Devolution will lead to dissolution of the State
Dr Kamal WICKREMASINGHE
During the 2013 budget speech in Parliament President Mahinda
Rajapaksa commented that “devolution should not lead the country to
separatism but it needs to be a mechanism that would unify the country.”
This highly relevant remark by the President elevated the debate on the
devolution process to another level because the proponents of devolution
have not addressed this important aspect previously.
The foreign-funded NGO operatives and others who have led the
campaign for devolution have not provided the Sri Lankan people with any
compelling social, political or economic reasons as to why the
government needs to continue to rely on this ‘dead-rope’ of a solution
to the ethnic problem. They seem to expect the people to believe the
unproven hypothesis that devolution of political and administrative
powers is the essential prerequisite for the integration of Tamils to
the Sri Lankan polity, without question. Any questioning of the
hypothesis or counter views on the subject, irrespective of the level of
logic involved, is immediately branded as arising from majoritarian
‘Sinhala chauvinist’ quarters.
The only reasoning the proponents of devolution have been producing
in support of it is the need to avert the potential ‘wrath’ of their pay
masters, euphemistically referred to as the ‘international community’
that does not necessarily include India. They assert that the Sri Lankan
government and the people are compelled to embrace devolution
uncritically and ‘meddling with it’ in any way or reneging on it would
amount to a serious breach of trust of the West. The response in
Parliament of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP V. Saravanapavan that
“The Thirteenth Amendment was India’s baby and, therefore, it should
play a role in convincing the Sri Lankan government not to repeal it”
sought to bring India in to the picture.
Those clamouring for devolution, led by the NGOs, do not seem to see
the need to examine the international experience of devolution in order
to determine its suitability as a remedy for Sri Lanka’s particular
ethnic issues. They seem to be taking great care to shift focus away
from the negative consequences of devolution, mainly its role as a
disintegrative force, in countries where they have experimented with it.
Francois Mitterand |
Rajiv Gandhi |
The Sri Lankan people on the other hand, by their show of distinct
lack of enthusiasm to vote at the Provincial Council (PC) elections,
seem to be asking as to why they should be embracing this white elephant
simply to satisfy the wishes of those who are hell-bent on causing the
disintegration of the Sri Lankan state and the nation in to tribal
homelands and communal rancour. The foreign funded NGOs and their pay
masters conveniently overlook the simple geographical fact that Sri
Lanka is too small a territory for a devolved, decentralised or Federal
system of government.
India’s possible concerns need not come in to the calculations of the
future of the devolution attempt by the powers that be, because India
will clearly understand the need to review the PC experiment based on
its social and economic costs, and the largely un-accrued benefits we
were told would be forthcoming. We need not worry about the ‘wrath’ of
anyone else.
India may not be as keen on devolution as in 1987
As to India’s position on devolution of power in Sri Lanka, it would
not be surprising to find that the current Indian administration and the
Ministry of External Affairs bureaucracy in particular, do not see the
provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and
J.R. Jayewardene as the be all and end all of solutions to the Sri
Lankan Tamil issue. As revealed by the late J.N. Dixit, High
Commissioner in Sri Lanka between 1985 and 1989 in his memoirs
Assignment Colombo, the policy elements of the Accord were devised not
by professional Indian Foreign Service (IFS) bureaucrats, but by the
Indian Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) with minimal input from President
Jayewardene’s Secretariat in Colombo. The haste in which the Accord was
prepared and imposed on Sri Lanka vouched for the lack of forethought
exercised in its design about future implications for India.
Though the Indian PMO convinced Rajiv Gandhi to force the Accord down
President Jayewardene’s throat at his weakest moment, soon they realised
that helping the separatists secure a de facto Eelam in Sri Lanka
through such a harebrained scheme would ultimately pose the same
problems to India a Tamil ‘Eelam’ would have posed: a devolved
‘Province’ dedicated to ethnic Tamis with extensive devolution of powers
is Eelam by any other name. Professional IFS bureaucrats soon became
aware that separatist forces in South India are waiting, rubbing their
hands with glee. Naturally, India will be looking for a way out.
