All fronts close in on Kilinochchi
Fall of Kilinochchi imminent:
Tigers fleeing to jungles cornered
Military outnumbers Tigers
If there was a ray of hope for the LTTE to cling on to their
remaining strongholds Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Muhamalai in the
Jaffna front, they have lost all those hopes with the fall of Paranthan
which is the key location that linked all their strongholds together
with key land routes.
The Task Force I or the 58 Division under the command of Brigadier
Shavendra Silva made this historic move on Wednesday evening amidst
fierce battles that erupted in the Paranthan West and the Jaffna lagoon
front. They were short of only few hundred metres to the key Paranthan
junction by Wednesday evening and that part too was taken under their
control just few hours before the dawn of the year 2009 which has been
the Year of Heroic Victory.
Therefore, the capture of Paranthan at the dawn of the year 2009, put
the Security Forces efforts to eliminate terrorism from the Sri Lankan
soil in a new height as those moves put the remaining part of the Vanni
liberation operation and the liberation of the remaining parts of the
Jaffna peninsula to a much convenient position. Not only Paranthan, the
Tiger administrative capital too is now under threat of falling to the
Security Forces as it has been sealed off by the 58 Division from the
North of Kilinochchi whilst 57 Division is advancing to the heart of
Kilinochchi, from the South and West of Kilinochchi. Therefore the move
made by the 58 Division after capturing Paranthan, in actual terms had
cut the throat of the LTTE paralysing the operations of the LTTE in the
Kilinochchi, Jaffna front and Mullaitivu.
The LTTE never expected losing Paranthan as they could not read the
battle properly and had made their full concentration on the Paranthan
junction and Kilinochchi front aiming to defend their prestigious
stronghold.
The 58 Division plan has never been read by the LTTE as they
outflanked all the LTTE defences and strategies of the LTTE after each
and every effort they made to stop the advance of the troops towards
Paranthan.
While progressing Eastward 58 Division troops managed to expand their
areas towards the North when LTTE was defending Adampan village in the
North West of Kilinochchi which was used as a buffer zone to Kilinochchi
by the LTTE after the fall of Akkarayankulam village.
The moves by the columns of troops by the 58 Division towards the
Jaffna lagoon in the north, the LTTE too had to deploy their cadres in a
wider front from Adampan to Jaffna lagoon to effectively face the 58
Division.
Army Commander
Lt. General
Sarath Fonseka |
It was a strategy to fix the LTTE in the ground and they did not
anticipate that through those moves the 58 Division had cleared the
paths to capture Paranthan, Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi simultaneously
whilst forcing the Tigers to thin out their forces over a wider area
which were initially committed to a narrow front towards Paranthan and
Kilinochchi. The aggressive military operations conducted by the 57
Division also helped a lot for the 58 Division to make these tactical
moves as the LTTE had to commit considerable number of cadres in the
Kilinochchi front.
First, the 58 Division had to cross the earth bund that was created
by the LTTE to delay the troops advance towards Paranthan after the fall
of Pooneryn. At the initial stage of the battle troops faced certain
drawback in their bid to capture this earth bund as LTTE tried to trap
the soldiers crossing this earth bund and advance towards the Tiger
territory directing rains of artillery and mortar towards them soon
after they crossed the earth bund. A fair number of deaths and
casualties were reported and a number of soldiers reported missing after
their initial attempts to capture the earth bund. The same situation
reported was from the 57 Division too in their bid to capture this earth
bund. But troops learnt many lessons from their drawbacks and it was on
December 16, they saw a major breakthrough in their attempt to take
control of this earth bund with the 57 Division, 58 Division and the 53
and 55 Divisions launching simultaneous attacks on Tiger defences.
Although a fare number of casualties and deaths were reported from
the Security Forces during the fierce battles in the 57 and 58 Division
fronts the 58 Division troops managed to capture one kilometre stretch
of earth bund form the North of Pooneryn - Paranthan B-69 road.
Brigadier
Shavendra Silva |
The 58 Division facing all counter attacks by the LTTE continuously
held this stretch of earth bund and advanced ahead of it from the Jaffna
lagoon front whilst taking the control of the lagoon front and expanding
their positions along the earth bund from Jaffna lagoon to South of
Pooneryn - Paranthan road.
They faced many counter attacks by the LTTE and the biggest counter
attack came on December 23 as rains of mortar and artillery fell onto
the Security Forces defences starting at 5.30 a.m.
It continued till 8 am in the morning. It was exactly few hours after
that the 58 Division captured Sinnaparanthan area located some five
kilometres west of Paranthan. It has been later revealed that the LTTE
had launched this massive counter attack after they received a stock of
ammunitions unloaded from a bigger ship which is now clandestinely
operating in the deep sea closer to Sri Lankan territorial waters and
transported in medium size trawlers. They have unloaded this ammunition
stocks, according to intelligence reports, to the Mullaitivu sea and
directly taken them to the 58 Division front.
However, the 58 Division managed to link up their positions along the
earth bund from Jaffna lagoon to Pooneryn Paranthan front and continued
to expand towards the South of Pooneryn Paranthan road towards Adampan
village.
By December 30 the 58 Division had created ground work to capture
either Paranthan or Pooneryn townships as they were closing onto the A-9
road from both directions. But Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka
decided to give priority for the capture of Paranthan considering the
tactical importance of the location. It was on the basis that the fall
of Paranthan also heralded the downfall of Kilinochchi and also the
Jaffna front as they cut vital arteries that link the Kilinochchi and
Jaffna fronts.
