What Darusman and Weiss fail to say
Prof Rajiva Wijesinha MP
The comparatively positive nature of the 2009 US State Department Report
Late in 2009 the US Department of State produced a ‘Report to
Congress on Incidents during the Recent Conflicts in Sri Lanka’. The
Report was shared in a very positive manner with the Sri Lankan
government, and I regret very much that we did not immediately look into
the matters it mentioned and produce a response to the US.
This was planned, and a Committee for the purpose was in fact
appointed. I have no idea whether the general lack of urgency delayed
things, but soon enough there were good reasons to feel suspicions about
at least some Americans. The shenanigans with regard to General Fonseka
were worrying, though I suspect we should realize that individual
Americans may have exceeded their briefs in this regard. As with Sri
Lankans, we cannot assume concerted policy in all cases where
individuals go out on a limb, though again, as with Sri Lankans, the
tendency to stand together leads to misunderstanding. Still, we should
understand that, at least in the American Defence establishment, there
is a positive attitude to what we achieved. Indeed there is also
awareness that excessive hypocrisy can be self-defeating, if ever
international instruments subject America to the same relentless
criticism some individuals apply to us, whether through
self-righteousness or other more sinister motives.
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Prof Rajiva Wijesinha MP |
What was interesting about the State Department Report was that it
was balanced and indeed made clear the contribution of the LTTE to any
abuses that might have occurred. Whereas some of those working for the
UN took pains to suggest that government also bore some culpability with
regard to child soldiers, the Report records 18 allegations about this
appalling practice of the LTTE. Indeed if any blame should attach to the
UN for its activities in Sri Lanka, it is with regard to the condoning
of this practice by the UN in the years after the Ceasefire Agreement.
The conduct of Joanna van Gerpen, who connived at the continuing
recruitment of children over 17, with her failure to ensure proper use
of the 1 million dollars that were given to the LTTE for rehabilitation,
seems to me deplorable, and she should be deemed guilty by association
at least of War Crimes, with appropriate recompense paid to those who
suffered.
LTTE responsibility for civilian casualties
More telling, because unusual for a State Department Report, is the
record of LTTE responsibility for civilian casualties during the last
months of the conflict. There are 36 reports (or 35, since one may be a
duplicate) of the LTTE forcibly holding onto civilians and moving them
into more and more constricted areas. Several of these involve firing,
with injuries and even deaths resulting. Nearly 200 deaths were reported
as arising direct from deliberate LTTE targeting of the civilians it had
kept hostage. These included children, beginning with a 7 year old girl
in February.
Astonishingly, this was not highlighted at the time, though it seems
the UN had the information, and produced it much later, ‘in a July 1
report by the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed
Conflict’, when it could serve no purpose in terms of restraining the
LTTE. It should also be noted that, though the State Department Report
does not mention this, the Jaffna University Teachers for Human Rights
recorded a much larger number of civilians killed when they tried to get
away - ‘The LTTE also for the first time, on 14th May, announced that
civilians who wanted to leave could leave. However, there were some
instances after that where they had ordered would be escapees not to do
so. We reported in Special Report No.32 that a large group of civilians,
who went to a palmyra nursery near Nanthikadal Lagoon before dawn on the
14th to cross to the other side or to Vattuvakkal to the south, were
shot at by the LTTE killing about 500 of them. We have had further
confirmation of this’.
This is appalling, but there were even more insidious incidents of
murder. The US Report records eleven incidents (or perhaps thirteen,
since there were a couple of reports of shelling from less than 500
metres, from directions that could have meant the LTTE was responsible)
in which it was reported that the LTTE fired from near civilians and
hospitals, or actually fired direct on the civilians they were holding.
These were obviously designed to provoke the Sri Lankan forces into
reacting. The first instance of this is reported as having occurred on
January 27th, for which an article in the New York Times cites witnesses
as saying - ‘Our team on the ground was certain that the shell came from
the Sri Lanka military, but apparently in response to an LTTE
shell...The team on the ground had suspected that the rebels were firing
at government forces from close to where civilians were taking shelter.’
