthcoming negotiation indicates the inadequacy of GOSL preparedness for talks. A reflection on the behaviour of the GOSL since the last December demonstrates that GOSL opts to adopt an accommodative strategy in its dealing with the LTTE while the LTTE has in turn been following a competitive strategy. The undue emphasis on 'trust-building' is one element of accommodative strategy. We do not argue that trust-building measures are not important in bringing positive results. In intractable and prolonged conflicts, trust-building is extremely important. However we have to keep in mind that a quantitative survey of almost forty intrastate peace processes in the 1990s showed that these trust-building measures did not have positive outcomes. Some of the measures that have been adopted even had a negative correlation with successful outcome, indicating that they have a sort of counter-productive effects. (Svensson 2000). We ran a classical game theory exercise with 3 x 3 matrix incorporating three scenarios - reversing to war, agreeing for a settlement and dodging the issue. Given current strategies and with hypothetical values the exercise has had a significant chance of producing an outcome that makes dodging the issue is beneficial to the LTTE whatever the GOSL does. So how the GOSL as well as Norwegian third party handle this situation would be key to the next phase of the process.

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