Sri Lanka: Democracy vs terrorism - part 2

Bernard GOONETILLEKE

Continued from of yesterday

That was, that they had not hit the peace alley with a view to giving up their demand for a separate state, but took that path with the intention of taking a short cut to a separate state.

If they failed, they would yet use the opportunity provided by the CFA, to remove the debilitating blockade of the North imposed by the Government, and use the relatively peaceful period to arm themselves, so that they could once again challenge the Government militarily, at an opportune time.

Negotiations

In fairness, it must be said that the LTTE entertained the idea of engaging in negotiations with the Government, with a certain amount of trepidation, not being certain as to which way the water would flow.

I remember accompanying a minister of the administration of that time to Oslo in August 2002, meeting with late Anton Balasingham, and giving him an assurance that the government would not try to gain undue advantage, or pressure the LTTE, as they gingerly ventured into negotiations with the Government, for the first time since 1990.

That was how Balasingham obtained the concurrence of the LTTE leadership to begin negotiations.

Oslo

When the going was good, the international media described the Sri Lanka peace process as ‘the fastest forward moving peace process,’ at that time.

However, the enthusiasm of Sri Lankans and the world was to be dampened soon, and it became evident that LTTE chief negotiator Balasingham was pressed against a rock and a hard place, as the Sri Lankan Government wanted to engage in real negotiations, and the LTTE leadership did not see any reason to comply, as it would have adversely impacted on its claim for a separate state.

However much the Government delegation pushed, and the Norwegian facilitators prodded, the LTTE stubbornly refused to budge, until negotiations virtually came to a standstill one chilly evening of December 2002, in Oslo.

To be fair by the Norwegian facilitators, they persisted until Balasingham yielded, and came up with a draft on the following morning, later known as the Oslo Declaration.

It said, “Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.”

Landmark decision

Which ever way one looks at the understanding reached in Oslo, it can be taken as a landmark decision. First, it was a decision to look for internal self-determination in place of external self-determination.

Second, it was a decision to look for a solution on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka and third, there was an agreement that the solution had to be acceptable to all communities.

In essence, the LTTE had moved away from its demand for a separate state, and returned to the original demand of the Tamils for a federal state, first made in 1949, and the Sri Lanka Government had moved away from its long standing opposition to a federal arrangement.

It soon became apparent, that either Balasingham had exceeded his authority, or the LTTE leadership realized they were speeding down the wrong track, which would rob them of their quest for statehood.

What followed was an apparent disagreement between the LTTE leadership and Balasingham, and this time around, ‘federalism’ became a dirty word, not for the Southern politicians, but for the LTTE.

Soon thereafter, Balasingham retreated from the “Proposal by the LTTE leadership,” as the Oslo understanding stated, for internal self determination, based on a federal structure, thus, providing an opportunity for some parties in the South to insist on a ‘unitary state’.

I went to great lengths to explain what happened in the spring of 2003, in order to demonstrate that the LTTE was primarily responsible for derailing the peace process. Having agreed to explore a federal solution, the LTTE pulled out of negotiations, describing it as suspension of “its participation in the negotiations for the time being.”

That the LTTE hijacked the Tamil demand for a separate State in the North and East of Sri Lanka, and systematically used violence and acts of terrorism, to achieve that objective, are undeniable facts. Also, nobody can disprove that several attempts were made by different administrations to bring the conflict to an end through negotiations.

LTTE strategy

The strategy employed by the LTTE was to walk away from the Thimpu talks, the Indo Lanka agreement etc., following it up with the assassinations of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President R. Premadasa, and attempting to take the life of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, employing suicide bombers.

Among the long line of government leaders assassinated by the LTTE, while the CFA was still operative, was Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.

Against this background, it is ironical that organizations such as Amnesty International, and even some friendly countries, should have expressed the view that the so-called unilateral abrogation of the CFA by the Sri Lanka Government in January this year, resulted in increasing the incidence of violence in the island.

Violations

They fail to see and refuse to acknowledge, that the CFA in fact did provide for one of the parties to the agreement, to withdraw from it, if it became necessary to do so.

It was the repeated violations of the CFA by the LTTE, on a massive scale, which compelled the Government to see the futility of hanging on to the CFA, which had practically become defunct due to LTTE intransigence.

Just for record purposes, by April 2007, the LTTE had violated the CFA 3830 times as against 351 times by the government.

Against such a number to its credit, it is ironical that the LTTE had to wait until the government issued notice of termination of the CFA in keeping with Article 4.4 of the agreement, to assure 100 per cent compliance of the CFA from thereon.

The resumption of the conflict in 2006 was no accident. Events that unfolded since early December 2005 indicate that the LTTE was moving in the direction of provoking the Government, and using the Government response to justify a thrust to capture Jaffna. The Government was cautious at the beginning, and practically ignored many grave provocations.

