Gordon Weiss sees 'role-model' in Prabhakaran - clone
- Jonas Savimbi:
To Weiss's readers, he only owes the truth
Prof Rajiva WIJESINHA MP
I never met Gordon Weiss. This surprised Zola Dowell, head of the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Sri Lanka, for
I had often complained to her and her senior colleagues about him, but
understandably enough our paths never crossed. The book he has written
now serves to confirm my view that junior staff of the UN came to Sri
Lanka with particular agendas, some insidious, some based on idealism
that was vague and/or intense. This led to conflicts with senior staff,
and confidences to journalists that contradicted the official position
of the UN - irregularities justified in the belief that they served a
higher purpose, identified only by the perpetrator.
Weiss's irritation with his superiors comes through forcefully in the
book, culminating in the assertion near the end of the narrative that
'One senior UN official did not help matters by rashly announcing to the
BBC that all civilians had been rescued'. This approach explains why,
after one of my several complaints, Neil Buhne, Head of the UN, just
sighed, 'Oh, Gordon!' But this was not an unusual situation, for I was
told also by a Head of Mission, in confidence, that he had a lot of
trouble with his own junior staff - all of which explains perhaps why
Prabhakaran and his senior commanders never doubted that what they
termed the international community would rescue them in the end. More
horrifyingly, this could also explain why they had no qualms about
taking so many civilians hostage, believing that they would thus help
their supporters, still deluded into thinking of them as freedom
fighters, to cry havoc, and ensure continuation of the dogs of war.
Weiss's narrative also confirms the conclusion I reached when I first
read the Darusman report, that perhaps the most insidious of UN
officials at the time was the South African Head of Security, Chris du
Toit. I had noted after reading the report that du Toit was probably the
man who set up what was termed a network of observers, and I suggested
then that our Ministry of External Affairs call in the Head of the UN
and find out how and with what mandate such a network had been set up.
Weiss confirms my deduction, it revealing that 'Du Toit would be the
driving force behind the gathering of much of the intelligence revealing
that large numbers of civilians were being killed'. Even more
interestingly, Weiss gives us more of his previous history - 'Retired
colonel Chris Du Toit of the South African Defence Force was a graduate
of some of the toughest campaigns fought by his country in the jungles
and veldts of southern Africa.
Those words brought back a constant refrain of Dayan Jayatilleka in
the long evenings in Geneva when we were preparing for yet another
onslaught by Weiss type proxy guerilla forces. He used to talk about the
awful nature of the Angolan guerilla movement, led by a man called Jonas
Savimbi, who proved a personal block to peace. After he died his
guerilla movement folded up and Angola finally achieved peace, a
phenomenon Dayan said would be replicated in Sri Lanka once Prabhakaran
was dead.
Dayan obviously could not anticipate a man who had worked with
Savimbi's forces organizing and training another type of long range
guerilla movement. The information confirmed what I had long argued,
that Sri Lanka was simply too indulgent to the UN about letting in staff
without a proper assessment of whether they were suited to the job they
were supposed to be doing on behalf of our people. Weiss however is full
of adulation for this hard-bitten military man , singling out only du
Toit (apart from his his racquets partner Vincent Hubin, whom I finally
met at the very end of his stay here) of UN officials to thank in his
list of acknowledgments. Du Toit receives perhaps the greatest accolade
possible from a man like Weiss, for he is thanked 'for his example'.
What was that example? It seems to be secretiveness combined with
falsehood. This is apparent from the great set piece in the middle of
Weiss's book, which constitutes also one of the main sections in the
Darusman report used to attack the Sri Lankan government. It deals with
what is termed 'Convoy 11', the convoy that went into the Wanni to take
food to the civilians - and the Tigers - on January 16th 2009. The
chapter of that name begins with a lie, when Weiss claims that in
January 2009 a majority of '330,000 people' waited in a triangle of land
one third the size of London. Then, with what is standard precision for
Weiss, he declares that '10,000 to 40,000 civilians died, and many more
were seriously injured', for which no evidence whatsoever is provided
(Weiss's difficulties with numbers is apparent from the fact that he
claims the ICRC evacuated 18,000 patients and bystanders by sea, when
the actual figure was under 14,000, with only 4,000 of these being
wounded).
Part of the convoy stayed on in the Vanni for nearly two weeks. Weiss
does not mention that they did so without permission, ostensibly to
negotiate the release of their staff whom the Tigers were holding
hostage. It had earlier been claimed that permission would be granted
for these to leave, but day after day the Tigers refused, so that the
halting of operations by Sri Lankan forces, day after day, was in vain.
All this placed the UN under considerable strain, as I found when we had
meetings with them to discuss the humanitarian assistance which my
Ministry was coordinating. I still remember one evening when Neil Buhne
kept hoping his people would be released, only to be let down yet again.
I told him then that, had the Sri Lankan side done the half of what
the Tigers were doing, the UN would have been down on us like a ton of
bricks. He agreed, and added, 'But you guys would't....' He paused, and
I finished the sentence for him, 'Kill you,', and he nodded.
None of this comes through in Weiss's narrative, the indulgence day
after day by the Sri Lankan forces to what seemed a reckless decision of
the UN to stay on in the Wanni in a quest that turned out to be
hopeless. I suspect they knew it was hopeless all along, and now,
instead of thinking they were being quixotic, I realize that perhaps
they were simply doing what Chris du Toit had wanted all along,
information that large numbers of civilians were being killed.
We suspected something of the sort, for it was soon after that the
story was leaked that a thousand or so civilians had been killed. That
was when my Minister asked me to call du Toit in, and Nishan
Muthukrishna, our Human Rights advisor, and I, questioned him closely.
He said then that there were three categories to make up the figure:
direct observation by UN staff, eyewitness reports and extrapolation,
which was assessments based on reports of incidents. The methodology was
never changed as far as we were informed, which is doubtless why the UN
in Sri Lanka was wary about the figures.
My recollection was that du Toit spoke about the incident as though
he had been there himself, though Weiss says otherwise, and that it was
his subordinate, a Bangladeshi colonel usually stationed in Vavuniya,
who actually stayed on in the Wanni. Anyway, Weiss acknowledges that,
with regard to the shooting that was supposed to have taken place near
Puthukkudiyirippu Hospital, the colonel who was quartered in a house
just across the way from the hospital, slept soundly. Weiss quotes the
colonel as describing scenes of horror, but du Toit told us none of this
when we met. He also noted that he could not say with any certainty from
which direction the firing had come. He had brought with him large
pictures of craters caused by shells, and he took out one and said that
was the only shot the direction of which they could be certain of, and
that had come from the direction of the LTTE forces.
That was the day on which Neil had rung up my Minister early morning
to say that we were firing into the No Fire Zone. My Minister had
checked with the army which had denied this, and later the Bishop of
Jaffna had issued a statement asking the LTTE to withdraw its heavy
weapons from the Zone. That evening Neil sent my Minister an sms to say
that they believed most of the firing had come from the LTTE. But none
of us figures in Weiss's book, and he would doubtless have dismissed it
as yet another rash announcement.
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