Why donors failed to bring peace to Lanka
SRI LANKA: In the past four years, the international donor
community has pledged billions of dollars to Sri Lanka with the aim of
promoting peace and economic reform. And a lot of it has already gone
into the country's kitty. Yet, aid has not met its objectives.
The necessary preconditions of peace still do not exist and Sri Lanka
continues to be perched precariously on the edge of war.
According to studies sponsored by The Asia Foundation, the reason for
this failure is that the donors have not addressed the political issues.
The issues, which underlie the conflict are poor governance, an
un-accommodative state and political structure, and perceived ethnic and
regional grievances.
The donors expected economic inputs and macro level economic reform
to trigger political change as desired by the Western world.
But the changes never happened. In some ways, these external inputs
even helped reinforce the existing political divide and accentuate the
ethnic conflict.
"The development cart has been put before the political horse," say
Goodhand, Klem et al, in Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka
2002-2005 (The Asia Foundation, Colombo, 2005).
"Economic imperatives were never likely to override political and
strategic interests in a conflict that is primarily about governance and
the nature of the state," they observe.
Differences between donors
However, all international donors cannot be put into the same basket.
There are crucial differences in the way in which the donors have
approached Sri Lanka and the issues in it. And the differences in this
regard have impacted the international aid effort and its results are
very significant.
According to Goodhand and Klem, the first distinction is between the
Asian and Western donors, and the second is between big donors like the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the smaller bilateral
donors.
The Asian donors (principally Japan and India) have been concerned
primarily with trade and geo-strategic objectives.
But the Western donors, comprising the US, EU and individual European
countries, have had a "menu of concerns" including democratization,
human rights and the liberalisation of the economy.
Unlike the Western donors, Japan, India and the IFIs have been
apolitical, preferring to work through the government of Sri Lanka
rather than seeking other channels to disburse their aid or carry out
their projects.
The difference between the large and the small donors is also of
importance.
The IFIs and Japan are the largest donors. According to Adam Burke
and Anthea Mulakala (Donors and Peace Building-2000-2005, The Asia
Foundation, Colombo, 2005) these large donors account for 75 to 80 per
cent of the aid flows into Sri Lanka.
And because these large donors have been largely indifferent to the
conflict in the island and its social, economic, and political
underpinnings, foreign aid has not had a significant impact on the
pattern of governance and the peace process.
It is not denied that the post-2000/2001 Sri Lankan and international
scenario did bring about a change in the outlook of the previously
apolitical or indifferent major aid giving countries and institutions.
The conflict-affected North and East did begin to get substantial aid
from the IFIs and Japan.
Tokyo even appointed a Special Peace Envoy (Yasushi Akashi) to tie
economic aid to peace building. But the impact has not been commensurate
with the expectations.
According to Burke and Mulakala, this is because the ethnic conflict
has only been a "secondary factor" in the process of deciding resource
transfers from the development banks and Japan.
"Given that these donors represent some 75 to 80 per cent of donor
funds, this is significant," they say.
Their plans are based on the theory that greater deregulation and
economic openness will eventually remove the "impediment" of ethnic
conflict.
The IFIs did strive to bring about policy changes in the government
of Sri Lanka towards this end.
But this approach was not founded on a correct appreciation of ground
realities and ground level popular concerns.
Oslo and Tokyo conferences
Undoubtedly, there was political awareness among the donors at the
top level.
And this was reflected in the decisions taken at the Oslo (December
2002) and Tokyo (June 2003) conferences.
Oslo got the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to agree to find a
"federal" solution within a united Sri Lanka.
But Tokyo was the "high water mark" in the convergence of aid,
security matters, and liberal ideological objectives, observe Goodhand
and Klem.
USD 4.5 billion was pledged at Tokyo, with the top most donors being
Japan, the ADB and World Bank. And they saw to it that political
conditions for the delivery of the whopping aid package were put in
place.
"Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to
substantial and parallel progress towards fulfilment of the objectives
agreed by the parties in Oslo," paragraph 18 of the celebrated Tokyo
Declaration said.
The Declaration called for compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA); participation of the Muslim minority in the talks; promotion and
protection of human rights; gender equality; and progress towards a
final political settlement.
Economic reform was another key aim of the major donors.
They found the United National Front (UNF) government led by Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, to be attuned to this objective.
Both the donors and the UNF believed that economic growth through
liberalisation and foreign investment would automatically blunt social,
economic, ethnic and regional conflicts.
Donors over-play development card
But the UNF regime and the international donors over-played the
development card. First of all, the Tokyo conference was held without
the LTTE.
The LTTE had withdrawn from the talks process earlier in April 2003,
complaining of slow progress and "over internationalisation" of the
peace process.
The rebel outfit did not want to give up the option of fighting for
total independence, under international donor duress. It also wanted to
take on the Sri Lankan government on a footing of strategic equality.
It feared a state shielded by a strategic and economic International
Safety Net (ISN), which the UNF was assiduously putting up.
The South too was not happy with the internationalisation of the
conflict, albeit for different reasons.
