The Sri Lankan conflict:
A multi-polar approach
Narrow interpretations of cultural identity and models of conflict
resolution built on ethnic dualism contribute to ethnic polarization and
inhibit sustainable peace. To improve both the analysis and processes of
conflict resolution, it is necessary to move beyond the bipolar ethnic
model and explore the multi-polar nature of conflicts. The conflict
between the Sri Lankan government and the secessionist Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is commonly identified as a primordial ethnic
conflict between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority.
But, much of the long pre-colonial history of Sri Lanka was
characterized by ethno-religious pluralism and co-existence over
antagonism and conflict. There has been tremendous inter-mixture between
Sinhala and Tamil populations as well as the Muslims who are considered
an ethno-religious group in Sri Lanka.
The dominant Sinhala vs. Tamil dualism projects Tamils and Sinhalese
as two homogeneous categories overlooking the intra-ethnic conflicts and
killings within the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities. It is believed
that the Tamil Tigers have killed more Tamils than the Sri Lankan armed
forces, especially given the fratricidal wars among Tamil militant
groups since 1985. Likewise, the Sri Lankan security forces had killed
more Sinhalese than Tamils by the end of the 1980s, particularly when it
suppressed the JVP (Jantha Vimukthi Peramuna- People's Liberation Front)
insurgency that arose against the 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, which
was introduced to resolve the Tamil separatist conflict.
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On the Tamil side, it is the 'partial and often partisan view' of the
northern, especially Jaffna peninsula Tamils, that is often identified
as the Sri Lankan Tamil perspective. This is largely due to the fact
that the Tamil Diaspora in the West is drawn largely from that
conflict-ridden region of the island. The Diaspora influence has
prevented the international community from understanding 'the
diversities and intricacies' within Tamil communities. Moreover, the
Tamil Tigers who claim to be the 'sole representative of Tamils' have
turned Sri Lankan Tamils, on the island and in the Diaspora, into a
'silent majority,' presenting the LTTE position as the only Tamil
perspective.
Electoral politics has contributed to a vibrant multi-party democracy
among the Sinhalese, but the entrenched party rivalry especially between
the two major political parties, UNP (United National Party) and the
SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), has undermined a unified approach to
eradicating terrorism and a political solution to the separatist
conflict. The Muslims are generally left out of the dominant discourse
on the Sri Lankan separatist conflict, yet they are a distinct
island-wide community and the largest group in the Eastern Province
claimed by the secessionists as part of its fictitious 'traditional
Tamil homeland'. Like the Sinhalese and the Tamils, they too have
significant regional and class differences.
Origins of the Conflict
The dominant ethnically based approaches portray the Sri Lankan
conflict as a purely domestic conflict when in fact, it has been a
regional South Asian conflict from the very beginning. After India
adopted the draconian anti-secessionist amendment to its constitution in
1963, the South Indian Dravidasthan secessionist movement was halted,
but, South Indian support for a "surrogate" Tamil state in the north and
east of Sri Lanka expanded.
All Sri Lankan moderate and militant separatist groups, including the
LTTE, were nurtured and protected by Tamil Nadu political parties. The
LTTE's assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in
Tamil Nadu in 1991 alone shows that the 'Sri Lankan' separatist conflict
is a regional one. Even today, the manifesto of the MDMK (Marumarchi
Dravida Munnetra Khazagham) in Tamil Nadu calls for autonomy for
regional states in India and establishment of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
The fault lines between the Sinhala and Tamil communities that show
up in the modern Sri Lankan conflict were drawn during the period of
British colonialism from 1815 to 1948. The island's conflict, like many
other 'ethnic' conflicts around the world, emerged with democratization
and the shift of power from privileged minorities, such as the Sri
Lankan Tamils to the Sinhala Buddhist majority who had been marginalized
under colonial rule. Today, the Sri Lankan conflict has become an
international conflict with serious implications for peace and security
across the world.
