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LTTE's Wanni bastion no longer impregnable
Forces have learnt from past debacles:
Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on
September 10, spelt out the Government's position with regard to the
Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in
Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned
to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.
He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for
terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of
terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.
The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also
indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to
implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All
Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the
North and the East.
This means the Government is very clearly in it's resolve in adopting
a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words
the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per
cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.
But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in
the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its
military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.
Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware
that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the
Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer
the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.
But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the
Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the
Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since
many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.
Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought
by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between
Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a
classic example giving credence to this school of thought.
The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive
"Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi" (Do or die) compelling the Security
Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the
Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after
the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE
The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa
operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni
though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles,
leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of
Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass
losing thousands of soldiers.
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Civilians undergoing weapons training in Wanni |
But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though
they were able to effectively resist Security Forces' moves to capture
the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security
Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the
Wanni.
Another school of thought is that the Government should exert
pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching
military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the
premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the
international front.
However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to
militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution.
It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the
Tiger outfit.
Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not
step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the
Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into
consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition
specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human
cost involved in any such operation.
There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration
such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian
population.
The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the
ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby
international support though the outfit is in a weak position.
On the other hand the international community will not condone, the
suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a
comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE's war chest.
What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical
to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the
latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable
time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.
The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily.
Different situation
But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period
in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni
from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the
Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE
having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.
There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990's too
the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East
was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth
is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce
the battle fronts in the Wanni.
That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other
means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from
Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other
force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these
territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those
parts of the East very easily.
But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left
any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they
deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to
dominate the areas in the Wanni too.
The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the
newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special
Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving
any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.
Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the
wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police
stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played
by the Security Forces earlier.
The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police
to run the normal civil administration in the East without any
hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the
East to face any military operation in the Wanni.
Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they
have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the
East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE
cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.
Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base
in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna
population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to
solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around
250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics
One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the
Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger
territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction
the troops were heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in
the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.
That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in
heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to
realise its objective is only too well known.
One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that
it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects
without giving clear signals about troops movement.
Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the
entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without
allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive
offensive operation against the troops.
That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in
defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are
now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as
they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in
their defence lines.
Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the
Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated
to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to
different battle fronts.
That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of
the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are
now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the
Forces.
On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to
lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard
threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality
service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State
owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard
economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security
Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the
South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south
through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the
civilian population.
In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position
as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar
have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to
Colombo or any other part of the country.
The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of
the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later
they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror
operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the
capture of Silavathura by the troops.
The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo
is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with
the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road
blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.
The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has
also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the
LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.
That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by
exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War
to Colombo.
The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the
backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security
Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter
their total strength to defend their territory.
According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting
cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the
Wanni.
Wanni situation
They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from
Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai
the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of
Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is
the only life line left for their logistic and other support.
With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed
civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops
infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate 'VIP' movements.
Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained
cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the
civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore,
the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme
pressure of the LTTE.
The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of
military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has
not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the
Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit
and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.
Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not
in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is
now ailing due to stress.
Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior
leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his
erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre
have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the
experience they had to face in the Wanni.
The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of
the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves
within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to
surrender to the Security Forces.
Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni
will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is
ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.
But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task
even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by
the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if
they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the
Wanni.
It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the
innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture. |