War and election victory
Leo Samson
I was surprised to see that the electoral victories of the UPFA is
linked to war strategy. In fact in 2002 there was a Local Government
Election where UNP won most local authorities on account of peace
strategy.
Both war strategy and peace strategy are ways of managing LTTE armed
struggle and elections in 2002 and 2008/2009 are linked to either
strategy.
The peace strategy of 2002 adopted by Ranil Wickremesinghe was backed
by international community.
Exchanging documents after signing of CFA |
Due to the inherent incompetence of the Defence Ministry at the time,
the government at the time was unable to strike a power sharing model
acceptable to all parties. In fact the peace strategy was stuck at the
confidence building level on the surmise that economic resurgence
arising out of peace dividend by itself will take care of the LTTE
threat.
There was no forceful strategy to use international pressure to get
LTTE to agree to an acceptable power sharing agreement. It looked the
Defence Ministry did fail to enter into a meaningful dialogue with LTTE
on the Manirasapuram LTTE camp issue. Finally confidence building
measures led to a stalemate in negotiations. The Harvard Model of
conflict resolution was correctly adopted.
Therefore the first opportunity to use LTTE threat to his political
advantage fell on Ranil Wickremesinghe. The impression created by him
through his frequent overseas visits was that international community
will bring pressure on LTTE to agree to a power sharing agreement in a
unified state.
Strategy wise it is foolish to leave the governance of the country in
the hands of foreign countries. The facilitator Norway gave the
impression that they need to bring a power balance between government
and LTTE so that a political solution short of self-determination will
emerge. Norway would naturally have benefitted oil exploration in the
Gulf of Mannar, if LTTE was successful in obtaining internal
self-determination.
If there was a competent defence establishment through peace strategy
a political solution which is more acceptable in human cost terms could
have been worked out. Having being incompetent to do so, Mr.
Wickremesinghe lost the government and then the presidency to UPFA.
The UPFA changed strategy and won the power balance in military terms
and now in the process of filling it in political terms. They were brave
and showed uncanny competency in strategic warfare. The UNP then tried
to weaken the war strategy through economic agitation capitalizing an
international escalation of commodity prizes and almost brought down the
UPFA government in the budget vote in 2007.
Now the options are for UNP to join the political consolidation
process by supporting whatever political structures that will be
required to implement APC proposals.
The Tamil people particularly diaspora is not happy with military
victories of the government and looking helplessly at international
agencies.
Mr. Wickremesinghe’s options are to join the APC, support the
government and assist Tamil people to achieve their aspirations. Then he
will go down the history as a national leader. For this purpose he need
to shed his foolish colleagues around him who alone are responsible for
his poor electoral performances. |