No easy exit for Tigers
Apratim Mukarji
There was scarcely any surprise when the pro-LTTE Tamilnet website of
Sri Lanka accorded the pride of place in its news items on November 12
to the unanimous resolution adopted by the Tamil Nadu Assembly earlier,
calling for a ceasefire in the island nation.
Fighting a last-ditch battle for survival, the Tigers and their
supporters clutched at the Assembly resolution as one possible key to an
eventual Indian intervention to save them from the relentless Sri Lankan
military onslaught.
Demonstration against LTTE in Sweden |
The Tamil Nadu resolution was adopted solely in the context of the
humanitarian crisis that has gripped the Northern districts of Sri Lanka
ever since the military offensive was launched to finish off the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It is clear by now that if the
offensive is not halted immediately, the LTTE rebellion-over twenty-five
years old- would be finally crushed.
On the other hand, if Colombo eventually bows to the shrill Tamil
Nadu protest, accompanied by restrained pressure from New Delhi and the
international community, the LTTE would earn a life-saving reprieve.
However, this appears to be a highly unlikely scenario.
To the politicians in Tamil Nadu, however, the uppermost thought in
their minds is that a ceasefire at the present juncture would save
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from terrible conditions. Northern
and eastern Tamils have been periodically turning into IDPs over the
last three decades and longer (the first IDPs in Sri Lanka used to be
those who fled home in the wake of the several anti-Tamil riots that had
rocked the island nation, years before the LTTE and other armed Tamil
groups began to fight the government militarily).
Govt. policy
In his latest rejection of the suggestion for a ceasefire of
hostilities and initiation of political negotiations with the Tamil
community (and certainly not with the LTTE as clearly stated on several
occasions), President Mahinda Rajapaksa predictably maintained (during
his bilateral talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on
November 13) his Government’s well-known position, that is, there would
be no negotiation until the terrorists were “eliminated”. President
Rajapaksa has been chillingly consistent with his Government’s policy
for handling the continuing Tamil insurgency in his country.
While Sri Lanka has, since 1983, experienced five phases of war
between the Government and the LTTE, this is the first time that the
military offensive has continued in complete disregard of the
international outcry on humanitarian grounds and frequent diplomatic
pressure.
It is beyond doubt that President Rajapaksa has been able to carry
out the all-out military campaign against the LTTE in contrast to his
predecessors who were obliged to bow to international pressure to stop
the war with a ceasefire and get back to negotiations.
vicious cycle
It is equally well-established that each time a ceasefire was put in
place (after the military had virtually cornered the LTTE), the latter
had exploited the period of the reprieve by recruiting fighters and
stockpiling arms and ammunition and other essential ingredients and,
after ensuring that a resumption of hostilities with all possible
consequences could be well-afforded, heightened their cleverly planned
violations of the ceasefire agreement that led eventually to a military
response by Colombo (each period of ceasefire was also marked by
Government Forces violating its conditions with equal impunity).
And thereafter the cycle had kept revolving-outbreak of hostilities
followed by a civilian exodus, large-scale civilian casualties and a
humanitarian crisis, which was followed by an international outcry and
followed in turn by a ceasefire and resumption of peace talks. President
Rajapaksa has, however, chosen to break away from this vicious cycle,
refusing to permit the LTTE an easy exit from certain decimation and
instead has in plain language called for an “annihilation” of the LTTE
before peace talks could be held.
Meanwhile, despite its numerically precarious position in Parliament,
the Indian Government has steadfastly refused to follow the precedent of
interference or intervention in Sri Lanka, sending the signal that even
though it shares the widespread agony over the plight of Tamil
civilians, it will keep off the island nation.
As far as Tamil Nadu is concerned, the Tamil politicians’ position
suffers from a serious weakness. It does not indicate how the LTTE
should be dealt with after a ceasefire comes into effect.
The Sri Lankan Government says that a ceasefire would be effective
only if the Tigers lay down their arms and surrender.
The history of this war confirms the logic of Colombo’s position
since every ceasefire (except the last one, which was ended
unceremoniously by the launch of the military offensive in the Eastern
province last year) was routinely followed by a resumption of
hostilities.
political settlement
It is only this time that if Colombo ultimately crushes the LTTE, its
victory would not be followed after a certain period of interval by a
resumption of the war as the Tigers would no longer be there to continue
with fighting.
The Rajapaksa Government says that it is then that a political
settlement will be arrived at ensuring peace in the country. In a recent
interview to The Hindu (October 29,2008) the President said: “The
current military operations are being carried out to build the
environment required to free our own brothers and sisters from the cruel
grip of terror and implement a just and enduring political solution
based on the four Ds-Demilitarisation, Democratisation, Development and
Devolution.”
equitable
It is obvious that a political settlement of the ethnic conflict
under the prevailing circumstances can be one imposed by the majority
Sinhala community upon the minority Tamil community though all the
formalities of presenting an equitable settlement would be present.
With the LTTE eventually “eliminated”, who will represent the Tamils
? Only an answer from the Tamil community can tell us if an equitable
political settlement under the prevailing situation is still possible.
So far Colombo and, more correctly, the majority community have not
betrayed any intention to build a public dialogue and thereby create the
necessary public space to make it possible for a truly inclusive
political settlement of the ethnic conflict to emerge. The
responsibility for this lies squarely with the majority community.
A commentator on Central and South
Asia, the author has written Sri Lanka : An Unending Conflict ? (2000)
and Sri Lanka : A Dangerous Interlude (2005).
Mainstream |