The removal of India from among the so-called ‘international
community’ keen to see devolution in Sri Lanka reduces the grouping to
the so-called West, our neo-colonial masters. Like many ideological
prescriptions they have been throwing at us over the years, the idea of
devolution is of course a disguised recipe for destroying Sri Lanka’s
national integrity: they tell us devolution is the sole means of
efficient and effective governance we could have to serve the needs of
diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. Incredibly, they
expect us to believe that devolution is a means of achieving national
unity and political stability. The international experience point to the
exact opposite!
Devolution, identity, and ethno-regionalism
There is strong evidence from several Western democracies that
devolution introduced as a strategy for managing ethno-regional conflict
gives rise to ethnic-nationalist challenges to the integrity of the
shared state, by way of demands for increasing levels of autonomy
leading to outright secession. Devolution creates opportunities and
incentives to mount such demands by ethno-regions, threatening ethnic
conflict and therefore democratic stability of the country.
Changing patterns of political identities, inspirations, and voting
in regional elections in the autonomous communities of countries such as
Spain, Belgium and Canada have demonstrated changes in demographic,
institutional, political, and cultural trends towards secession with
serious implications for the democratic state. Even in France where
regions do not enjoy as extensive authority as the provinces of Spain or
Belgium, the administrative decentralisation seems to have given rise to
cracks in the unitary state model with a strong civic identity.
Professor Dawn Brancati of the University of Washington at St Louis
argues, based on statistical analysis of electoral data from 30
democracies, that devolution increases both ‘anti-regime rebellion’ and
“inter-communal conflict”. She suggests that regionally organised groups
increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by “reinforcing regionally
based ethnic identities, producing legislation that favours certain
groups over others, and mobilising groups to engage in ethnic conflict
and secessionism or by supporting terrorist organisations that
participate in these activities.” In essence, she concludes that
devolution is not an effective tool for the management of ethnic
conflict, but introduces the real risk of aggravating ethnic enmities.
Devolution experience in Spain, Belgium and Canada
Spain is a country with a long history of inter-regional and
inter-cultural conflict with periods of war between regional entities
recognised by contemporary populations as their ethnic or national
homelands. The modern Spanish state that attempts to integrate disparate
territorial entities with varying cultural identities under a single
central authority is a case study in devolution. The devolution
experience in Spain has been one of the autonomous communities engaging
in a spiral of escalating demands that are progressively ‘hollowing out’
the central state.
In the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre of Spain, the momentum
generated by the creation of the autonomous regional governments
equipped with extraordinarily wide-ranging institutions, resources and
policies has generated conflicting perceptions of regional identities.
It is argued that the institutional levers of control and the
construction and dissemination of identity, myths, and symbols, in these
regions is often in competition with the state.
Such identities are consolidated and reinforced through regional
administrative cadres, intelligentsia, public agencies, services,
education, and cultural life in general. In the Basque Country, the
nationalist regionalist government is pressing for implementation of a
de facto demand for independence that has already led to direct
confrontation with the government in Madrid and to an intensification of
political conflict in the autonomous community.
Analysts believe Belgium, a country founded as a centralised state,
after the French model, but gradually ‘reformed’ into a federal state
through consecutive constitutional amendments since the 1970s is on the
brink of losing its nationhood. Survey data on political attitudes and
patterns of party support in the Flemish speaking Northern region of
Flanders, the French speaking southern region of Wallonia and in
Brussels, point to a trend towards demands for higher and higher levels
of autonomy. A crucial element in such trends is the lack of national
political parties that represent national interests: Belgium has
broken-up into three rival regions defined in ethno-linguistic terms,
threatening the survival of the nation state.
In France, the decision by President Francois Mitterand to introduce
regional elections in 1982 created the opportunity for the re-emergence
of historical regionalisms in Corsica and Brittany where a strong
regionalist movement had already extracted concessions to regional
autonomy prior to Mitterand’s reform.