Not entirely surprisingly, the Darusman report and Gordon Weiss, both
of which make free with the New York Times to misrepresent something I
wrote, omit this detail. The wording suggests that the witnesses were
part of the UN team that had stayed on in the Wanni, and which Weiss
cites as his chief source for horrors attributed to the Sri Lankan
forces. Clearly the citations have been selective, though he does
mention in passing that ‘the Tigers appeared to have ignored the
brokered agreement meant to safeguard the wounded and medical staff’.
Twice in February there were reports of LTTE fire coming from the
Puthukkudiyirippu Hospital area, while in March, when the civilians had
been herded into a strip on the coast, the LTTE was reported as having
fired shells near the Puttumattalan Hospital. Meanwhile on February 18th
the sources reporting on civilian casualties to the US embassy noted
that ‘it could not be ruled out that the LTTE shelled civilian areas to
assign blame to the SLA’. This suggests that the earlier technique, of
provoking fire, had merged into actually doing the firing and then
blaming the Sri Lankan army. This indeed is what the UN had suggested
way back in January, on the first day on which there were reports of
large numbers of civilian casualties. The UN Resident Coordinator
informed us, having earlier thought that the Sri Lankan forces were
responsible, that he believed most of the firing came from the LTTE.
The blind eyes of Weiss and Darusman
On April 22nd, it was reported that ‘a shell hit the roof of a small
church packed with people...The witness sustained shrapnel wounds in his
back. He believed the attack was committed by the LTTE’. This incident
takes on added significance because the reference is probably to the
Valaignamardam Church, which was used as a refuge for those escaping
from LTTE conscription. UTHR recorded that in March the LTTE stormed the
church to reclaim there victims but ‘ the victims evidently did not want
to give up without a fight. The LTTE opened fire and killed four persons
inside the church. As panic and terror spread the church emptied. One
observer described the scene of wailing and mourning as one, whose
profound imprint the shore and landscape would long remember. The LTTE
brought a stream of buses, packed the young and moved them away in quick
succession to Mullivaikkal’.
Gordon Weiss seems to ignore this incident completely, while the
Darusman panel presents it in their usual anodyne fashion as far as the
LTTE is concerned, with their usual lack of precision as to dates
(unless indeed the incident occurred twice) - ‘On one occasion in
mid-April, LTTE cadre, led by the former Trincomalee Political Wing
leader known as Ezhilan, forcibly recruited hundreds of young people
from Valayanmadam Church and put them on buses to Mullivaikkal’. The
fact that the young people had initially gathered there for refuge under
the protection of the clergy, and that some had been shot, is
conveniently omitted’.
Darusman also omits shelling of the church, which TamilNet had
alleged, claiming that ‘Rev Father James Pathinathar, a prominent
Catholic priest was injured in SLA shelling that hit the Church in
Valaignarmadam’. UTHR had a different take on what happened - Since the
Army was expected to move south, many who wanted to get out of LTTE
control remained in the church. Ilamparithy and Elilan once more came to
the church and wanted the fathers to move to Mullivaikkal. The fathers
refused. There was at this juncture nothing but mutual aversion between
them and the LTTE. On an earlier occasion the fathers had wanted the
LTTE to surrender in order to spare the civilians the enormous suffering
imposed on them. The LTTE had become very angry’.
Tiger appropriation of nationalists until they offered resistance
It was in that context that UTHR reports that ‘On 22nd April a single
shell fell in the church and Fr. James Pathinathar was injured’. About
this they state that ‘Although wary of its totalitarian aims,
nationalists generally avoided confrontation with the LTTE and were
frequently cornered and appropriated by it’. Weiss evidently subscribed
to this tactic of the LTTE, since he only mentions Pathinathar once, to
say that despite problems with the LTTE he claimed that ‘“people here
know they have more to gain from supporting the Tigers”’. The quotation
is not dated, and nothing is said about the priest’s trials in March and
April.
UTHR goes on to say that ‘After the last incident of shelling, a
senior educationist who was a few hundred yards south of the church,
told us that based on what the people gathered of the shell’s origin and
trajectory, the general consensus was that the LTTE fired it. Another
shell which fell the next day, led to the amputation of one of Fr.