CFA
Over the course of the Sri Lankan secessionist war, the LTTE-banned
in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, the EU, India, and
Malaysia -has emerged as -the prototype of global terrorism. According
to the FBI, LTTE's ruthless tactics have 'inspired terrorist networks
worldwide including Al Qaeda in Iraq'. The LTTE 'perfected the use of
suicide bombers; invented the suicide belt; pioneered the use of women
in suicide attacks'. It is also the first militant group to acquire air
power. Notwithstanding its multiplicity of intra-ethnic, regional, and
international dimensions, the Sri Lankan conflict continues to be
characterized as a primordial Sinhala vs. Tamil conflict and a domestic
phenomenon. The failure to grapple with the multi-polar reality has in
turn contributed to the failure of peace initiatives, especially the
2002 ceasefire agreement facilitated by Norway.
The 2002 Ceasefire Agreement The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA)
upheld the dualistic characterization of the Sri Lankan conflict by
recognizing only the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE as the two
parties to the conflict. Bypassing elected members of Parliament
representing non-LTTE Tamil interests and choosing to negotiate with the
unelected LTTE, the Agreement accepted the LTTE as 'the sole
representative of Tamils' elevating the internationally banned terrorist
organization, to an equivalent status with the democratically elected
Sri Lankan government. The Agreement did not require LTTE cadres to be
disarmed.
Rather, it dictated terms to weaken the armed forces of the
government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and strengthen LTTE military capability
by requiring the GOSL to disarm non-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups and
to offer to integrate those cadres within the GOSL armed forces 'for
service away from the Northern and Eastern Province'. The CFA did not
ban child soldiering and forcible recruitment and child recruitment,
routine practices of the LTTE, and it failed to specify mechanisms to
monitor and enforce other serious human rights violations or to uphold
pluralism and democracy.
Other terms of the Agreement further advanced the separatist
ambitions of the LTTE. By accepting those terms the government of Sri
Lanka acceded to the LTTE's right to control land areas it had usurped
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a formal partition of the
country under the supervision of the Scandinavian-led Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Notwithstanding implications for democracy
and peaceful conflict resolution, there was massive support for the CFA
from the 'international community' and the local peace lobby, which
dubbed it as the 'best chance to establish peace'. For those opposed to
separatism and the LTTE, however, the CFA symbolized appeasement, if not
outright capitulation, to terrorism. Norway, the facilitator of the
peace process, and the Scandinavian countries that provided the members
to the SLMM were the final arbiters and supervisors of the
implementation of the Agreement.
SLMM
Although this placed Norway in the dominant position, Norway and the
Nordic SLMM were severely constrained by the CFA's capitulation to terms
laid down by the LTTE. For example, according to the CFA, the SLMM,
which established its headquarters in Colombo and local monitoring
committees in all other districts of the North and the East, was
excluded from Killinochchi and Mullaitivu, the LTTE strongholds where
the Tigers were allowed to do as they pleased without any kind of
monitoring. Given the LTTE's insistence that the proscription prevented
it from being 'an equal and legitimate party to engage in peace talks
with the government,' the Sri Lankan government lifted the proscription
on the LTTE, paving the way for negotiations. There was tremendous local
opposition against this move since the LTTE had neither disavowed
separatism nor were disarmed.
During the 2002-2003 negotiations, the GOSL and the LTTE held six
highly publicized rounds of talks, but, the LTTE refused to deal with
the core issue- specifically, the nature of the administration for the
north and the east-at any of these sessions. The situation on the ground
became more confused, and there was little hope for long-term peace
among those directly affected by the conflict.
Marginalization by the peace process and fear of living under a
terrorist LTTE regime radicalized many young Muslims, who began to
demand a separate Muslim region in the southeast. On January 29, 2003,
students of the South Eastern University put forward a separatist Muslim
platform- the Oluvil Declaration. Echoing the landmark 1976 Tamil
separatist declaration, the Vaddukodai Resolution, it asserted that
Muslims are a separate nation with claims to a 'traditional homeland',
self-determination, and political autonomy apart from both Tamil and
Sinhala domination.
The peace process was not broadened in response to the concerns of
Muslims or different Tamil and Sinhala groups. Thus, the internationally
driven bipolar conflict resolution model intensified the spectre of a
future globalised war between the LTTE and the Muslims and ethnic
balkanization of the east. Low caste Dalits who constitute a major
portion of the LTTE cadres also felt marginalized by the peace process.