Here, it was felt that the CFA was a Norwegian-inspired sell out to
the LTTE. The South feared that in its bid to find a quick fix solution
to the conflict, the West might have no compunction about yielding to
the separatist demand of the LTTE and dividing the country.
Commenting on the Tokyo declaration and its aftermath, Goodhand and
Klem say: "Arguably this was a case of international actors pushing
ahead with their own time frames and agendas (encouraged by the UNF
government) without taking into account the changed ground situation."
Not surprisingly, the international donors could not implement the
Tokyo Declaration.
A popular mood in the South against the peace process as it was
going, resulted in the defeat of the pro-peace and pro-donor UNF in a
snap election in April 2004.
Power went into the hands of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA),
a Sinhala nationalistic grouping which was opposed to almost everything
the peace process stood for, including international involvement and the
new economic policy.
The UNF government's enthusiasm for radical economic change, as per
the Western model, endeared it to the donors no doubt, but it resulted
in the government's getting alienated from the masses.
Poverty alleviation
A poverty alleviation scheme called "Samurdhi" was denied to 300,000
recipients; fertiliser subsidies were curtailed; electricity charges
were hiked; and efforts were made to restructure the public sector. A
major nationalised bank, providing cheap credit to the poor, was to be
privatised.
"In the main, these reforms were done by stealth and there was very
little public consultation," observe Goodhand and Klem.
As for the LTTE, it too resisted the Western concepts of development
administration.
While the donors wanted decentralised decision making, the LTTE was
"extremely statist" and "hierarchical".
The donors wanted the North East to enter the globalised market, but
there was resistance to this, given its immediate economic costs to the
common man there.
Both the South and the LTTE felt that the other was getting pampered
by the donors. The donors had only exacerbated existing ethnic tensions.
Goodhand and Klem say that policy formulation did not appear to be
conflict sensitive and to adequately take into account the need for
balanced assistance to the North East and the South. And the attitude
remains the same to this day.
"In spite of the evidence that shock therapy and a growth-first model
are politically destabilising, donors do not appear to have changed
their thinking on this matter," the authors say.
Political opposition
Between 2002 and 2005, the donors, Sri Lankan regimes and the LTTE
did put up proposals for institutionalising the new democratic
development and aid utilisation strategies.
But these did not survive or even come into existence, because of
underlying political conflicts.
With the backing of the donors, the government and the LTTE set up
the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN)
and the North East Rehabilitation Fund (NERF). But both SIHRN and NERF
lacked legal status and the requisite independence, which the LTTE
insisted on.
Political opposition in the South to any institutional recognition of
the LTTE or to the grant of powers to organisations in which the LTTE
was represented, prevented the UNF government from implementing its
agenda to co-opt the LTTE into Sri Lanka's administrative structures and
wean it away from terrorism, separatism and armed struggle.
Not surprisingly, SIHRN and NERF fell by the way side. Later in mid
2005, the internationally backed and funded post-tsunami rehabilitation
organisation for the North East (P-TOMS) also did not come into
existence because of political opposition in the South.
Conflict over "normalisation"
The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE had agreed that "normalisation"
of life in the North East was a sine qua non for carrying out any
political or economic development plans and having any meaningful peace
talks. But the definition of normalisation differed, leading to
conflict.
For the LTTE, normalisation meant the withdrawal of all kinds of
movement and fishing restrictions in the North East; the dismantling of
checkpoints and the High Security Zones in Jaffna; and the army's
quitting public and private places.
But the state had consistently viewed such demands as being extremely
dangerous to its security.
The implementation of every good scheme and thought got stymied by
underlying political and strategic considerations, an inherited baggage
of fears about each other, and deep anxieties about survival.
Goodhand and Klem wonder if there can be normalisation without
addressing the underlying political questions.
"Governance" is key
Goodhand, Klem, Burke and Mulakaka, say that the only way out of the
current impasse is for the donors to show greater sensitivity to the
political dimensions of the Sri Lankan problem and also to see the
issues as stemming from poor governance, basically.
"The root cause of problems currently being experienced - such as
uneven development patterns, an ethnicised education system, a lack of
minority voice in the political process - can be traced back to the
political culture and quality of governance in Sri Lanka," Goodhand and
Klem say.
They also point out that donor policies, instead of helping to change
the structures to rid them of their maladies, have only reinforced the
existing systems. In other words, conflicts have been exacerbated by
donor policies.
Some donors like Japan do not think of systemic changes, while others
like USAID do, and are addressing governance issues at the grassroots
level, with some success.
But again USAID touts the Western model, which may not suit local
conditions or meet the requirements in Sri Lanka, the authors argue.
The Asia Foundation researchers also recommend that the donors
redefine "civil society" and go beyond interacting with "like-minded"
civil society groups mainly located in cosmopolitan Colombo, and include
"non-like minded" groups outside the metropolis, so that they get a
rounded picture of the ground situation in Sri Lanka.
(The writer is Special Correspondent of Hindustan
Times in Sri Lanka)
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