Vasanthaseelan’s legs. He and Fr. Pathinathar were subsequently removed
by ICRC ship. Fr. Pathi is credited by several persons who were in the
NFZ of having tried to protect would-be-conscripts.
The more than 3000 people remaining around the church and environs,
including some Christian clergy and religious workers, were sent across
once the Army moving south reached Valaignarmadam about 25th April. A
person who stayed about 300 yards south of the church told us that on
looking out of his bunker about 26th April, he saw a soldier near the
church signalling him to come forward. Thus began his journey to an IDP
camp and the end of the role played by Our Lady of the Rosary during
those times’.
That narrative is perhaps the best comment on the relentless claims
of TamilNet and Darusman and Weiss about government shelling of
civilians. Given all this we should be thankful for the small mercies
offered by the US State Department in bothering to record another side
of the story.
LTTE shelling in the final days responsible for the majority of
those killed
That Report goes on to say that, on May 9th, ‘Witnesses stated that
the LTTE shelled from civilian areas. The SLA shelled, but once inside
they helped to evacuate the civilians they had access to, including the
injured. A local source confirmed that the casualties were mainly from
SLA shelling, but the LTTE had also been firing at the SLA’. This is
certainly not a war crime, and is a far cry from the tactics used in
other areas where the struggle against terror is conducted. And with
regard to the final days of the battle, the Report records the adherence
to humanitarian and legal norms when it states that ‘An organization
reported that, at the beginning of the final operation, the SLA used
shelling that resulted in some civilian casualties.
However, the IDPs to whom the organization spoke were uniformly
emphatic that the SLA shelled only in reply to the LTTE’s mortar and gun
fire from among the civilians. Civilians also said that on May 15 the
SLA stopped shelling when the LTTE began destroying its own equipment.
The organization also reported that some LTTE cadres were going to
bunkers where civilians were sheltered, asking “So you want to run away
to the army do you?” and then opening fire against them’.
This is bad enough, but the Report has an even more damning account
for May 17-18 - ‘An organization reported accounts from IDPs of heavy
fighting from the night of May 17 into the morning of May 18. The IDPs
were certain, based on the direction from which the shells were coming,
that a large number, perhaps the majority, of those killed in the NFZ
during the previous 12 hours of fighting were killed by LTTE forces’.
Now we have to remember that all these are reports. There are other
reports which are critical of the forces. How much credit we give to
each report will depend to some extent on our personal perspectives. But
there seems to be no doubt about certain basic facts -
a) The LTTE kept civilians back forcibly
b) It was prepared to kill those who resisted or tried to escape
c) It conscripted civilians ruthlessly, including children
d) It was prepared to kill those who resisted
e) It fired from the midst of civilians and areas which should have been
kept free of fighting
f) It did this to provoke the forces into firing back
g) It was prepared to have the civilians from amongst whom it fired
killed
h) It was prepared to risk damage to hospitals with concomitant loss of
civilian life
i) It fired into the midst of the civilians it was holding hostage
j) Killing of the hostages increased over the last few months
Army efforts to minimize civilian casualties , This has to be taken
in conjunction with the following facts -
a) During the initial military operations, even taking TamilNet
figures into account, there were hardly any civilian casualties
b) On the first day that many civilian casualties were reported, the UN
thought most of the firing had come from the LTTE
c) There are several instances of the army refraining from firing on
civilians even when provoked
d) The army in many instances facilitated the escape of civilians
It is possible that individual acts of abuse occurred and, if
evidence about this is proferred, alleged incidents should be
investigated. But the list proferred by the US State Department suggests
that much of what is reported would come within the sphere of possible
collateral damage resulting from the ruthless techniques adopted by the
Tigers. I have looked elsewhere at allegations with regard to hospitals,
and shown how repeated claims make it clear that hospitals themselves
were not targeted, and indeed continued to operate after what were
claimed to be several assaults.
I believe comparison of the other incidents recorded with the
pronouncements of TamilNet at the time of conflict will make it clear
that in those instances too there is little evidence of culpability on
the part of the forces. Taken as a whole the US State Department Report
suggests that deliberate targeting of civilians did not take place, and
the slow progress of our forces despite superior fire power makes it
clear that we did our best to abide by basic norms. |