Reconciliation, Sri Lanka and the world

Text of a presentation on January 10th at the Observatory Research Foundation, Delhi

by Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, MP, Adviser on Reconciliation to the President

The report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation is now public. It has been generally welcomed, and the exceptions that prove the rule sadly confirm the distinction between those who seek reconciliation and those who have other motives in the extraordinary campaign that has been conducted against Sri Lanka over the last two years

The vast majority of local and international observers have welcomed the Report, though many have noted that a positive report will serve little purpose if its recommendations are not implemented. This is an understandable caveat, for Sri Lanka has not always acted as swiftly as it should, and it has also often failed to publicize its actions. This latter shortcoming is unfortunate, not just because it allows critics to claim that nothing is being done, but more seriously because it prevents the analysis both by government and by concerned persons with no axe to grind of achievements, and thus, as importantly, understanding of deficiencies that need to be corrected.

International community

This inadequacy has been startlingly illustrated by the failure to work coherently enough on the interim recommendations submitted by the Commission. Initially these were not adequately publicized. This was not because of any commitment to confidentiality, since they were soon enough readily known by anyone who was interested, but simply because government did not seem to realize the importance of the recommendations and of, not only acting, but being seen to act. Though a committee was set up to ensure implementation, the lack of transparency in this regard, and what can only be described as a concomitant absence of any sense of urgency, allowed for the feeling that government was not really serious. The views of the Commission, that many current problems might have been avoided had their recommendations been implemented coherently, is quite understandable.

I say this with a slight but not overwhelming sense of guilt because one of my functions, as Adviser on Reconciliation, was supposed to be to ‘Monitor and report to the President on progress with regard to the Interim Recommendations of the LLRC, and promote appropriate activities for this purpose through the relevant Ministries. In mitigation I can plead that, though my appointment was made in January 2011, my terms of reference were only received in May. And I finally received an office only in October, with one operational staffer in December. I have no budget for work, though since December I have been supplied with fuel for visits to the North.

Positive approach

Why such incoherence? Whilst I have no illusions about the slowness with which government moves, in general, and find this culpable, I should also note that the more vociferous members of the international community, those who now criticize the LLRC Report, were not really concerned with reconciliation, as opposed to their own agendas. With a stunning ignorance of history, and exemplars such as South Africa and Chile where the country moved forward without bruising animosities, they confused reconciliation with retribution. Even more absurdly, they thought it was the democratically elected government that should be punished, not terrorists or those who hijacked power and used it brutally as the Pinochet government in Chile or the apartheid regime in South Africa, both of which were allowed to go away quietly as it were.

What is the reason for this? On the one hand there were countries such as Britain and other European states that were worried about the electoral power of the Tamil Diaspora, and assumed that its more vociferous members were decisive factors. Fortunately that populist perspective has now diminished, and perhaps one of the most heartening developments in recent months has been the impression Britain has given of wanting to move on, instead of dwelling in the unprincipled wickedness of the Miliband years.

But, conversely, the United States of America seems to have got more intense, as was exemplified by its efforts to suborn military personnel to give evidence against the Sri Lankan state. The recent efforts of its political affairs officer to pressurize government with regard to Sarath Fonseka, whom earlier the Americans had fingered as a possible war crimes suspect, is only explicable in terms of a sense of guilt about the garden path up which he was led. I should note that one should not of course generalize about the Americans. Even more than other countries, they seem to suffer from schizophrenia with regard to foreign policy, as was exemplified by the positive approach of their Defence Attache in Colombo, who was promptly rebuked for his pains. But, in addition to the endemic tussle between foreign affairs and defence perspectives, America also suffers from a strange combination of ruthless self interest, as their performances in Iraq and Pakistan over the years have shown, and a desire to be seen as decent guys. For Sri Lanka this has led to astonishing levels of persecution since, as one forthright Republican observer put it, the bleeding hearts had to keep quiet about Guantanamo and everything else they had shouted about before, so they transferred their attention to Sri Lanka.

Political settlement

Instructively, and I believe this is where India must be careful not to allow itself to be used, I have heard some Western observers claiming that the policy of persecuting Sri Lanka is also in India’s interests, since otherwise our government is not likely to move on the political settlement that was anticipated. If so, the adoption of Sarath Fonseka as the preferred candidate for the Presidency was a very strange way of showing it. Instead of recognizing that the President had to repudiate the Fonseka philosophy of post-war-arrangements so as to be able to move on with reconciliation, a strange combination of social butterflies in Colombo and perverse diplomats decided to espouse the Fonseka cause. Sadly they managed to convince the Tamil National Alliance to follow suit, and it seems to be no coincidence that the principal Sri Lankan criticism of the LLRC Report came from the TNA, as though to reinforce the otherwise isolated American perspective.

All this has done untold damage to one of the main areas in which action is needed to achieve reconciliation, namely constitutional reforms to promote the empowerment of the Tamil people. I myself believe that the leadership of the TNA is sincere about seeking a solution within the framework of a unified Sri Lanka, but their unremitting persecution of the government with regard to what they suggest are war crimes does not help to create the confidence that is needed if power is to be shared further. If indeed they felt that crimes had been committed, endorsing Sarath Fonseka was a strange way to express indignation. To claim, after having done that, that retributory justice is required seems hypocritical and it is therefore understandable that doubts remain about the commitment to reconciliation of at least some members of the TNA.

To be continued