Forces continue mission to liberate Tamil civilians unperturbed by LTTE moves

Proper political leadership paved the way for Forces’ success:

FORCES’ EASTERN DOMINANCE: The 30 years long conflict in Sri Lanka reached a new height last week with the capture of areas west and south of Batticaloa under their control confining the Tiger terrorists to a jungle patch in Thoppigala.

But it was not a journey across a desert sans enemy strongholds as explained by certain politicians who had never thought of visiting the areas liberated by the Security Forces not only using their heads but with kind hearts inside their camouflaged kits.

Now it is high time to have a flashback on the events that had unfolded during the past one and half years in which the Security Forces made this dramatic turn to bring down the enemy to its weakest position in recent history.

Today, it seems many have forgotten the past. They think that the current situation resulted after events that had unfolded within a fortnight.

Many have forgotten their memories about the series of provocative acts of the LTTE against the Security

 Forces and has now come to the level to think that the current situation has resulted solely due to the actions taken by the Government.

It was a determined effort by the LTTE to pinch the Government and drag the Government into the path of war. But, they could not reach their target until a woman suicide cadre stormed the motorcade of Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006 inside the Army Headquarters.

However, the incident at Army Headquarters turned out to be a boomerang for the LTTE, since it was the second occasion they closely missed their targets of suicide missions. The Army commander narrowly escaped and recovered from his injuries to accept the challenge posed by the LTTE to him.

April 25, 2006 was the first day the Government reacted to LTTE provocations. Till then it was a tug of war between the patience and the provocations. The LTTE tested the limits of the patience exercised by the Government until nearly 150 Security Forces personnel fell victim to LTTE claymore mines.

The reaction by the Government to these provocative acts came in the form of precautionary measures and stepped up security measures to prevent such attacks by the LTTE. But they were not satisfied with the manner in which the Security Forces reacted to their acts.

Then they heighten their provocative acts against the Security Forces personnel under the cover of civilians.

But the extreme patience practised by the Government in the face of these provocative acts brought results as the entire international community fell in line with the Government to justify the cause of action taken by the Security Forces to contain terror acts of the LTTE to limited areas.

It was not a success that can be explained by statistics. It can only be explained from the humanitarian aspects as the measures taken by the Government were entirely aimed at giving a sigh of relief for the people who had been suppressed at the hands of the LTTE for decades without seeing any light at the end of the tunnel.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that the East has never been freed from the clutches of the LTTE in this magnanimous manner in the 30-year long history of the conflict.

According to senior military officials, areas like Peraru jungles close to Yan Oya in the North of Trincomalee has never been cleared even during 1980’s where the LTTE presence was insignificant in those areas.

The Security Forces have recorded this victory while the LTTE has been brought down to the weakest position in Jaffna in which they ran their own administration despite the area falling under the control of the Security Forces.

The iron fist of the LTTE controlled each and every act of the civilians in Jaffna peninsula despite the presence of the Security Forces before the closure of the A-9 road from Muhamalai entry exit point.

It is now high time to recall why the LTTE made such a fuss for the opening of the A-9 road for the civilians and

 exerted pressure on the Government using the international community to achieve their militaristic goals betraying the true needs of the Tamil community to achieve their petty objectives.

No one has so far questioned as to why the LTTE did not make a single effort to launch a massive assault on the FDLs in Jaffna despite the advantageous position they entertained having their biggest strength in the Wanni.

The LTTE, by refraining from committing such an act, has admitted the fact that they have been militarily and also psychologically weakened after the closure of the A-9 road as it disconnected them from Jaffna which was considered the heart of the LTTE.

Now anybody can realise as to why the LTTE made such a fuss for the opening of the A-9 road when it was closed after violence escalated.

The LTTE has now given up their campaign to bring pressures on the Government for the opening of the A-9 road as they have failed in all their endeavours to sabotage the Government’s efforts to bring normality to the Jaffna peninsula.

The other significant factor is that the key towns in the East have also been taken under the full control of the Security Forces. This is also unprecedented in the history of the 30-year long conflict.

Now they have no control over the population living in the Eastern towns of Trincomalee, Batticaloa as Security Forces brought the LTTE activities to a minimum level.

The other highlighting factor is that the Security Forces have recorded these victories while bringing the LTTE’s violent activities in Colombo and suburbs to minimum level through intense security measures adopted by the Forces and the Police to maintain high standards security in Colombo and other main cities in the country.