Karuna's challenge
As a Sri Lankan Tamil Dalit leader wrote, 'A problem that has been
awaiting a resolution for decades was simply glossed over as if it did
not even exist.' The limitations of the bipolar model of conflict
analysis and resolution became most apparent when the LTTE split into
two in March 2004. The Northern/Wanni wing led by Prabhakaran moved
against the renegade LTTE Commander in the East, Karuna and some 7,500
of his cadres, in violation of the CFA. Karuna's challenge to
Prabhakaran's authority was more than a personal matter.
It was driven by more deeply rooted historical, cultural, and
regional differences and political-economic inequities between the
Tamils of the north and the east. In defecting from the LTTE, Karuna
invoked the resentment of eastern Tamils toward the northern Tamils who
had long dominated over them and spoken for them. The LTTE split exposed
the shortcomings of the bipolar conflict resolution model, which
overlooked intra-ethnic, regional, and cultural differences within and
across the linguistic divide. The ground situation in the north and the
east, became rife with internal LTTE feuding and LTTE intra-ethnic
killing.
Notwithstanding its professed role as protector of Tamils, the LTTE
continued to oppress Tamil people, using the legitimacy given by the CFA
as their 'sole representative'. According to SLMM statistics, the LTTE
has been responsible for a disproportionately large number of the CFA
violations and human rights abuses. Between February 2002 and April
2007, for example, the LTTE was responsible for 3,830 and the GOSL for
351 out of all violations ruled and reported by the SLMM. Of these, LTTE
was responsible overwhelmingly for human rights violations including
child recruitment, torture, forced recruitment of adults, and
assassinations.
UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, Child Soldiers Global Report, and the
local human rights group University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna)
UTHR reported that the CFA led to an increase in one of the worst
aspects of the 21-year separatist conflict-the forcible recruitment of
children, some as young as ten or eleven years of age.
Just as UNICEF was relatively ineffectual in stopping LTTE's
recruitment of children, the SLMM was ineffectual in controlling Sinhala-Tamil
as well as Tamil-Muslim clashes which flared up in the east in the
aftermath of the signing of the CFA. More than 200 politicians from
rival Tamil parties were reportedly killed between the signing of the
CFA in 2002 and mid-January 2006. A number of Tamil media personnel who
did not completely toe the LTTE line were also believed to have been
eliminated by the LTTE.
Providing long lists of names of Tamil opponents systematically
eliminated by the LTTE, UTHR blamed civil society activists, the
international community, and the Sri Lankan government for the
'manipulative', 'unprincipled,' and costly approach to peace which
yielded 'Dividends of Terror' rather than peace.
Norway
Norway, the facilitator of the peace process, and the Scandinavian
peace monitors, the SLMM, came under even more criticism from Tamil
dissidents, Sinhala and Muslim nationalists, and some international
human rights and anti-terrorist groups. Norway has played and continues
to play multiple and conflicting roles in Sri Lanka as peace
facilitator, leader of the SLMM, and leading aid and loan provider. As
Human Rights Watch observed in August 2003, 'The SLMM appears to lack
both sufficient political distance from the negotiating process and a
genuine capacity to investigate these [human rights] incidents. As a
Norwegian-led initiative, the monitoring effort is too closely tied to
the politics of the peace process.'
Although Norwegian peace 'facilitation' in Sri Lanka continued to be
viewed positively in the international media and by LTTE supporters,
there was growing frustration and anger in Sri Lanka. Norway was seen as
a new colonial ruler and a supporter of LTTE separatist terrorism. The
Patriotic National Movement, which emerged in February 2004 with the
objective of protecting Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, called for the expulsion of Norwegian facilitators from Sri
Lanka. One rally drew over 50,000 people, considered to be the largest
protest in Sri Lankan history. Frustrated by Norwegian disregard for
LTTE atrocities, Tamil dissident groups frequently protested outside the
Norwegian embassy in Colombo, bringing coffins of their politicians said
to have been murdered by the LTTE.
During the course of the ceasefire, the LTTE was able to strengthen
itself financially and militarily. By 2007, it was raising an estimated
US$ 200 to 300 million a year through its licit and illicit businesses
and fronts globally. The financial largesse allowed the LTTE to purchase
advanced weaponry for its military struggle and to pursue a
sophisticated propaganda campaign on electronic, print, and other media
and try to portray itself' as a genuine national liberation' movement
despite its continued terrorist activities. Indeed, the bipolar conflict
model which identifies Tamil interests and LTTE interests as one is at
least partly to blame for this situation. Federalism: The Magic
Solution? According to Sri Lankan government estimates, Sinhalese were
75 percent, Sri Lankan Tamils were 11.9 percent, Indian or hill country
Tamils 4.6 percent, and Muslims (Moors and Malays) were 8.2 percent of
the island's total population in 2001. According to other estimates, the
percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils is less or the same as for the Muslims,
i.e. 8 percent of the total population.
