Solution through principle of internal self-determination - Part 2

Continued from yesterday

Tamil grievances and aspirations

When we discuss the conflict in Sri Lanka, we also come across of two terminologies viz. 'grievances and 'aspirations' of Tamils. Sometimes we use the adjective 'legitimate' to highlight the two issues.

First of all, I have to make it clear that as human beings we all have aspirations. We aspire to do well in our lives; we aspire to our children excelling in studies and succeed in life, and the list can go on and on.

Most of the time our aspirations can be legitimate; but then, some of us could also aspire to achieve certain other things, which are not quite legitimate.

What is important is that, it is not only the Tamil community that have aspirations. Other communities too have their own aspirations and legitimate aspirations too, which may be similar to or different from those of Tamils.

The fact of the matter is, the administration has accepted in good faith to address the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people. But nobody has listed or gone beyond such statements to list or examine what these aspirations are, whether they are legitimate or not, and more importantly, if they are justified, whether those give reason for creation of a separate state.

I could say the same thing about grievances too, but to a lesser extent. For example, earlier I acknowledged that the Tamil community had certain grievances resulting from the language policy adopted in the 1950s and the university entrance policy in the 1970s.

The fact is that the issues relating to the language policy has been addressed when Tamil was made an official language along with Sinhalese, through amendments to the 1987 constitution. Yet, we have to acknowledge that still there are certain grievances experienced by Tamils, due to the practical shortcomings in putting the language policy in to practice.

Southern consensus

Needless to say that any agreement reached to devolve or share administrative power should be done through a democratic process. Such units must be established having consulted the people living there through democratic means, such as multiparty elections or referendums.

It must be emphasized that President Mahinda Rajapaksa has gone on record not once but several times that he is in favour of granting maximum possible devolution.

It is with that commitment in view earlier this year; he took steps to establish an All Party Representations Committee (APRC), open to all democratically elected parties in parliament. Unfortunately, several parties have so far not joined that process. Moreover, a panel comprising legal and constitutional experts has been established to advice the APRC.

Negotiations with the LTTE

It will be fair, I suppose, to expect the LTTE to undergo a metamorphosis, so that it will also transform itself to a democratic entity as several other Tamil militant groups did after 1987. In fact, some former militants now hold cabinet portfolios and one is entrusted with the task of regional development.

However, those who have studied the conflict of Sri Lanka would notice that the Tigers engaged in negotiations with successive administrations on five different occasions, namely in 1985, 1987, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2002/2003.

On all those occasions, they walked away from the negotiating table to wage war and on three occasions employed suicide bombers to kill those who were responsible for taking them to the negotiating table and succeeded on two occasions.

More recently, in April 2006, having agreed to meet in Geneva, they refused to proceed to the venue, and in May, having gone all the way to Oslo, refused to engage in talks with the Government negotiators on a flimsy excuse. They have adopted a similar tactic last week in Geneva.

Despite their intransigent behaviour, the peace facilitator Norway, and other Co-Chairs - the US, Japan and the European Union, and the Secretary General of the UN together with many others have encouraged the two sides to re-engage in negotiations.

In the case of the US, it has taken the position, as explained by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who does not mince his words, that "The US does not recognize the LTTE. We don't deal with them, we don't support them, we are extremely critical of them...we have no sympathy whatsoever for the Tigers." Yet he urged the Government to negotiate with Tigers.

The international position on negotiations with the LTTE can best be described as seemingly contradictory but conditioned by circumstances. In the first instance, there is a strong feeling here in the US and elsewhere, that one should not deal with terrorists.

Yet there is general support, if not urging, that the Sri Lanka Government should engage in negotiations with the LTTE. Is this due to the claim by the Tigers that they are the "sole representatives of the Tamil People" or due to the fact that they dominate certain areas of the North and the East and holding a vice-like grip on the Tamil people to the extent that separating the people from the LTTE is not a feasible exercise?

On the other hand, is it due to the fact that the Government has so far not come up with a workable proposal for devolution or sharing of power with the Tamils? How come the international community have overlooked the need to support and empower those Tamil political parties, which are democratic and are at the receiving end by the Tigers?

There is general agreement within and outside Sri Lanka that the conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be resolved by continuing with the armed conflict. The way out of the impasse is through negotiation.

However, to think that objective could be achieved through negotiations only with Tigers does not seem to reflect reality. The five instances of negotiations since 1985 and the last three experiences in Geneva and Oslo are sufficient to conclude that the vision of the Tigers is nothing but a separate state.

This is confirmed by the well-documented thinking of the leader of the organization, that a separate state should not come on a platter either. The Tamils have to fight to realise that objective. In fact his call to his supporters was, if he deviated from the goal of a separate state, they have the right to kill him.

It is exactly that goal they are pursuing right now, which exercise was articulated by the leader of the organization last November as follows:

"The new Government should come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people. This is our urgent and final appeal. If the new Government rejects our urgent appeal, we will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self-government in our homeland."

I should try to explain the situation for the sake of clarity. During the 2002/2003 negotiations the two sides met on six different times in various cities of the world from Bangkok to Hakone with Oslo and Berlin in between.

I speak, on those meetings with some knowledge having attended all of them. At none of these negotiating sessions was it possible to focus on substantive issues, as at each session the LTTE dodged dealing with core issues on the guise that they need to focus on the "existential" problems of the Tamil civilians.

However, in December 2002, when they were urged by the facilitator to compromise, the LTTE delegation agreed to:

" ..explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.

Guided by this objective, the parties agreed to initiate discussions on substantive political issues such as, but not limited to:

* Power-sharing between the centre and the region, as well as within the centre;

* Geographical region;

* Human Rights protection;

* Political and administrative mechanism;

* Public finance;

* Law and order".

The fact that agreement ended up being still born is seen from what happened since then ending with the "temporary suspension of the negotiations" in April 2003 by the Tigers, and the demand for a federal structure being elevated to a 'confederal' structure in the ISGA proposals of October that year.

It is in this context some believe that transformation of the confederal structure to a separate state will be a matter of time. Ahead of the October 28-29 round of talks in Geneva, political leader of LTTE, Suppiah Thamilselvan has gone on record that it was not the intention of the organisation to focus on substantive issues until the restoration of normalcy has taken place and only after that they will be able to talk about people's political aims and aspirations.

Having assured the international community that they will go to Geneva without conditions, Tigers have insisted in Geneva that future participation in the negotiations will depend on the opening of the A-9 highway to the North. This is very much like the position the Tigers adopted during the 2002/2003 negotiations.

Let me conclude my presentation with some steps that need to be taken, if we were to focus on Sri Lanka tomorrow rather than today.

I. There should be a commitment on the part of parties to the conflict that the conflict can be resolved only through negotiations and that it must be a democratic solution.

II. Parties should address all issues affecting all minorities, including the Tamils.

III. The APRC process should be fast tracked with a view to reaching consensus on political settlement within the shortest possible period.

IV. The latest round of negotiations commenced in Geneva on October 28 should, within a specific time frame, focus on substantive matters with a view to ending the armed conflict and achieving a political settlement.

V. In the process of negotiations for a political settlement, the Government should not overlook the moderate Tamil parties and Muslims in the parliament.

VI. Following the stance taken by the LTTE in Geneva last week, the international community should encourage, failing which, pressurize, the LTTE not to leave the negotiating table under spurious pretexts.