Sri Lanka’s victory
A win that vindicates one of
the major lessons of September 11: Most of the time, terrorists
have to be defeated militarily before political accommodation is
possible. |
The war on terror scored a big victory with the Sri Lankan Army’s
battlefield defeat of the terrorist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
The event ends one of the world’s longest running civil wars. It also
vindicates one of the major lessons of September 11: Most of the time,
terrorists have to be defeated militarily before political accommodation
is possible.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced last week that the Army had
routed the Tigers from their last redoubt in the Northern Province,
killing Tiger Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran and several hundred other top
militant leaders too.
Prabhakaran’s apparent demise is the Sri Lankan equivalent to killing
Osama bin Laden. Now that the Tiger leadership has been eliminated, it’s
much less likely the cadres will continue a low-level terrorist
insurgency.
The story of how Sri Lanka got here is worth recounting. The conflict
had political roots when it started in 1983. After independence from
Britain, the ethnic Sinhalese majority pursued many discriminatory
policies against the Tamil minority: a Sinhala-only language policy,
preferences for Sinhalese in university admissions and Government
hiring, and the exclusion of Tamils from the police, to name a few.
A unified Sri Lanka is the hope of future Picture by Chaminda
Hiththetiyege |
But the war quickly became more about Prabhakaran’s determination to
form an independent Tamil state under the exclusive control of his
Marxist Tigers than about those Tamil grievances.
His troops spent the early part of the war fighting and eliminating
competing Tamil militant groups as often as they fought the Government.
The Tigers also killed many moderate Tamil politicians who would have
been willing to cooperate politically with Colombo.
Along the way, Prabhakaran made extensive use of suicide bombers —
including a teenage girl who blew herself up to assassinate former
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 — and relied heavily on child
soldiers. In the final months of the war, he used Tamil civilians as
human shields.
Sri Lanka’s conflict has claimed 70,000 lives by most counts. It
should have been clear early on that Government negotiation would go
nowhere with such a committed killer.
But successive Governments engaged in talks with the Tigers, and
periodic Government ceasefires and negotiations gave the terrorists
opportunities to regroup. For instance, the Tigers built an “Air Force”
of propeller-driven planes and used it to attack Government bases during
the ceasefire that technically was in effect from 2002 to 2008.
Rajapaksa, elected in 2005, finally put an end to the “peace process”
with Prabhakaran and focused on winning the military fight. In 2007,
with the help of a Tiger splinter group, the Government subdued the
Eastern Province; the first elections were held there last year.
The fighting then moved to the North. It has not been cheap or easy.
Military spending in the 2009 budget is $1.7 billion, five percent of
GDP and 20 per cent of the government’s budget.
Colombo also learned lessons from its earlier failures against the
Tigers. The military improved its training in counter insurgency
tactics, and Colombo invested the resources to enable the Army to hold
territory it won.
Moves by the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries to
freeze Tiger fundraising among the Tamil diaspora helped weaken the
Tigers. Rajapaksa wisely ignored international calls for a ceasefire as
he got closer to victory, including threats from the Obama
Administration to block $1.9 billion in International Monetary Fund aid
money.
Serious problems remain. The Government now faces a potential
humanitarian crisis in housing, feeding and clothing the more than
200,000 Tamil civilians who have fled the fighting. Over the longer
term, Colombo will have to more fully address the political grievances
of moderate Tamils and ensure that there are economic opportunities for
all Sri Lankans.
After decades of socialism, several rounds of liberalization have
since paved the way for six percent to eight percent annual growth even
amid a civil war. But with the tourism, garment and tea industries all
suffering in the global slowdown, Colombo must institute more reforms,
like tariff cuts, to spur further growth.
As Colombo starts to grapple with those post-conflict problems,
everyone else can take note: Thanks to a strategy of defeating the
insurgency, Sri Lanka is now in a position to talk seriously about peace
and economic growth. When negotiating with terrorists doesn’t work,
beating them does.
The Wall Street Journal
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