The proportions of the two communities -Sri Lankan Tamil and
Muslim-will keep decreasing and increasing if present trends continue.
Separatist argument
The emigration of people from the north and the east has steadily
increased due to the war and LTTE terrorism. The majority of Tamils in
Sri Lanka live amidst the Sinhalese and the Muslims in the multicultural
southern areas of the island. In other words, the Tamil community now is
more an island-wide rather than a regional minority. These demographic
and multicultural realities undermine the separatist argument that an
exclusive Tamil northeastern region is required for the Tamils to live
in safety apart from the Sinhalese.
Some 800,000, that is, more than 25 percent, of Sri Lankan Tamils are
now part of the Diaspora. Toronto is believed to be the largest Sri
Lankan Tamil city in the world. Much of the financial (about 90 percent)
and ideological support for the LTTE comes from the Tamil Diaspora elite
and the worldwide Tamil community, making the Sri Lankan separatist
struggle a transnational phenomenon increasingly removed from domestic
realities.
The 're-drawing of the ethnic map of Sri Lanka' calls into question
the justice of granting one-third of the island exclusively to the small
population of Sri Lankan Tamils, especially when increasing numbers of
them are no longer living in the areas erroneously claimed as the
'traditional Tamil homelands'.
For most of the long history of the island, tolerance and mutual
coexistence have been the predominant characteristics of inter-group
relations, not enmity and conflict. During the course of the war, two
broad patterns of ethnic relations have emerged: a mono-ethnic policy in
the north and ethnic pluralism in the south. Some 100,000 Muslims and a
smaller number of Sinhalese were driven out of the Northern Province by
the LTTE's ethnic-cleansing campaign, making it imperative that any
solution to the separatist conflict take into account Muslim and Sinhala
rights to the north and the east and their opposition to Tamil regional
autonomy. Despite the most gruesome LTTE massacres of Sinhala and Muslim
civilians in the Eastern Province, it has maintained its
multiethnic-Muslim, Tamil, and Sinhala-character, but, given historical
settlement patterns that enhance mutual coexistence, attempts to
artificially carve out exclusive ethnic enclaves by Tamil or Muslim
separatists could lead to greater upheaval and suffering.
Political-economic issues
Given the dominant Sinhala vs. Tamil dualism, few studies have
explored the common political-economic issues facing youth across the
different communities. While 'ethnic tensions' exist, they have been
'exacerbated by the ongoing conflict'. As one study noted, Tamil and
Sinhalese youth have 'similar major concerns and 'reducing the potential
of violent conflict to ethnic discrimination belies the complexities of
social discrimination and the very real lack of adequate employment and
livelihoods of youth both'. Indeed, the broadening of the global
discourse on conflict requires moving beyond ethnic dualism and cultural
identity to considering socio-economic inequities at the local, regional
and international levels as well as the patterns of pluralism and
coexistence and the changing ethnic distribution on the island.
A sustainable solution to the Sri Lankan conflict 'must take into
account issues of poverty and property rather than seek to extend the
interests of international corporations'. Indeed, decentralization of
power needs to be carried in a way that allows local people-Sinhalese,
Tamils and Muslims-greater control over regional resources and decisions
over governance. The creation of separate ethno-nationalist regions is
not a panacea.
A policy that only breaks up the unitary, centralized Sri Lankan
state through a form of federalism and grants Tamil regional autonomy is
unlikely to address these fundamental issues of economic democracy and
political participation that are important to all Sri Lankans, not just
a single ethnic group.
Asoka Bandarage is currently a professor at Georgetown University.
She has taught at Yale, Brandeis and Mount Holyoke, and is the author of
Colonialism in Sri Lanka, Women, Population and Global Crisis and
publications on South Asia, global political economy, ethnicity, gender
and population. This article is derived from her forthcoming book, The
Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Broadening the Discourse (Routledge).
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