Analyzing the State Department report
Prof Rajiva WIJESINHA
Supposedly one of the wonders of modern management studies is what is
termed a SWOT analysis. We had to engage in them endlessly when trying
to make good use of funding the World Bank provided for universities
about a decade back, Sadly the present state of the universities
suggests that, while the good universities have arguably got better, the
others have not really developed in the ways that were anticipated. SWOT
it seems turned out to be just that, worthless repetitive labour, not a
way of transforming weaknesses by building on strengths, and turning
what seem threats into opportunities.
I was reminded of this when reading through the recent State
Department report on incidents during the recent conflict in Sri Lanka.
What some have seen as a threat seems rather to provide an opportunity
to make clear the sterling professionalism of the Armed Forces in their
struggle to deal with terrorism.
In this context it is worth noting the detailed study by Neville
Laduwahetty of what he sees as a problem with the report, namely that it
also extends to possible war crimes, whereas it was meant only to look
at possible violations of international humanitarian law. The
distinction is a subtle one, and understandable in a context in which
the United States and its allies have been accused of war crimes, but to
me the advantage of the confusion is that it suggests the report has
recorded every single incident its writers think could possibly be an
offence.
If then one can deal with what is a worst possible case scenario, the
miasma of suspicion that the LTTE has managed to create can conclusively
be laid to rest. Hearteningly, for instance, in its record of
allegations with regard to 'Children in Armed Conflict', the Report has
nothing against the Government, which can be cited finally to silence
those who have been trying to suggest over the last four years that the
Government bears some guilt in this regard too. Tragically, this
position was used to moderate what should have been categorical outrage
about the manner in which the LTTE took many international do-gooders
for a ride while continuing with its disgusting practices.
I refer advisedly to the LTTE creating a miasma of suspicion, since
in fact I have at hand a much larger list of allegations, namely those
that appeared on TamilNet. I monitored these as what seemed to me part
of my responsibilities as Head of the Peace Secretariat, and I would
request reports from the forces of anything that seemed a violation of
human rights - though I should admit that I did not have at my
fingertips the distinction that Ladduwahetty records and which he has
understandably assumed the State Department would be aware of.
It was thus that I was able to put on record in December 2008 the
fact that, on a worst possible case scenario, even the LTTE and its
agents had been able to allege only 78 deaths of civilians at the hands
of the Army from June to December 2008. There were only 74 allegations
of deaths from June 2006 until December 2008 from Air Force sorties,
excluding the incident at Sencholai, where it has been proved that what
was attacked was a training centre.
Whilst the Army was not always able to give me precise details, given
the range of activity, the Air Force reported in detail in each case,
often with maps, on what its target had been. It transpired that they
had engaged in 451 actions until December, and in only 29 of these were
there even allegations of civilian deaths.
In 20 of these instances the alleged casualties were one or two,
which suggests that there was no bombing of civilian targets. In all
cases the military target that was hit was pointed out to me, and these
certainly seemed plausible, as for instance in the case in which the
greatest number of casualties had been alleged, on February 24, when I
was shown that it was a Sea Tiger base that had been attacked, in
Kiranchi in Pooneryn.
I have sometimes felt then that I was responsible for the plethora of
allegations that arose after 2008, after this statistical analysis had
put paid to the claims of institutions such as Human Rights Watch which
asserted with deplorable frequency that we engaged in indiscriminate
attacks on civilians. Sure enough, after I proved this, the numbers of
alleged casualties rose dramatically.
It could be argued that this was because the war had intensified. But
if we look at just the incidents recorded for January, both by me and
(far fewer) by the State Department, we can trace a pattern that
suggests the majority of allegations pertain to damage inflicted by the
LTTE itself.
I say this advisedly, because the UN itself is on record, on January
26, as saying that 'For info we believe that firing this morning most
likely was from an LTTE position'. This message was sent since before
dawn the head of the UN had called up Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe to
report alleged firing by the Army into the No Fire Zone. The Minister
had in turn called up the Vanni SF Commander who assured him that the
firing was by the LTTE.
Further confirmation of this came in the course of the morning when
the Bishop of Jaffna issued a press release in which he said that he
would ask the LTTE to stop using its weapons in the No Fire Zone.
He also noted that he would ask the Army to expand the Zone, which he
would hardly have done if he thought the Army was firing into areas it
had declared safe. Following on this came the admission from the UN.
Significantly enough, the greatest number of allegations of this
sort, apart from those on TamilNet, were put forward by Human Rights
Watch, which had begun the practice of supporting in 2008 the LTTE
effort to suggest that civilians were staying with them of their own
free will. It was Human Rights Watch that began the practice of talking
of internment camps with regard to the centres the Government had set up
for the displaced who sought safety in Government controlled areas. I
pointed out then that HRW would have blood on its hands if it persisted
in providing justification for the LTTE strategy of holding onto
civilians, to use as shields and as bargaining tools.
And worse, as fodder. There is no doubt that, from January, there
began a cynical process, as the UN has testified, of the LTTE firing on
the civilians they were keeping hostage, so as to stir up feeling
against the Sri Lankan Government. Whether through gullibility or worse,
HRW became a useful ally in this process.
Thus we find that, of 34 specific incidents recorded by the State
Department for January, only two were about LTTE actions. Neither of
these was reported by HRW. Of the remaining 32, fully 23 allegations
against the Forces are attributed to HRW. Interestingly enough, even the
State Department notes, with regard to a hospital which HRW reported was
hit by shells on January 13, that 'According to satellite imagery taken
on January 28, the Puthukkudiyirippu Hospital did not appear to show
visible damage and appeared to be functioning'.
With sources like this, who needs refutations? But of course we
should supply them, with detailed analyses, as the Air Force provided me
with, of at least some of the essential targets they took to reduce the
murderous reach of the terrorists. The UN personnel who went into LTTE
controlled areas in January, and were then prevented from leaving,
should be a good source of information, and they will surely not object,
if it is to help the State Department, to answering in detail questions
as to what they saw and heard - certainly one of them told us, with
maps, that the one shell the trajectory of which they could analyse with
certainty was fired by the LTTE.
A similar cursory analysis of the incidents reported for the next
four months would also show opportunities to make crystal clear the
tactics of the Tigers and the mature responses of our Forces. I have in
fact responded already with regard to some allegations, through analyses
that are still available on the Peace Secretariat website. But these
were written in haste, when we were also under siege in Geneva, in a
diversionary assault that began in February with some HRW missiles, as
indeed I recorded at the time. More detailed analysis then would be
helpful, since it would also help to educate others fighting against
terror about the combination of forces and strategies terrorists have at
their disposal to do down democratic accountable governments. |