SHIPPING

Maritime security and port facility security code

Rear Admiral - Jayanath Colombage

It is a well-known fact that oceans connect the world and 70 percent of the earth’s surface is water, whether it is the ocean, rivers or lake or estuaries. Even those countries which are landlocked are depending on the ocean for their sustenance.

Sri Lanka is situated, geographically in a very advantages position. The major East -West trade routes are located very close to the southern part of the island.

We have a long history of maritime traditions and our forefathers have shown a great maritime affinity and ventured into faraway lands by sea. We have gone through three decades of conflict but our ports were never closed and sea lanes were always kept opened.

Maritime security can be defined as “Measures taken by owners, operators, administrators of vessels, port facilities, other maritime organizations or establishments to protect against; terrorism, sabotage, stowaway, illegal migrants, asylum seekers, piracy, armed robbery, smuggling or theft of vessels”.

It is a concept that includes military science, police science, security management, sociology, domestic and international law, history and world trade. Maritime security policies can be issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), various international conventions, own legislations or bi-lateral or regional conventions.

When one considers the threats to maritime domain, terrorism tops the list. Maritime terrorism obviously takes place in the maritime environment and not a new phenomenon.

The famous terrorist attack on cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985 has given birth to the IMO convention ‘for suppression of unlawful acts against maritime navigation of 1988’.

This conventions preamble stated that the world is deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all forms.

A maritime terrorist is one who, for political purpose or in order to affect the exercise of another state’s or political entity’s rights, attempt to do any of the following; Seize or exercise unlawful control over a ship or other maritime structure by threat or force, perform or threaten an act of violence against a person on board which is likely to endanger safe navigation, destroy or damage, or place a device likely to destroy or damage, a ship, maritime platform, cargo or navigational facility, knowingly communicate false information which endangers safe navigation.

LTTE was considered as a terrorist group which had developed international maritime capability. They operated a merchant fleet under various flags of convenience with front offices in many capitals in the world. LTTE used purpose built craft to carry out attacks against military as well as civilian targets.

They pioneered the black sea tiger suicide craft and was determined to take control of the sea from the Sri Lanka Navy. However the Sri Lanka Navy was able to maintain dominance at sea whilst denying the same to the LTTE sea tigers.

In 2000, a US Navy destroyer, USS Cole was attacked by a suicide boat launched as a port service boat when the ship was berthed at port of Eden, Yemen. A similar attack was carried out against Very Large Crude Carrier MT Limburg when the ship was entering port of Dhaba in Yemen in 2002.

The world maritime community was greatly worried about the safety and security at sea and the freedom of the commerce by sea. The terrorist attacked targets in the USA in September 2001, which included World Trade Center and Pentagon. The terrorist used hijacked passenger aircraft to carry out these devastating attacks on US targets and the ship itself was seen as a possible weapon.

USA was greatly concerned the possibility of a ship arriving at a port carrying weapons of mass destruction, which is capable of destroying not only the port but the adjacent population.

When analyzing past terrorist incidents at sea the following key lessons could be drawn; terrorists plan well ahead of an operation, they observe the ships and port facilities before launching an attack, they will try to recruit crew members or port employees, all ships and port facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, sparsely manned cargo ships are more vulnerable than passenger ships, and, access control to ship or port is most important.

Terrorism is not the only threat to maritime security. Cargo theft, stowaways, drugs and weapon smuggling, sabotage and arson and piracy could be considered as non terrorism related threats.

Piracy is a crime of opportunity and an economically motivated activity, which is a major threat to international shipping.

If the LTTE was not defeated, they would have used their maritime capabilities to pirate ships passing Sri Lanka and that would have been a major threat to maritime commerce in the Indian Ocean.

Somali pirates who operate from the horn of Africa and long distances away from the Somali mainland into the Indian ocean are a major threat to maritime trade at present and concentrated efforts of the international community will be needed to curb this menace.

The LTTE was involved in large scale smuggling of weapons, explosives and other ordnance by sea. Two questions are relevant about these large scale smuggling operations. How was it possible for the LTTE to acquire large quantities of weapons and other war fighting materials from various parts of the world, despite strict international control regimes in place? And how was it possible, for the LTTE ships to transfer these items on board their ships and sail in the oceans and dock them in various ports, without being detected by law enforcement authorities? The argument in the case of non terrorism related maritime threats is that, if a criminal, drug trafficker, pirate or armed robber can breach your security, a terrorist certainly can and it can also be observed, that measures needed to combat terrorism will assist in combating other illegal activities.

This was clearly evident in Sri Lanka ports Maritime crime went down to a very low level due to counter terrorist action taken by the Sri Lanka Navy.

However it is important to understand that a balance must be made between security and trade and trade has to continue. In the case of Sri Lankan ports this was balanced very well. Despite the threat posed by the terrorists and enhanced security measures, our ports were never closed and sea lanes were kept opened.