That was why the mere statistics and number of incidents alone cannot explain the situation in a proper manner.

Many incidents that could have brought devastating consequences to the country were averted by pre-emptive measures taken by the Government in Colombo and suburbs by conducting cordon and search operations.

The victories recorded by the Sri Lanka Navy against the LTTE arms smuggling operations by destroying four major LTTE ships and hindering all the efforts by the Sea Tigers to demoralise the Security Forces have to be highlighted when explaining the current security situation in the country.

If not for the Navy, the LTTE would have been a much stronger organisation today with all forms of modern weaponry available with them to fight the Security Forces in the East as well as in the North.

The actions taken by the Navy had sunk the LTTE’s morale to the lowest level as the Navy action had caused the destruction of their years-long efforts to bring those weapons and ammunition to Wanni wriggling through international anti terror networks.

The Sri Lanka Air Force too contributed immensely to keep the Security Force victories at their peak with their well trained pilots taking precise LTTE targets from the air.

But all these victories did not come automatically. These victories resulted due to well planned mechanisms put forward by the Security Forces solely with the objective of liberating the Tamil community from the Tiger grip.

The Security Forces, for the first time in the recent history had a free hand to control the situation on their own without any political pressures.

The political leadership supported their action absorbing all sorts of pressures that had been raised due to Security Forces action in the North-East without transferring those pressures directly to the Security Forces.

That had helped the Security Forces immensely to engage in their mission without any burden about any political pressures.

Thus it has to be mentioned that the path they had taken was not a rosy one.

There had been mountains of challenges before them as a part of Prabhakaran’s long term campaign to break the will of the Government to defeat the LTTE militarily.

It is better to quote a report compiled by a team of US Defence Department sponsored by the UNF Government led by Ranil Wickremesinghe to give a clear picture about the LTTE leader.

“Prabhakaran’s long term goal is to break the will of the Sinhalese-led Government and thus lead it to accede to his demand for a Tamil Homeland. To achieve this end any and all measures are justified in his mind. Prabhakaran is likely to continue assassinating political and military leaders as well as bombing key targets in the economic infrastructure.

He views the high political and economic targets costs his action imposed on the government as doors that lead to negotiations as a ploy for the LTTE to rearm and regroup especially after a series of battle defeats”.

That must have been the most appropriate statement included in this lengthy report compiled by the US Defense Department team sponsored by then UNF Government in 2003.

The copies of their report was handed over to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando and Minister Milinda Moragoda.

As it has been clearly explained here Prabhakaran has always been engaged in a process of breaking the will of the Government to defeat their organisations.

Prabhakaran adopted so many methods to achieve this goal during the past one and half years but miserably failed in all his endeavours.

He made use of bus bombing when they were above to be defeated in the Vakarai battle. The prime aim of the LTTE was to get the civil society to raise their voice against military operations in the North and the East so that the Government would succumb to the pressures of civilians to halt the military operations.

But the public reacted to this situation in a more responsible manner extending their full support for the Security Forces and the Police to take the situation under control.

As they failed in their endeavour the LTTE has resorted to make use some of the Southern politicians and political parties to campaign against the Government making human rights violations as the basis for their campaign.

But the Government and the Security Forces went ahead with their plans undeterred by this vicious campaign against the Government and the Security Forces.

Amidst this heavy campaign the LTTE leader used the aerial attack on the Katunayake Air Force Base with a much determined effort to break the ongoing military operations in the East.

But the air attack on the Katunayake airbase could not move the Government from its determined path as it was well aware that an organisation which had existed more than 30 years would not keep silent once Security Forces mercilessly attack their strongholds in the East.

Therefore, they have now turned their campaign targeting individuals to put a stop for the military operations. But the Government and the Security Forces will go ahead with its determined plan unaffected by the moves of the LTTE.

LTTE’s defeats in East - a chronology

* Just days after Prabhakaran’s speech on November 26, 2006, a new round of violence erupted.

* Increased LTTE activity in the North and East, including Claymore mine attacks which killed 150 Government troops beginning from December 2005.

* Clashes between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lanka Navy, and the killings of sympathizers on both sides leaving around 200 people dead.

* The co-chairs - the United States in particular - were heavily critical of the violence perpetrated by the LTTE.