Patterns of evolution of dual Canadian-Quebecois identity over time
have showed clear evidence of a strong association between ‘Quebecer’
identity and support for provincial sovereignty for Quebec. The
Quebecois in Canada have mounted a nationalist challenge to the state.
Secession requests are nothing novel in the grand old Federation of
the United States itself: South Carolina, the state whose 1860 secession
sparked the civil war, has renewed its intentions in response to Barack
Obama’s victory and Texas, which considers itself a ‘republic,’ not a
mere ‘state,’ almost annually mentions secession in the context of
disagreements with Washington.
The dynamics of national and ethnic identity under devolution
In multi-ethnic societies, various ethnic groups may claim to project
‘dual identities’ made up of predominant or partial regional and common
national cultural identities. Contrary to the assumption that ‘dual
identity’ is an expression of support for the state, the regional
identity by its very nature tends to inflate under devolved power
structures, challenging the central state with increasing demands for
more autonomy and independence: the degree of regional or subnational
consciousness is closely intertwined with unreasonable demands for
constitutional reform and the level of autonomy for the provinces.
Changing identities and preference for more autonomy in the regional
electorates, and grievances arising out of perceived status inequalities
associated with devolution ensure continuing demands for ever-expanding
powers and authority from regional electorates, and the ‘strategic
calculus’ of elites who seek to ‘lead’ take up the cudgels. The tendency
to disregard the conciliatory gestures of the State further increases
the probabilities of demands for more autonomy and independence. Over
time, ethnic myths become powerful political instruments that can
destroy national solidarity and social integration for the sake of
regional privilege. The end result would be more conflict, court
challenges and demands for secession.
Sri Lanka does not need devolution
Devolution has always been an instrument of the ‘divide and rule’
strategy of the neo-colonialists. Cunningly, they present it as a
‘solution’ to the problems of multi-ethnic societies that are based
primarily on limited economic opportunities resulting from ever
shrinking national economies. The countries who have adopted devolution
have done so following pressure from ‘donors’ and international money
lenders, the IMF and the World Bank, same instruments that maintain
grossly unfair terms of international trade that causes economic
problems in the first place.
Sri Lanka during its independence struggle, and immediately after,
has been a multi-ethnic state in in which people of all ethnic groups
have lived in solidarity, showing allegiance to the larger polity
inspired by a common history and a set of shared values. The shameful
history of the last 30 years that was an aberration to this long pattern
of national unity should not be allowed to permanently distort the
destiny of the nation.
Like all post-colonial states, Sri Lanka’s past ethnic problems were
not caused by homogenising, state-centric nation-building policies. It
was the worsening levels of poverty that caused the temporary collapse
of the national value system. The poverty and lack of economic
opportunity in Sri Lanka, like in all post-colonial societies, is not
synonymous with ethnic identity as being portrayed by the Western
sponsored research and NGO activity: there are poor Sinhalese in
Moneragala as much as there are poor Tamils in Mannar and poor Muslims
in Kalmunai.
The way to lift these people out of their poverty is not by giving
them their own ‘government’ with another bureaucracy and a fleet of
vehicles; What is needed the government in existence correctly
identifying the projects that can provide them with the economic
opportunities they need.
There are valid governance related objections to devolution too: it
has often resulted in mere transfer of power to regions with inadequate
or ineffective modes of accountability. The remoteness of devolved
governments often insulates them against scrutiny by national media,
contributing to corruption, and other forms of maladministration. The
Sri Lankan experience also shows that it attracts anti-social elements
and other undesirable characters to regional level politics.
Those who campaign against review of the Thirteenth Amendment on
account of Western preference for it may do well to remember that the
American Declaration of Independence dramatically asserts that
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or abolish it, and institute new government.”
Many Sri Lankans agree, and they are taking necessary steps to
sustain the national integrity of Sri Lanka. |