Security Forces on the forward march Pictures by Rukmal
Gamage |
The capture of Paranthan meant the LTTE losing the vital links
between Jaffna fronts and Mullaitivu too, as they could not operate
through the A-35 road once the troops captured Paranthan junction and
the stretch of A-9 road the North of Paranthan. They have to use the
coastal link from Chempiyanpattu to Mullaitivu to keep strategic links
between Jaffna front and Mullaitivu which are in a desolate conditions
at present.
Considering all these factors troops of the 58 Division decided to
launch the offensive to capture Paranthan whilst maintaining pressure on
Kilinochchi as they were operating one and half kilometres away from the
Kilinochchi station.
Troops of 58 Division went on a wider front to Paranthan and cut off
A - 9 from 3 Km North of Paranthan a location between Paranthan and
Elephant Pass whilst another column of troops cut off the A-9 road in
general area famously known as Karandi Bokkuwa which is located some
four Kilo meters South of Paranthan junction.
The 9 Gemunu Watch battalion under the command of Lt. Colonel Lal
Chandrasiri went and cut off the A-9 road from the North of Paranthan
while 12 Gemunu Watch battalion under the command of Lt. Colonel Nandana
Dunuwila advanced towards the A-9 road between columns of troops of the
9 Gemunu Watch and the Paranthan junction. The 17 Gemunu Watch battalion
under the command of Lt. Colonel Keerthi Kottewatta advanced head on to
the Paranthan junction in their bid to capture the key junction town.
Troops attached to the 10 Gajaba Regiment under the command of Major
Udaovita advanced from the South of Pooneryn Paranthan road to cut off
the A-9 road in the general area Karandibokkuwa to the North of
Kilinochchi.
Since it was a totally difficult task for the infantry troops to
cross the open terrain stretching more than one and half Kilo meters to
advance towards A-9 58 Division troops used the 30th night and the 31st
morning before the first light to bring in troops as close as 500 meters
to the West of A-9 road and advanced towards West of Paranthan on
December 31 morning without taking much casualties.
During day time troops managed to pin down LTTE from their defensive
position while attacking them accurately with the use of their massive
fire power. By December 31 evening the LTTE cadres were thoroughly
demoralized and disorganized and it was found that no senior commander
came on to defend their positions against the aggressive troops who were
determined to capture Paranthan and the A-9 before midnight 31, 2008.
That was one of the rare occasions where the troops observed LTTE
leadership blaming each other without adopting any method to prevent the
aggressive troops of the 58 Division.
Sri Lanka Air Force Fighter jets also operated in support of the 58
Division throughout day hours taking amazing hits.
Troops were determined to capture Paranthan latest by 9 pm and
managed to complete the task just around 8 pm capturing Paranthan
township and the total A-9 road creating history in Eelam War.
Fall of Paranthan would also open a gateway to the LTTE’s remaining
defences at Vaddakkachchi, and Puthukkudiyiruppu areas on the A-35 road
(Paranthan- Mullaittivu). Muhamalai in the southern part of the Jaffna
peninsular neck will also be untenable for the LTTE with the fall of
Paranthan.
The chemical factory was the hallmark of Paranthan, providing direct
and indirect income to many locals. In 1986 SLA positioned a small
administrative base at Paranthan, which was linked to the main base at
Kilinochchi. LTTE disrupted civil administration in the area in early
1990s. SLA liberated it from the LTTE grip during the ‘Sathjaya I and
II’military campaigns conducted in September 1996. However, troops had
to make a tactical withdrawal in September 1998”, Army sources said.
With the capture of Paranthan the 58 Division troops immediately started
their advance towards Kilinochchi from the East and West of Paranthan by
yesterday afternoon sealing off Kilinochchi from the Northern direction
too.
Troops attached to 10 Gajaba Regiment under the Command of Major
Udaowita and 11 Sri Lanka Light Infantry battalion under the command of
Lt. Colonel Kithsiri Ekanayake are advancing towards Kilinochchi from
the East of A -9 road whilst troops attached to 12 Gajaba Regiment under
the command of Major Saliya Amunugama and 6 Gemunu Watch battalion under
the command of Lt. Colonel Kamal Pinnawala advancing towards Kilinochchi
town from the West of A-9 road. Troops observed the way LTTE fleeing
from the area loading their stuff in vehicles and recovered 12 dead
bodies scattered in the area.
The civilians living there had taken this situation for their
advantage to flee towards Security Forces.
With these moves the capture of Kilinochchi the de-facto Tiger
capital has also become a matter of days as 574 Brigade under the
command of Lt. Colonel Senaka Wijesuriya advancing from the South of
Kilinochchi and have passed the Iranamadu junction whilst 572 Brigade
under the command of Colonel Dhammika Jayasundera and 571 Brigade under
the command of Lt. Colonel Harendra Ranasinghe advancing towards the
centre of Kilinochchi from the West and South West direction..
As of yesterday they have completed more than 60 per cent of their
mission of Kilincochchi giving early signs of fall of Kilinochchi within
a days period as the troops are aggressively advancing towards the heart
of Kilinochchi in all fronts without leaving any room for the LTTE to
operate there.
The only option now available for the LTTE is to flee towards the
jungle patches in Puthukuduiruppu and Vishvamadu in the East of
Iranamadu tank but will be once again cornered in this jungle terrain as
59 Division troops are advancing towards Puthukuduiruppu from the West
of Mullaitivu after they consolidated their positions in the Mulliyawali
village.
Therefore, the LTTE is now poised to see the end result of their
tactical withdrawal they made since the beginning of the Sampur
operation as they have been left with only narrow stretch of sea belt in
the North Eastern coast of Mullaitivu to flee from the Security Forces
and seek safety outside their illusive Tamil Eelam. |