However, when the LTTE employed a suicide bomber in the attempted assassination of the Army Commander, in April 2006, and followed it by cutting off vital water supplies to some 60,000 farmers in the east several months later, the government reacted firmly, and with resolve.

The LTTE’s folly ended, with their losing of the Eastern Province to the Government, where steps have been taken toward democratic elections on May 10, after a lapse of 14 long years.

The Government’s response to the challenges seems to have caused concern, not only the LTTE, but also some friendly governments, who believe that the current military operations in the Northern Province, is aimed at seeking a military solution to the conflict.

These sources repeat themselves, every now and then, by proclaiming, “There is no military solution to the conflict, and a solution must be found through negotiations,” as if they are privy to a formula, of which the Government is unaware.

Devolution

What is being said by them is a mere repetition of the government position, and there is no fundamental difference between the Government position and that of some countries, which are engaged in the situation in Sri Lanka.

The irony is that, such views continue to be expressed despite repeated assurances given by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, that his desire is to grant maximum possible devolution within one country. The Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has made his position clear as well.

The government’s position is clear. While it believes in a political solution to resolve the issues faced by the minorities, it has no choice but to act firmly and decisively against the LTTE’s armed incursions within and outside the North and the East, so that, that organisation will entertain no illusion that it could achieve its political objectives by resorting to acts of violence and terrorism. The message is loud and clear for all interested parties to hear.

Eventually, there will have to be a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and the LTTE should realise that resorting to terrorism will not achieve for them a separate state.

A democratic solution

This brings us to the most important issue concerning the conflict in Sri Lanka. That is, the solution to the conflict, or issues affecting the minorities, must first be discussed and negotiated, with the involvement of all interested parties in the island.

That is the only way, a sustainable solution that is fair and reasonable to all, can be arrived at. It is also crucially important that the final agreement should be democratically approved by the people.

The question we have to answer is, what should be a fair and lasting solution ? How do we reach that goal ? What process should be employed to reach that goal ? Needless to say, whatever shape of the solution, it will have to be arrived at through a democratic process.

The irony is that, the LTTE in its current form, cannot be a party to a democratic process.

If the past provides us with a guideline, then we know, that throughout its existence, the LTTE has done its best to stifle democracy. Assassinating moderate Tamil political leaders such as A. Amirthalingam and Neelan Thiruchelvam, and preventing Tamil people in the North and the East from voting at the 2005 presidential election, are but two examples of how alien democratic practices are to the LTTE.

If the demand for a separate state is a non-negotiable issue to the LTTE, one cannot expect that organisation to engage in negotiations in good faith, for a political settlement.

In such a backdrop, the Government will have the unenviable task of deciding how to proceed.

One way to address the issue is to consult the Tamil people in the North and the East.

And such an opportunity has arisen at least in the East, as a result of the bold decision taken by President Rajapaksa, to go ahead with provincial council elections in the Eastern Province in May, which was preceded by the peaceful and successful local election held in Batticaloa District last March.

At least, there are signs of the long standing logjam being gradually broken. The first is, the decision to hold provincial council elections in the Eastern Province, consisting of three districts, and a mixed population of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese. In fact, this exercise will be a test bed for turning the Eastern Province around.

The second important aspect is, the decision taken by none other than the LTTE, to field candidates under its political party, the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT), which was registered by them, many years ago.

TMVP

The third and equally important issue, is the TMVP, the breakaway Eastern group of the LTTE, which participated in the local elections in the Batticaloa District in March, which has also fielded candidates at the forthcoming provincial election.

All in all, the governing party, the opposition party, the parties representing the LTTE and its breakaway group, the TMVP, the SLMC and many others, will join the hustings, seeking the vote of the long-suffering people of the Eastern Province, a feat that would not have been predicted, even by the most confident soothsayers.

To say the least, it is a near miracle, how democracy triumphed in the Eastern Province, while the people in some part of the Northern Province are still under the jackboots of the LTTE.

Opportunity

President Rajapaksa has accomplished the impossible task, of providing an opportunity for the people in the East, to elect their representatives through the ballot, in place of those who have, for so long, imposed their will on a long-suffering people, through the barrel of their guns.

Rarely has the world seen such a feat of democratization of a region held to ransom by terrorists, for such a long time. The people of the East now have to move on, from democratic elections to ensuring their personal security, development and prosperity.

It is here that the international community, including the U.S., has a role to play. In this context, Sri Lanka welcomes the stand taken in the U.S. Department of State Budget for the Financial Year 2009, where it is stated: “The liberation of the East from the LTTE control in July 2007, presents strategically important opportunities for the United States to advance human rights by promoting economic, political and social development.”

The international community, with its concern for stability in Sri Lanka, should move in and assist generously, in developing the Eastern Province, and wean the youth away from the culture of violence, by providing them with employment opportunities. Now is the time to act decisively, and to allow the process of healing to begin.

The writer is Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to the US