Lanka-LTTE war: A lesson in use of force

Harsh V. Pant

At a time when India is struggling to find the right policy mix to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, two other terrorism-related struggles are drawing global attention.

The more high-profile one is the Israeli counter offensive against Hamas but another equally significant development is the gradual rout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces.

The Sri Lankan military is hoping that 2009 would be the year that would finally witness the demise of the LTTE. The Tamil Tigers, on the other hand, are keen to put to rest any doubts about their impending collapse. And so, after a long silence, they finally made a statement that despite recent setbacks they would bounce back.

consequences

What is happening in Sri Lanka today will have some far-reaching consequences not only for Sri Lanka but also for the entire region. Though Tamil separatism as a political ideology remains rather potent, the LTTE as a military force was gradually withering away over the last few years.

The LTTE have been fighting since 1982 to create an independent state for Sri Lanka’s minority Tamils after decades of marginalisation by Governments dominated by the ethnic Sinhalese majority.

failure of the LTTE

It have been estimated that more than 70,000 people have been killed in the war. For the first time in years, the Sri Lankan military offensive has virtually seized all major strongholds, marginalising the Tigers to an extent that even their supporters are wondering about their ability to hold on for another year.

The strategic failure of the LTTE lies in its not being able to read the big picture accurately. Rather than keeping India on their side or, at least, neutral, the Tigers antagonised the Indian public by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi.

The result was that apart from a small fringe of political sympathisers in Tamil Nadu, there has been very little political support for the LTTE in India. Moreover, it was declared a terrorist organisation by more than 30 states and in a political environment shaped by September 11, 2001, there was little strategic space left for the Tigers to manoeuvre.

So when the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime in Colombo decided that the time for a steady military offensive had come, the LTTE was left bereft of any outside support base.

military approach

It has been rightly pointed out that a purely military approach will not resolve the problem of Tamil separatism. But the military option is integral to dealing with the problem of violent extremism and terrorism, something that the LTTE exemplified long before Islamist extremism came to the fore.

It is nonsensical to suggest that terrorism cannot be defeated by military force. It can be defeated by effective use of military power but if the absence of terrorism and extremism is to be guaranteed on a sustained basis, a comprehensive approach, that includes effective economic, political and social changes, is needed.

victory

But such changes can only be brought about once a limited measure of security has been achieved. And for this it is important to defeat terrorists and insurgents militarily. This was how the US policy of surge in Iraq achieved the desired results and one hopes that the Sri Lankan government would follow up its military victory with suitable socio-economic and political changes that can address the genuine aspirations of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

While the Sri Lankan Government says that whatever be the solution Sri Lanka can’t be divided, the LTTE’s aim is to carve out a Tamil homeland. India has always maintained that the conflict of Sri Lanka has to be resolved within the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and there has been no change in this position.

success

Sri Lanka’s success in neutralising the LTTE should not only be welcomed by India but it should also be emulated in certain respects. It is very important for a state to demonstrate its credibility by establishing its monopoly on the use of force.

The fact that the LTTE could run a parallel Government was hurting the credibility of the Sri Lankan State and by demolishing that capability of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan State has sent a strong message that it remains the final arbiter as far as the legitimate use of force within its territorial bounds is concerned. The capture of the de facto capital of the LTTE, Kilinochchi, is therefore of great symbolic value even though it’s not a great strategic asset.

A similar, and in many ways a much more severe problem confronts India where the Indian state’s monopoly on the use of force is today being questioned by various entities and the Indian state has shown a remarkable reluctance to impose its will on such groups.

The Indian elite should recognise that India is a regional hegemon because of its size and capabilities. It will be resented because of this no matter what, by its neighbouring states to various degree. But it is for India to first establish its will within its own territory and then play the role of a security provider in the region before thinking of a global role for itself.

strategic milieu

India should now insist that the Lankans push through a political devolution package for the Tamils, which India sees as essential if any long-term reconciliation is to be achieved.

The Tamil separatist movement’s end has been forecast on many occasions since its inception in the 1970s but the LTTE has proven adept at adapting itself to changing strategic milieu previously.

Yet what is clear is that the LTTE is at its lowest ebb today, and if the Sri Lankan Government can play its cards right, this might be the beginning of a new era for Sri Lanka and the region.

The writer Harsh V. Pant teaches in King’s College London.