INGO dollar operative at work again

By Special Correspondent

Yet another dollar paid INGO operative is now writing adverse reports about Sri Lanka - -and mind you, while simultaneously working for the United States High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Roger Nash has written a highly adverse commentary for the Norwegian Refugee Council, even though it is clear that the Sri Lankan humanitarian work with the refugees of war was exemplary. The writer comes to conclusions based on his own sketchy work according to those who worked with the Norwegian Refugee Council. It seems to be another example of damning the country despite the good work done – despite evidence to the contrary.

The ‘Dialogue on Safeguards: Decision-making in Humanitarian and Development Work’ will take place at the Taj Samudra on December 4 and 5. The Article written by Roger Nash which is based on the findings of an independent review of NRC’s (Norwegian Refugee Council’s) engagement in humanitarian activities during the conflict and immediately after. The first session on Tuesday morning will be guided by the findings from this study.

It is pertinent to ask:

* Has the writer come with his own conclusions? Who was interviewed? Who are the participants at the workshop? Are any from Government who were or are involved invited? Why is the dialogue being held a 5 Star Hotel?

* Why is there no mention of protection measures taken within Manik Farm? Is there a concept of our citizens being pollicised by INGOs?

* How much funds did NRC receive since 2009?

* Has the writer studied the response of the Government titled “Sri Lanka’s Humanitarian Effort” which was a response to the Darusman advisory note and details Manik Farm. See some passages below.

* Is Roger Nash here on a Business Visa or Tourist Visa?

Why Manik Farm was selected

Here is the Govt response:

The concept of ‘Welfare Villages’, four in the district of Vavuniya and a village in Mannar, had been previously formulated, and discussed at a meeting on January 29, 2009.

These were designed to have roads, electricity, semi-permanent shelters, learning centres, post offices, co-operatives, parks, places of worship, banks, IT centres, child and women development centres etc to cater to all needs of the displaced. The reason the concept of a ‘Welfare Village’ was suggested as a stop gap measure until the resettlement areas were cleared of land mines and essential, basic infrastructure together with adequate security was provided. While welfare facilities were prepared at Manik Farm, government extended an invitation to Prof Walter Kalin, UN Special Representative for the Rights of the Internally Displaced, to visit and advise on the situation. His report was extremely constructive. He recognized government and UN efforts to abide by national as well as international (SPHERE) standards, and acknowledged security considerations. He advised on ensuring rights based approach while not compromising on security. The large influx of IDPs had in their midst LTTE cadres as well.

Sending IDPs to families and friends

By June, as discussed with the UN Special Representative, a programme commenced of sending IDPs with special needs to kith and kin outside the IDP Welfare Village with written consent that they will look after them, viz.

- Elders (over 59 years of age)

- Pregnant mothers with their family

- Families with infants

- Disabled persons

- On medical grounds (Chronic Debilitating Illnesses)

- University students

- Sri Lankans now citizens from other countries

- Priests

- Approximately 4,000 elders and 2,000 pregnant mothers were among these, along with 450 priests.

Here however are excerpts from some of Nash’s highly biased conclusions:

The primary argument used by humanitarians to explain their support to the camps was that the IDPs were experiencing clear hardship and demonstrated need and that the role of humanitarians is to address need where they find it.

Most humanitarian actors believed there was nothing they could do to influence the prolonged detention of IDPs. There were three key assumptions underlying this belief:

1. The Sri Lankan government was not sensitive to external pressure

2. The humanitarians had no leverage over the camps

3. The institutional costs would be high for any INGO that did not agree to be part of the government’s plans

The first of these three beliefs was manifestly incorrect. Although the Sri Lankan government went to great lengths to project an aura of strength and imperviousness, its sensitivity to world opinion was proved by the enormous amount of energy it consistently expended on quelling criticism.

Relationship with the state

Cooperation with the host state is almost an axiom of humanitarian work. After all, it is the state that has ultimate responsibility for its population. Conversely, challenging the state can result in obstruction of programme implementation. Yet there is a fundamental concentration when the state is manifestly breaching its obligations to its own citizens. There are many cases where states are not primarily concerned for the interests of displaced populations – often the case in situations of ethnic internal conflict. In these cases automatic cooperation is inappropriate.

In Sri Lanka the international humanitarian community appeared to have internalised the government position that it was their job to fund and support the government’s planned response to the IDPs almost under any conditions, no matter what that response was.