National conflict and transnational consequences:

North East economic revival

Keynote Address delivered by External Affairs Minister Professor G L Peiris, at the symposium organized jointly by the Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka in Colombo on October 26, 2010. First part of this article was published yesterday

Among the 87 were persons against whom very serious charges including murder were proffered and they are wanted in this country.

The time has come to take a fresh look at the orthodox conceptions and assumptions of international law. In principle, when a group of people arrive on the shores of a country claiming refugee status, the receiving country is discouraged from having contact of any kind with the government of the country from which the voyage of the refugees originated. The application of this principle to the Canadian situation brought about immensely unsatisfactory consequences. The upshot of it all was that all of these people have the potential of being released into Canadian society. What is the consequence of that? If this were to happen, there will inevitably be considerable social disorder in that community.

People smuggling

Many of these people will find themselves on the dole. They would be supported by the taxpayers of these countries. They would generally have no fixed abode, no fixed employment and the natural and inevitable consequence of that situation would be proliferation of crime. That, of course, is accompanied by other equally distressing developments, to do with gun running, narcotics, people smuggling, fraud connected with passports and visas, all of which would be the natural result of a situation of that kind. These are matters which the international community needs to be conscious of.

There is certainly at least a moral obligation devolving on them to respond appropriately in order to contain consequences of that nature which emanate from conflict at the stage when the conflict itself has physically come to an end.

I spoke of the need to take a fresh look at the principles of international law governing the reception of refugees, but I think the problem is broader and deeper. It is my view that the traditional corpus of international law does not work and does not adequately serve the international community at this time.

Defence strategy

I read the speech by Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, two days ago, where he made some very relevant remarks on the subject of the role of force in defence strategy. The Prime Minister of India implied that today insurgents and terrorists are able to derive a very considerable advantage from the manner in which International Law is structured and he said we must make it very clear that we have the resolve to combat terror and we have the means at our disposal to accomplish that object. There must be no equivocality or ambiguity on that point at all. This must be a message that must go out loud and clear to insurgents wherever they may be active, in any part of the world.

The backdrop to this is something that we need to reflect upon. The principles of International Law were developed in a particular context. That is true with regard to the formulation of legal principles in any field. The orthodox setting in which these principles received expression and were subsequently refined and developed was in the context of conflict between and among sovereign states.

Today the problem has a totally different dimension. Today the most dangerous conflicts in South Asia are not conflicts between or among states but situations where the legitimate authority of the established state is being challenged and jeopardized by insurgency. That is the familiar pattern.

The most striking characteristic of that situation is asymmetry. There is no reciprocity or uniformity. There is a sovereign state and in opposition to it, an insurgent group.

Territorial borders

The insurgent group is at a decisive advantage. Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom made a very perceptive remark soon after her life was attempted. I am referring to the Brighton bombing. Thatcher was able to save her life only by a whisker. The bomb exploded five minutes after she left the room where it had been placed. She reacted the next morning when she addressed the media. She said, we must remember what a decisive advantage the terrorist has against the lawful Government and her words were, the terrorist chooses the time, the place and the opportunity.

How do you protect every temple, church, bus halt, railway station in the whole country; it is they and they alone who know where the next bomb is going to go off. The response of the IRA to Margaret Thatcher was even more interesting. They said, Madam, we have to be lucky only once; you have to be lucky, every time. That is true.

I am saying this to illustrate to you the obvious reality that, in a conflict of this nature, the terrorist is at an overwhelming advantage.

The principles of International Law which are evolved to deal with that situation must obviously take that reality into account. This underlines the need to look at particular segments of the established corpus of law, for example, the right to preemptive action. We don't believe in preemptive action outside our territorial borders but certainly the right of self- defence in national law does not arise only after you have been attacked.

The substantive criminal laws of India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, all these countries recognize the right of self-defence when there is reasonable apprehension of danger. That, certainly, is a principle that needs to be developed and applied in situations involving conflicts between the State and insurgent groups.

United Nations

There is the argument that is very powerfully and emotionally developed in various quarters that, whatever is done in the aftermath, if it is to be credible and effective, has to be at the international level. There are very influential INGOs espousing this cause with a vengeance, but internationalization brings in its wake very formidable problems. I think right now, the clearest example of that, is Nepal. When I became Foreign Minister in April, soon after that, the first visit overseas was to Thimphu, where, one of the interesting discussions we had was with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Nepal.

We realized how serious the situation there is. The situation on the ground is that the elected government of Nepal does not have full authority to deal with problems connected with arms and ammunition, because the final authority with regard to many of these matters is the United Nations.

So you have, in many of these critical situations a certain condition of atrophy. The Government finds its hands tied and that immeasurably strengthens and emboldens the terrorist groups.

That degree of internalization is a disincentive to effective action by the State and a source of tremendous strength, no doubt unwittingly, to the terrorist groups. We believe that the international order today must be constructed on the premise that countries must be encouraged to deal with their own problems. That is very essential.

Gone are the days of the colonial mentality, when the doctrine was preached that the emerging nations do not have the resources, pecuniary, intellectual and in terms of empirical experience, to deal with matters of this nature. They have to be done for them, by others.

Cultural values

That is a wholly condescending and patronizing attitude which is very much out of line with the mores of the contemporary world. Therefore, we believe, in keeping with the spirit pervading the charter of the United Nations and the values which lie at the core of the United Nations, as an instrument, that the central endeavour must be, to give every encouragement to countries to work out solutions in keeping with their own historical antecedents, their social traditions, their cultural values, all of which change significantly from country to country. There is no size that fits everybody.

That is why, when we were contemplating the legislation and the structures of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), we were certainly happy to benefit from useful experience elsewhere.

To be continued