Defence column |
by Ranil Wijayapala |
Yala attack plan to shift attention away from North
Desperate LTTE in diversionary attacks:
The LTTE this time has come with a different
game plan with the launch of a sudden attack on an isolated Army
detachment in the Southern end of the country. The intention of the LTTE
is quite evident.
It wants to give the message to the country
and also to the international community about their capability to launch
attacks on Security Forces even in the South despite the setbacks
suffered by the outfit in the Wanni and
Environment Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka visited the Yala
National Park on Tuesday after Monday evening’s LTTE attack on
Thalgasmankada Army Post. Here the Minister meeting the wild
life officers. |
the Jaffna Forward Defence Lines.
But, it is very evident from this attack that the LTTE is in a
desperate state. If not, why target an Army detachment guarding the Yala
National Park. It also betrays a sign of desperation after the outfit’s
inability to launch any major attack in the North or in the Wanni.
Out of the seven soldiers attached to the detachment manned by the
troops of the 18 Sri Lanka National Guard six were killed in this
unexpected attack.
Many feared that the LTTE had infiltrated the Yala National Park in
large numbers as the tractor which was heading towards Thalgasmankada
Army detachment to collect the bodies of the soldiers was caught in a
landmine explosion just 600 metres away from the detachment.
One soldier was killed and five others injured in this mine explosion
increasing the number of deaths to seven.
Elite Commandos and Special Forces were flown to the Yala National
Park on Wednesday morning to launch a massive search operation and track
down the Tiger cadres who had infiltrated the National Park.
Even two days after the search operation, troops found no proof of a
Tiger presence despite searching many parts of the Park including block
II of the park hemmed between Kumbukkan Oya-the border of the Ampara
district and Menik Ganga.
Therefore, it is believed that the number of Tiger cadres who had
launched this attack would not have exceeded ten.
Yet, the existence of even a handful of Tiger cadres inside the
National Park will be a threat as they can launch unexpected attacks not
only on Security Forces and Police personnel but also the civilians
visiting the park, in their desperation.
That was why the Defence Authorities have taken steps to screen all
parts of the National Park to give a full security guarantee to the
people visiting the Park before it is open to the public.
Apart from this the security of the historic Situlpawwa Raja Maha
Vihara has to be considered in view of the large number of Buddhists
visiting the sacred area as it is located just six kilometres away from
the Thalgamsmankada Army detachment.
However, this is not the first occasion the LTTE carried out such
attacks inside the Yala National Park. There had been many occasions
where the LTTE had set fire to a number of Holiday Bungalows inside the
National Park in the late 1990’s.
But according to records this is the first occasion the LTTE was able
to kill seven soldiers inside the Yala National Park located in the
southern tip of the country.
What is most important here is to find out how the Tiger cadres
infiltrated the Park. There are many possibilities for them to
infiltrate the national park considering the enormous jungle area it
covers bordering many districts including Ampara, Moneragala, and
Hambantota.
According to Security Forces the most probable way for the LTTE
infiltrate the national park is through Ampara border across Kumbukkan
Oya which demarcates Ampara district and the Hambantota district.
Zone II of the National Park located between Kumbukkan Oya and Menik
Ganga, according to sources, provides a safe haven for any group to
operate freely considering the number of rock caves in the region.
This area could have been used by the LTTE to infiltrate into the
Zone I of the National Park and launch this
The Wild Life department vehicle that gamagedot d |
attack on Thalgasmankada located some six kilometres into the
land from the location which links Menik Ganga into the sea.
The Security Forces believe that groups of Tiger cadres who fled from
Kanchikudichchiaru jungle would have entered the this area across the
Lahugala National Park in the Ampara border with the Police Special Task
Force launching a number of search operations in the jungle patches of
the Ampara district in search of the Tiger cadres who fled from
Thoppigala.
There had been information that a team led by LTTE leader Ram had
fled further southwards from the Thoppigala in their bid to escape
Security Forces operations.
The presence of the STF in the area has paved the way for the LTTE to
flee from the Kanchikudichchuaru jungle towards further south of the
Ampara district.
The other possibility for the LTTE to move into the area is by
mingling with the fishermen arriving there to the Yala National Park
area for seasonal fishing.
There had been information from a hunter, that some suspected people
were living inside a rock cave in the Block II area of the National
Park.
Therefore, it is quite clear the LTTE infiltrated the jungle through
the Ampara border from Panama and Lahugala jungle.
Another possible way for the LTTE to infiltrate the Yala National
Park is mingling with the pilgrims from the North to the annual
Kataragama perahera through the jungle terrains passing the Yala
National Park.
The recently concluded Kataragama perahera gave ample opportunities
for fleeing Tiger terrorists from the Eastern theatre to move towards
the southern end mingling with these pilgrims on Pada Yatra.
Though it was compulsory for the Security Forces to screen them
before arriving at Kataragama they had many opportunities to move away
from these pilgrims and take refuge in jungle patches easily.
