Diplomacy, espionage and Indian foreign policy making

Dr Kamal Wickremasinghe

Public officials in Sri Lanka, especially the counter-intelligence establishment, will probably need to be spending a lot of time in analysing the background to the expulsion by Russia last week, of an American CIA officer operating under diplomatic cover.

The spy arrested near a Moscow park, wearing a blond wig, was allegedly trying to recruit a Russian intelligence services officer responsible for fighting Islamist terrorists in the Caucasus region. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) named the man as Ryan C. Fogle, third Secretary at the US embassy in Moscow. Footage aired on the English-language TV channel Russia Today showed Fogle being paraded. He is alleged to have in his possession two other wigs, three pairs of glasses, and a kitbag of spy equipment, stacks of €500 notes and his US embassy identity card.

He was carrying a recruitment note written in Russian to the targeted official offering “up to $1 million a year, with additional bonuses”, together with instructions on how to transfer information. The would-be target had ‘set Fogle up’, trapping him red-handed.

Upon his arrest, Russia’s Foreign Ministry summoned US Ambassador Michael McFaul for an urgent meeting and ordered the arrested man’s immediate departure from the country.

The arrest of the spy comes in the middle of renewed US demands for Russian help, following the thawing of relations in the wake of Boston bombing, to end their seemingly unwinnable proxy-war in Syria, but ensuring regime change. Russia displayed their contempt by announcing the sale of advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Syria the day after John Kerry left Moscow after lodging the request.

The expulsion of the CIA spy took place just days after the British Prime Minister David Cameron met Mr Putin in Moscow with similar requests. The spy was being paraded on television while Mr Putin was meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, the other player in the tri-partite “special relationship”, in the southern Russian city of Sochi.

Russian officials expressed “surprise” at the attempt to recruit a security officer responsible for fighting Islamist terrorists in the Caucasus after Russia had announced cooperation on the issue. The ministry said the arrest “raises serious questions for America”, since “such provocative actions in no way help to strengthen mutual trust.”

The only surprise element in the affair, from the point of view of other countries familiar with the activities of such US ‘diplomats’, is that the Russians were surprised by the attempted spy recruitment episode, suggesting that they had placed a certain amount of trust in the honesty and integrity of the neocon-ruled US.

Of course, it is ‘par for the course’ for the neocons to deploy operatives under diverse guises, in foreign countries, some going by their real identities using diplomatic cover, and others under “non-official cover” of assumed identities totally dissociated with the US government. Their unethical and illegal subterfuge of foreign nations and their governments is founded on the deployments of such agents to recruit corruptible local elements.

While throwing the canard of “advanced” satellite and other technical intelligence as the source of their information, their most-favoured method still is “buying-out” local bureaucrats and military officials with influence, and others with access to sensitive information and higher echelons of governments or capacity to organise NGO type activity – eavesdropping can never substitute for HUMINT!

Sri Lanka and India are vulnerable to similar attempts by the neocons

This particular incident deserves the attention of Sri Lanka not only due to the current, similar neocon activities in Sri Lanka that clearly pose risks, but also due to the already well known neocon infiltration of the Indian bureaucracy that is bound to have serious repercussions on our all-important relationship with India.

Though seems unlikely at the first blush, similar activities were behind India’s dramatic, totally inexplicable vote, twice, in favour of the US sponsored anti-Sri Lanka resolution at the UNHRC in Geneva, ‘against the flow’ of amicable bilateral relations between our two countries.

Understanding the important dynamic of the influence of the key members of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in foreign policy decision making in Delhi, and their vulnerability to neocon approaches helps realise that the US role in the event is not at all far-fetched.

Different sets of undercurrents other than the widely-known domestic political considerations drove India’s vote at the UNHRC in 2012 and 2013 - the ‘friends’ of the neocons had a significant effect on the 2012 decision. The agents were quickly identified and their future influence was ameliorated through the quick actions of the patriotic forces within the IFS. The determining conditions that prevailed in 2013 to yield the same result however, were different.

The dynamics that governed India’s vote go right down to the roots of the political-bureaucratic complex consisting of three agencies that churns out Indian foreign policy - the prime minister’s office (PMO); the National Security Council (NSC) led by the national security adviser; and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

The PMO has been sitting at the apex of the Indian foreign affairs pyramid since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru who formulated India’s non-aligned, nonviolence-based foreign policy. He was also the Minister of External Affairs, and had a strong personal role in making all major foreign policy decisions himself, after consultations with the bureaucracy.

