Sri Lanka’s humanitarian effort:

How the state met Northern food needs

Extracts from the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province 2011 Report

Continued from yesterday

A special logistical hub was set up in Vavuniya by the government with WFP and UN agencies to facilitate the storage of nearly 5000MT of food and non-food items in order to accelerate supplies to the Vanni. This was to ensure speedy supplies to the Vanni and to reduce the turnaround time of the supply fleet.

The process in the uncleared areas was monitored by ICRC in consultation with the respective GAs. In the final stages, delivery of essential supplies to Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts were escorted by the ICRC. Even on occasions where the ICRC was hesitant to escort the convoys, the government ensured that the movement of supplies continued. However, government’s total control in the distribution of essentials to the population was limited. LTTE always took first choice of all supplies sent, and giving the leftover to the civilian population.

Shortcomings and bottlenecks affecting supplies were brought to the notice of the CGES and the government ministries by GAs and to the CCHA by the respective sub-committees almost on real time basis and decisions were taken promptly to remedy the situation. Mechanisms were set in place to avoid delays while going through checkpoints with the assistance and co-operation of the Security Forces. To ease cross loading and delays at Medawachchiya and Omanthai check points, special arrangements were made for government /WFP trucks to be checked and sealed in Colombo by Sri Lanka Army (SLA). However delays in uncleared areas were reported frequently.

Humanitarian aid trucks

Whilst government staff was available seven days a week at Omanthai entry/exit point, the ICRC restricted its presence to four days a week during the latter stages of 2008, thereby restricting vehicle movements. The LTTE deliberately turning-away WFP humanitarian aid trucks, imposing restrictions on aid staff and seizing of WFP supply trucks in uncleared areas hindered timely supply to civilians. Limited working hours and occasional withdrawal of ICRC monitoring staff due to security concerns at the checkpoint controlled by the LTTE further restricted the available supply.

During the period January 2008 upto early May 2009 altogether 58,393 MT of essential items were sent to Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts under the three categories of supplies mentioned in paragraph 28. This was in addition, there was a three month combined government supplied buffer stock available in location as confirmed by the GA Mullaithivu.

As in the case of assistance to the civilians of Jaffna peninsula, a special focus was given to provide all assistance required for maintaining agricultural and livelihood activities, so that the civilians in the uncleared areas could continue their farming activities and maintain regular income. Requirement of fertilizer on a subsidised basis as given to farmers in the rest of the country was made available to these two districts. Farmers in these districts benefited immensely by this contribution.

Large quantities of fuel including kerosene were also sent to the Vanni un-cleared areas. Every month, between five to six hundred thousand litres of fuel was sent to each district. The supply of fuel ensured the continued functioning of the government institutions including hospitals and transport services.

Security Forces

Supply of Kerosine ensured that the population could cook, operate their farming equipment and meet other household requirements. However, it was reported that the fuel supplied by the government was used by the LTTE as well in their terrorist operations.

A large quantity of fuel stored by the LTTE was found after May 2009. The government also approved considerable quantity of fuel to UN agencies, the ICRC, I/NGOs working in these areas throughout this period. While the government was making every effort to make services available to the people in Vanni despite numerous impediments, the LTTE by sabotaging these efforts, attempted to use food as a strategic weapon. This was demonstrated by the fact that the government had to make strenuous efforts to keep the road open for more than three days a week.

During the latter part of 2008, supplying of essentials into the Vanni got progressively complex. Change in land route in Vanni due to security reasons caused concerns both to the government and the UN.

The Security Forces quickly opened alternate routes and facilitated the transport of humanitarian assistance. However it took time for the UN agencies to obtain security clearance from UNDSS resulting in undue delays to transport essentials. The government convoys however persisted and delivered supplies overcoming road obstructions encountered.

By October 2008, WFP, along with other agencies, left Kilinochchi and relocated themselves in Vavuniya, CGES enhanced supplies to Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts. CGES in consultation with WFP arranged special convoys every week to the Vanni.

ICRC and UN vehicles

The WFP carried 12 such convoys from October 2008 to January 2009, delivering 7,694 metric tons of food to both districts. As requested at the CCHA, WFP purchased extra-long trucks in late 2008.

Priority lanes at checkpoints were established for ICRC and UN vehicles to expedite this food delivery operation. The increase of food supply was a direct result of the intervention made by the government in response to the ground situation.

To be continued