Eyes on South Asia
Rasul Bakhsh Rais
The entry of countries outside of South Asia as observers at the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) might make some
waves. These observer countries are important players, however, on the
global economic and security scene, and have a varying interest in the
South Asian landscape.
States seek observer status in regional or other international
organisations when they don’t meet the criteria for membership. China,
the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Iran and the European
Union have all been accepted into SAARC as observers, meaning they would
attend summit meetings, watch proceedings and make statements with the
permission of the chair.
For nearly a quarter century since the creation of SAARC, no country
from adjacent regions or afar evinced any interest in the agenda, vision
or functioning of this largely ineffective organisation, except sending
the usual messages wishing it the best of luck.
Why have they suddenly become interested in SAARC? How will the
presence of these observer countries affect the growth of cooperation
among members?
First, all observer countries have extensive bilateral relations -
especially economic and security - with all SAARC members. Observer
countries have interacted with South Asian states, though in varying
degrees, for over half a century. The interest in SAARC, however, is
new, and has been influenced by a number of developments.
Chief among them is the economic growth in the region over the past
two decades, mainly in India, the largest regional economy. Three other
countries - Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka - have not been too far
behind either.
Economic growth in each country and in different parts of that
country may have different economic and policy dynamic, but what
explains positive economic change in South Asia is a set of identical
economic frameworks and economic globalisation. All South Asian
countries have an identical template for economic policy, but with
different resources, politics and governance endowments.
The factors of economic frameworks and globalisation are, in fact,
two sides of the same coin. They are rooted in the same neo-liberal
ideological framework and driven by the global flow of capital and
technology, and the relocation of industry and production. Of course,
not all countries of the regional have benefited from this process.
India had a far greater national capacity in every field and therefore
has done far better than the others.
The interesting thing is that while India and its immediate
neighbours have a historically greater density of economic linkages with
non-regional industrial states - which have grown substantially during
the past two decades - regional trade remains very low. The opposite is
true of other regional organisations like ASEAN and the EU, where
economic integration has made great progress.
All observer countries in SAARC have multiple webs of economic,
political and strategic relationships with more than one regional
country. What, then, shapes the interest of these countries to sit as
observers in SAARC meetings?
We believe that their involvement in SAARC in this capacity is
propelled by two factors. One is the expansion of bilateral economic
exchanges with most regional countries, which is largely determined by
economic liberalisation and openness to global market forces. The
second, perhaps the more important, factor are the future growth
prospects of the region for the global economy and the observers.
South Asia is a region that will see further economic development and
expansion in the coming decades. Therefore, opportunities for
investment, trade and relocation of industrial activity are likely to
grow if all other issues affecting growth - energy, trade, recession -
are settled. Going by global economic cycles, the present conditions of
economic stress and fiscal decline may not last forever.
Globalisation now shapes economies, cultures and even political
attitudes.
It is one of the autonomous effects of conscious economic and
technological policies of the western world. The end of the Cold War
added that extra ideological authenticity, swagger and aggressiveness to
the neo-liberal prescription for economic growth.
With the exception of Iran, which has joined SAARC for very different
reasons, other observers have played a great role in global
interdependence and economic integration.
Therefore, helping South Asian countries expand cooperation among
themselves would reduce the transaction costs of global integration.
Greater liberalisation of trade, investment and capital flows across
South Asia would benefit multinationals in almost every field and cut
their costs of production. Economic cooperation within the regional or
at a larger level has positive gains for everyone engaged in it, with
differential payoffs depending on participant states’ various
capacities.
Economic growth and stability in any region, especially South Asia,
is significantly linked to political stability and security. The
unstable and insecure zones experiencing conflict cannot be integrated
into productive economic processes. And if they are not contained or
resolved, their effects will spill over borders. South Asia has many
past and present examples of how inter-state relations are affected by
security challenges.
Regional security problems in South Asia - Afghanistan and Pakistan’s
tribal belt; the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka; until recently the
Maoist insurgency in Nepal and India’s north-eastern states; and the
unrest in Kashmir - do not present a comfortable picture to foreign
economic and security players.
India, with its massive size, can isolate its heartland from its
conflicted periphery, but other states cannot. Multiple points of
conflict within the region and the India-Pakistani rivalry add
difficulties to economic cooperation and growth, in which all SAARC
observers have developed a considerable stake.
The effects of conflict in the region, purely in terms of security,
are no longer confined to South Asian states. Modern-day insurgencies
have transnational linkages and support bases, flows of weapons and
fighters, and political connections across borders.
Most SAARC observer states have been affected by transnational
militancy directly, and therefore have an interest in defeating or
diffusing it. A good number of them are involved in the reconstruction
effort in Afghanistan.
It is no coincidence that these observers drew closer to SAARC after
9/11, which reshaped strategic relationships of major powers in the
context of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ongoing review and
reassessment of the war on terror suggests that only through regional
cooperation can the insurgencies be defeated.
The presence of major global economic and military powers, even as
mere observers, will have a positive effect on how SAARC redefines
itself as a meaningful regional organisation. Its lacklustre performance
in vital areas of cooperation has not made anyone happy.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War,
Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books
2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences. He can be reached at *[email protected]
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