The role of the PMO in foreign policy and decision making further expanded during the regimes of Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), Indira Gandhi (1966-77 and 1980-84) and, Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89), with the Research and Analysis Wing within the PMO almost becoming the primary information provider.

However, senior civil servants of the elite IFS (usually identified by their graduation year as much as by their name!) staff all three arms and exert significant influence through information filtering and subtle psychological techniques.

Unlike in the US,there are no political appointees among the foreign policy mandarins. Apart from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s removal of Cabinet Secretary Kamal Pande in June 2004, political appointments and sackings of IFS officers are rare.

The problem with the Indian civil service today is that it does not differ much at all from the British colonial civil service, the “steel frame” of British imperialism, India inherited at independence and still resort to largely colonial methods of public administration.

The IFS that recruits just 0.01 per cent of aspirants is the most elite of the public services; Those who survive the cut-throat admissions and promotions processes of the IFS go on to secure key positions as advisers in the PMO, on the National Security Council, and at the MEA.

The policy making and advisory process by IFS officers takes place in an environment lacking significant collective strategic thinking, as is common in Western countries, including the dreaded think tanks; the process in India is highly individualistic.

The system does not put out white papers or other formal documents that set out the country’s long-term foreign policy goals, nor does the system produce any guidelines for policy making except for the overarching policy framework expressed in parliamentary statements and speeches, also written by the same bureaucrats. Like with all organisations, the three arms of government, all housed in the imperious South Block, are prone to many personal rivalries, ‘turf wars’ and intrigue that take special proportions due to the high level of freedom enjoyed by bureaucrats. Those who know to ‘read’ can clearly see how different forces are reflected in final policy decisions.

Rumours of IFS officers working as US agents are rife at the South Block

Such a policy making environment is obviously ripe for US exploitation, and the first Obama administration recognised this in 2009 when they announced a policy of “intense engagement” with India, built around the so-called India-US “Strategic Dialogue”, with none other than Sri Lanka’s “friend” Robert O. Blake appointed as assistant secretary for South Asian affairs at the state department.

The components of the Strategic Dialogue include India-US-Afghanistan trilateral process, the Joint Working Group on Space - including exploration of Mars - and the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor, and India’s role in maritime security. All such initiatives involve the future protection of American interests in the region such as future of Afghanistan after the planned troop withdrawal and the future of Diego Garcia after the expiry of the “$1 lease” from the UK in 2016.

Also involved are key defence trade elements with significant resource transfers to the US through Indian defence purchases, accounting for much of bilateral trade currently worth around $100 billion.

The hectic arms trade being pushed by the military-industrial complex with full support of the US embassy, with hefty incentives, commissions and outright bribes on offer, is bound to corrupt the occasional IFS officer, or two, and there are legendary stories of corruption with some captured on camera.

The rumours often surround people at the top, like the recently deceased Brajesh Mishra, who was India’s permanent representative to the UN, and later held the positions of principal secretary to the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and India’s first national security adviser (1998 – 2004) concurrently, after entering BJP politics.

There are many in the IFS who believe that Mishra’s strong push for severing traditional relations with Russia and moving towards closer ties with the US was based on special’ relations he had with certain US diplomats in Delhi at the time.

Wikileaks puts some in trouble

Another IFS official whose name pops up in a number of confidential Wikileaks cables is that of Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s current Ambassador to China who has previously worked in Moscow, Washington, Budapest, Tokyo, Prague and Singapore.

He was head of the Americas Division at the MEA from 2004 to 2007. He has worked in Sri Lanka also, from 1988 to 1990 as Political Advisor to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), and was considered as replacement to Mr Kantha before the final selection of Y.K. Sinha. Dr. Jayashankar figures prominently in a number of ‘Wikileaked’ US diplomatic cables in different contexts, written by different US diplomats in Delhi, Colombo and Tokyo, to the state department.

In a confidential cable dated January 9, 1989 (89COLOMBO158), the then US ambassador in Colombo, James W. Spain passed on to Washington the assessment of Jaishankar whom he described as a "working-level Indian high commission official who deals most closely with all aspects of India's role in North Eastern province", as presenting a sober view of current strength of the LTTE.