* Both parties agreed in February 2006 that new talks could be held in Geneva Switzerland on February 22 and February 23.

* At the talks in Geneva both sides agreed to curb violence and to hold further talks on April 19-21.

* The LTTE resumed attacks against the military in April beginning with a Claymore anti-personnel mine attack on military vehicles which killed 10 sailors on April 11, 2006.

* On April 12, coordinated bombings by rebels and rioting

in the north-eastern part of the country left 16 dead.

* The LTTE called for a postponement of the Geneva talks until April 24-25, and the government initially agreed to this.

* April 20, 2006: The LTTE officially pulled out of peace talks indefinitely.

* Violence continued to spiral and on April 23, 2006, six Sinhalese farmers were massacred in their paddy fields by suspected LTTE cadres in the Trincomalee district.

* LTTE attempted the assassinate Army Commander Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka by a pregnant LTTE Black Tiger suicide bomber who blew herself up at the Army Headquarters.

* For the first time since the 2001 ceasefire, the Sri Lanka Air Force carried out aerial assaults on Tiger positions in the north-eastern part of the island in retaliation for the attack.

* The European Union decided to proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist organisation on May 19, 2006.

* New talks were scheduled in Oslo, Norway, between June 8-9.

* Delegations from both sides arrived in Oslo, but the talks were cancelled when the LTTE refused to meet directly with the Government delegation claiming its representatives were not allowed safe passage to travel to the talks.

* Further violence followed, including the Kebithigollewa

massacre on June 15, 2006 in which the LTTE attacked a bus killing at least 64 Sinhalese civilians and prompting more air strikes by the Air Force.

* June 26,2006: The assassination of Sri Lanka’s third highest-ranking Army officer and Deputy Chief of Staff General Parami Kulatunga.

* A new crisis leading to the first large-scale fighting since signing of the ceasefire occurred when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru reservoir on July 21, 2006 and cut the water supply to 15,000 villages in Government-controlled areas.

* The Air Force attacked LTTE positions on July 26 and ground troops began an operation to open the sluice gate.

* The sluice gates were eventually re-opened on August 8, 2006.

* LTTE launched attack on a Sri Lanka Navy base in Trincomalee and Muttur in early August, resulting in the deaths of at least 30 civilians and displacing 25,000 residents of the area.

* The clashes erupted on August 2, 2006 when the LTTE launched a heavy artillery attack on Muttur and then moved in, gaining control of some parts of the town.

* The military retaliated, and re-established full control over the town by August 5 killing over 150 LTTE cadres in heavy fighting.

* August 11, 2006 - In the north of the country, some of the bloodiest fighting since 2001 took place after the LTTE launched attacks on Sri Lanka Army defence lines in the Jaffna peninsula.

* The LTTE was forced to give up its offensive due to heavy casualties. The LTTE is estimated to have lost over 250 cadres in the operation, while 90 Sri Lankan soldiers and sailors were also killed.

* On the same day, a convoy carrying the High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Bashir Wali Mohamed was attacked by a claymore anti personnel mine concealed within an autorickshaw.

* On August 28 the Sri Lankan military launched an assault to retake the LTTE camps in Sampur and the adjoining Kaddaiparichchan and Thoppur areas.

* Security Forces captured Sampur from the LTTE on September 4, 2006.

* A suspected LTTE suicide bomber struck a naval convoy in Habarana, in the canter of the country killing about 100 unarmed sailors.

* December 1, 2006 LTTE suicide cadres attempted to take the life of Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa in Colombo

* The Army began an offensive against the LTTE on December 8, 2006 in the Batticaloa district with the objective of taking Vakarai.

* Suspected LTTE cadres carried out two bus bombings in the south of the country, killing 21 civilians in early January, 2007.

* January 19, 2007. The Army launched assaults from three different directions, and liberated Vakarai from the grip of the LTTE.

* A bomb explosion on April 2, 2007 in a civilian bus kills twelve civilians in Ampara.

* March 26, 2007: An air strike by the LTTE happened for the first time in history on March on air-force base at Katunayake.

* In April 2007, troops captured the strategic A5 highway which was under LTTE control for the last 15 years. The LTTE’s already diminishing presence in the East was reduced to a mere 140 square kilometres of jungle land in Thoppigala.