The Security Forces who were guarding the Yala National Park had not
been on alert as the area had not come under such a terror attack for
the past few years.
The LTTE took this chance to overrun the Army detachment killing six
soldiers there in the detachment as the Security Forces guarding the
National Park have not conducted any search operations outside their
detachment.
But this cannot be taken as a serious lapse on the part of the
Security Forces as they never expected such an attack from the LTTE at
this point, though there had been many incidents in the past inside the
Yala National Park.
There had been several terror attacks on Thalgasmanakada in 1986, and
in 1996. The LTTE set fire to a few holiday bungalows inside Yala
National Park in 1996.
In October 1997 there was an incident in which the Kataragama bus
depot was set on fire while a few vehicles were set ablaze in Galge area
inside the Yala National Park.
The LTTE had selected an easy target to transmit a message across the
world announcing their presence at a time the outfit was at the
receiving end of a severe hiding both on ground, sea and through air
attacks, its worst ever reversal in the near three decade old conflict.
There had been wide publicity to this incident as it involved a world
famous Wild Life Park and also due to its location hundreds of miles
away from the theatre of battle in the Wanni and in the Jaffna
peninsula.
Had the LTTE launched this attack targeting a small Army detachment
in Weli Oya or in Jaffna the incident would have gained the least
prominence to the LTTE since such incidents were commonplace in the
North.
Even if they did the same thing in Trincomalee or in Batticaloa, that
also would not had any effect as this type of isolated incidents are
frequently reported when Security Forces launch search operations to
check Tiger infiltrations into the province possibly from the Northern
sector.
One major objective of the LTTE through this attack is to divert the
attention of the Security Forces from the Wanni in the face of the
severe beating taken by the outfit. They want the Security Forces to
deploy a major strength, at least a Brigade to secure an area like the
Yala National Park, which stretches over 97,889 hectares.
It is vital for the LTTE to shift a considerable strength from the
Wanni battle front as it facing an acute shortage of fighters to face
the Security Forces advancing towards their Wanni strongholds slowly but
steadily.
Such a vacuum in the Wanni battle front will enable the LTTE face the
Security Forces easily with the limited number of cadres available with
them.
During this week alone more than 100 Tiger cadres were killed in the
confrontations with the Security Forces West of Omanthai. The number of
Tiger cadres killed in these confrontations in this location have
increased to 1,500.
Heavy LTTE casualties were reported when troops crippled a Tiger
advance on Wednesday at the defence lines North of Uyilankulam, Mannar.
The limited encounter between Forces and the LTTE sprung amidst
stormy weather with the onset of monsoonal rains.
Earlier, on Monday the Security Forces were able to kill more than 30
Tiger cadres in the FDLs West of Omanthai. Many of these cadres were
female cadres and bodies recovered by the Security Forces were handed
over to the LTTE later through the ICRC.
Yesterday too the security Forces averted another major LTTE move
towards Security Forces defences in Periyathampanai in the West of
Omanthai killing at least 13 LTTE cadres and injuring 10 of them. Seven
bodies of the LTTE were recovered by the Security Forces along with
their personnel weapons.
What is most significant is that the LTTE is realising that the fall
of the Wanni bastions is inevitable in the face of determined efforts by
the Security Forces to continue their advance towards the uncleared
areas amidst heavy resistance from the LTTE.
In the same way the LTTE is also receiving severe beatings from the
Security Forces in the Jaffna FDLs. According to the military at least
five LTTE cadres are being killed on daily basis in the Jaffna FDLs in
Muhamalai, Kilali and Nagar Kovil.
The recovery of a large haul of arms inside a house in Jaffna was a
major breakthrough to the Security Forces since this detection could
well have averted a major disaster that could have been planned by the
LTTE to gain the upper hand.
That was the biggest recovery ever made by the Security Forces in the
Jaffna peninsula. Troops acting on information given by civilians
detected this massive LTTE war chest inside a false wall of a house.
The recovery included 622 Kilograms of C-4 explosives packed in
boxes, 6334 live rounds of T-56 ammunition, one T-56 weapon, one silence
pistol, 21 boxes of bicycle balls, eight suicide jackets, five claymore
mines, five cellular phones, one Global Positioning System(GPS) set, 20
T-56 magazines, 790 T-56 silencer ammunition, 70 LTTE code sheets and a
large stock of batteries.
This is the second largest quantity of C4 explosives detected in a
single instance after the recovery of an explosive laden freezer truck
in Trincomalee.
It is clearly evident that LTTE is now in a major preparation to
launch a massive attack on vital security installations either in Jaffna
or elsewhere in the country in order to rise from its present debacles.
Therefore, the attack on the Thalgasmanakada Army detachment can be
seen as one step towards destabilising security in the South as it was
the only place they could find to attack the Security Forces.
Therefore it is vital on the part of the Security Forces and also the
public to be alert to possible LTTE moves to launch a desperate and
inhumane attack targeting civilians in Colombo to exert pressure on the
Government to hold back military operations targeting the group’s Wanni
strongholds. |