In another cable dated April 25, 2005 (31383), Delhi Charge d'Affaires Robert O. Blake, Jr. writes in typically arrogant fashion that "Jaishankar called the US embassy to make sure we had noticed" the GOI's vote(against the Cuba-sponsored UNHRC resolution condemning US practices at Guantanamo).

In another cable dated December19 2005 (05NEWDELHI9514) written prior to the departure of the then Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on an official visit to Washington, Blake informs the state department of India's 'game plan' during meetings, as "revealed" to him by Jaishankar.

The most recent revelation of Dr Jaishankar's apparently 'cushy' relationship with the Americans came in the form of a Wikileaks cable sent in February 2010 by the US ambassador to Beijing, Jon Huntsman, informing the state department that the Indian ambassador Jayashankar had sought "closer co-operation with the US"to curb "China's aggressive approach" to neighbouring countries.

The crucial player in the 2012 UNHRC vote was Ranjan Mathai

The decision by India to vote for the US resolution against Sri Lanka at the UNRC in Geneva in March 2012, albeit a much diluted version of the original produced by the US, was significant not just because it was against Sri Lanka: it marked the departure from the long standing Indian stance of not voting for resolutions critical of individual member countries. The change was the personal influence of Ranjan Mathai who was appointed Foreign Secretary just months before, in August 2011. Ranjan Mathai, a Keralite is a veteran of nearly 40 years in the IFS with postings as Ambassador almost exclusively in western capitals,UK,US, France, Belgium,and client states such as Israel (1998 to 2001) and Qatar (2001 to 2005). He has previously served in Colombo, and has been Head of a Division at the DEA dealing with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Maldives.

Soon after becoming Secretary, Mathai launched, with gusto, a new foreign policy agenda for India which he announced at the release of a book titled 'India's Neighbourhood Challenges in the Next Two Decades', at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Ranjan Mathai's new vision for India essentially reflected a new US defence strategy outlined by the then US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, a hawkish neocon and formerly the Director of the CIA, at IDSA just six months ago. Mathai, considered a great friend by the neocon establishment, sounds ideologically completely persuaded by the US rhetoric and the primary premise that the geo-political situation in India's neighbourhood would change drastically in the next two decades and will present a "challenging" environment,a position most untypical of the traditional Indian approach.

Mathai's proposed policy was heading towards making India part of the Asia Pivot Penetta was minting, and was aimed at making India America's 'deputy sheriff' in South Asia. The model completely ignored India's strong historical,cultural, and other influences on the region.

Mathai's "brave new world" approach did not withstand scrutiny, and there is no mention of it any more at the PMO. His influence waned together with the demise of his moves to make US the ruler of the region. Currently, according to reliable sources, Mathai is excluded from decisions relating to appointments of envoys. During his heyday however, in early 2012, he dictated the Indian vote on Sri Lanka at the UNHRC, on American instructions.

In 2013, Ranjan Mathai initiated the first formal consultations visited Washington DC between February 20 and 22 and spent nearly three hours at the state department with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, an operative with strong links to Madeline Albright.

What mattered most in relation to the Sri Lankan vote in 2013 however, was not Mathai's influence but the 'hotter' political climate in Tamil Nadu, together with Dilip Sinha, India's ambassador to the UN, a cousin of Mrs Kantha, playing a leading role.

Winds are changing

Ranjan Mathai is due to retire at the end of July, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh due to make an announcement soon on the appointment of his replacement.

It will be either Sujatha Singh, current ambassador to Germany, or S. Jayashanker currently in China, with an outside chance of a one year extension of term for Mathai.

If Dr S Jaishankar, (IFS 1977 batch) becomes next secretary, Sri Lanka can expect a bumpy ride, with US finding a cat's paw in Delhi to assert neocon wishes in Sri Lanka. But like Mathai did, he will face opposition.

Due to the same dynamic, the incoming Indian High Commissioner Mr Y.K. Sinha, currently the head of a Division dealing with Pakistan and Iran affairs at the MEA will face circumstances similar to what Mr Kantha faced.

When it comes to crucial issues on Sri Lanka,Mr Sinha will have limited influence and his commission will be, as a good diplomat, to manage the aftermath. Our empathy will probably make his job easier.