Sri Lankan ports have experienced suicide craft attacks, under water saboteur attacks, threat from sea mines, moored and limpet mines, attacks by underwater craft, attacks against Merchant Vessels at anchorage, alongside berths and at sea, Improvised Explosive threat, indirect fire from distant areas and attacks by light aircraft. These acts go to prove that Sri Lankan ports have been under terrorist threat for a long time. Shipping is perhaps the most international of all the world great industries and one of the most dangerous. Since mid 19th century, there had been many treaties adopted to improve safety at sea.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the agency for introducing maritime legislations to the world. There are about 40 such conventions and protocols adopted by the IMO thus far. These have been updated from time to time so as to ensure that they are in line with the changes taking place in the world.

IMO has seen a renewed focus on security since the terrorist atrocities in the USA in September 2011.

This led to a diplomatic conference in London in 2002. IMO resolution A 924 (22) “Prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism against shipping”, in November 2002. With this resolution, IMO called for a review of the existing IMO instruments and the possible development of new provisions to; Prevent and suppress terrorist acts against ships at sea and in ports, Improve security on board and ashore, deter acts of violence and crime at sea, and enhance maritime security.

The result was amendments to convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 74). SOLAS 74, chapter V was amended and chapter XI was renumbered as XI-I and a new chapter was created as Chapter XI-2. This new chapter XI-2 was the International Ship and Port facility Security Code (ISPS Code). In the amended chapter V, it was made mandatory for all ships above 300 gross tonnages, engaged in international voyages to install and maintain in operational condition an Automatic Identification System (IAS).

The re-numbered Chapter XI-1 provided guide lines on Ship Identification Number (also known as the IMO number) and Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR). The chapter XI-2 , which is the ISPS Code consist of two parts: Part A- Mandatory Requirements and Part b- Guidance regarding provisions of chapter XI-2

Part A of the ISPS Code has to be read together with the guidance offered in part B. For a full understanding it is also necessary to refer to the regulations contained in SOLAS chapter XI-2 and to guidance in certain of the Conference resolutions adopted by the 2002 Diplomatic Conference.

Part “A” of the ISPS Code mandates that each port

* Appoint a dedicated PFSO

* Conduct a comprehensive PFSA

* Prepare a three level threat preparedness program known as PFSP That all shipping companies

* Appoint a company security officer (CSO)

* Inspect each ship and appoint a ship security officer (SSO)

* Prepare a ship security threat assessment

* Prepare three-level individual ship security plan

* The guidance in the ISPS Code part B relates primarily to the protection of the ship when it is at a port facility

* It should not be read or interpreted in conflict with any of the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 or part A of the Code

ISPS Code is applicable for all Passenger ships including high speed passenger craft, cargo ships, including high speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, mobile off shore drilling units and Port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

ISPS Code is not intended to apply to port facilities designed and used primarily for military purposes. ISPS Code is not applicable for naval ships and naval auxiliaries.

The ISPS Code mandates that every port facility and ship prepares a port facility security plan and ship security plan for three levels of security as follows;

Security Level 1: Minimum appropriate protective security measures to be maintained at all times

Security Level 2: Appropriate additional protective security measures which shall be maintained for a period owing to a heightened risk of a security incident

Security Level 3: Further specific protective security measures maintained for a limited period when a security incident is probable or imminent

As for the ISPS Code, A Port State may require that ships intending to enter its ports provide information to ensure compliance with Chapter XI-2 prior to entry into port with the aim of avoiding the need to impose control measures.

The biggest change is that the contracting governments to the 1974 SOLAS convention are able to formally exercise control over ships in accordance with the provision of chapter XI-2 and of the ISPS code.

When a valid ISS Certificate cannot be produced or when there are ‘Clear Grounds’ for believing that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 or Part A of the ISPS Code, certain control measures may be taken against such ships. Such control measures are:

Inspection of the ship,

Delaying the ship,

Detention of the ship,

Restriction of operations including movement within the port, or

Expulsion of the ship from port.

The Manila amendments to the STCW Convention and Code were adopted on June 25, 2010, marking a major revision of the STCW Convention and Code. The 2010 amendments are set to enter into force on January 1, 2012, aimed at bringing the Convention and Code up to date with developments since they were initially adopted and to enable them to address issues that are anticipated to emerge in the foreseeable future.

New requirements for security training, as well as provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly trained to cope if their ship comes under attack by pirates is going to be addressed in this new amendment.

How did Sri Lanka achieve ISPS status? On May 17, 2004 the Commander of the Navy was appointed as the Designated Authority for all ports in Sri Lanka as per the ISPS Code. The naval area commanders who are also the competent authority for major ports in Sri Lanka were directed to prepare port facility security assessment (PFSA) as per the ISPS Code.

Port Security Committees were established and meetings conducted. All facilities were visited and security audits carried out and PFSAs were submitted to DA by May 21, 2004.

Port Facility Security Officers were appointed by May 31, 2004. Port Facility Security Plans were submitted by May 31, 2004. On June 14, 2004 ISPS Code was fully implemented on a trial basis.