P-TOMS, an opportunity to build trust and understanding - former US Envoy

Washington, D.C. - Although the United States Government's U$ 134 million contribution to tsunami relief has no connection with the peace process, former American Ambassador to Sri Lanka Teresita C. Schaffer believes that this was an opportunity for the Government and the LTTE to work together on their common goal of repairing the devastation for a better understanding.

In an interview with Asian Tribune, Schaffer, touching on the now Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure (P-TOMS) signed between the Government and the LTTE, said "an arrangement which brings the LTTE into the decision and management process for reconstruction of the hardest-hit areas of the country can pay powerful dividends both for reconstruction and ultimately for Sri Lanka's larger task of reconstructing its national policy".

She advocates closer parallel ties and cooperation between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tigers: "The peace process represents an opportunity for the government and other organizations, including the LTTE, to learn to work together on their common goal of repairing the devastation. I believe that one of the ways that the Sri Lankan parties to this conflict can prepare for resumption of a serious peace process is to work together, or at least in parallel, on concrete and tangible things."

Schaffer continued, "When one is trying to overcome long-standing suspicions, the concrete and visible is much more compelling than abstractions. A successful de-mining or reconstruction project that one can see and touch is more compelling than a Constitutional proposal that is subject to many interpretations. And resources of all kinds can be opportunities to create this kind of concrete accomplishments, which can be powerful even if it has no direct connection to peace effort."

Then this one-time senior diplomat, who created a controversy years ago by suggesting a Confederate political structure for Sri Lanka to resolve the 'national issue, focused on the just signed P-TOMS that has created a political storm in Sri Lanka.

"This is where the issue of managing post-Tsunami relief comes in. I believe that an arrangement which brings the LTTE into the decision and management process for reconstruction of the hardest-hit areas of the country, can pay powerful dividends both for reconstruction and ultimate for Sri Lanka's larger task of reconstructing it national policy."

Then she says why: "It can offer the government and the LTTE the opportunity of doing small, concrete things together, and thence, perhaps, creating the first fragile strands of trust. In other words, both regular aid and tsunami relief represent resources that can help Sri Lankans develop a 'peace dividend'. Indeed, the experience of working together and the concreteness of these accomplishments are probably more important than the amounts of money involved."

Ambassador Schaffer outlined four factors that increased the level of U.S. involvement in Sri Lanka:

First: The attack of September 11, 2001 on the American soil brought the terrorism issue into sharp focus. Although the LTTE, unlike the Islamic extremists that have been the primary object of the U.S. "war on terrorism", did not target Americans, this experience increased U.S. interest in bringing this phenomenon to an end in Sri Lanka.

Second: The Norwegian facilitators who became involved in Sri Lanka at about that same time saw the need for international support for their efforts, and made a compelling case to Washington that it needed to step up its involvement in order to keep the peace process afloat.

Third: The new U.S.-Indian relationship. It has always been clear that a settlement in Sri Lanka would have to enjoy India's acquiescence, regardless of whether India was involved in brokering it. In years gone by, India was uncomfortable with any active U.S. diplomatic posture in its neighbourhood.

But with the dramatic change in its relations with Washington, with the increasing overlap between the two countries interests and within the expanding high-level dialogue between Washington and Delhi, India no longer had the same automatic scepticism about a U.S. role - role that India and the United States were able to consult about in the normal course of their diplomatic conversations.

Fourth: Perhaps most importantly, Sri Lanka had a serious peace process taking shape. Three governments in a row had made serious preparations for discussions with the LTTE; they held meetings and exchanged proposals; they had the able assistance of a skilled Norwegian team. In other words, there was the real possibility of success.

Ambassador Schaffer however says that, to get Washington's attention, "Sri Lanka would not have claimed the level of attention it received from senior (US) officials unless it also looked like a reasonable bet," reminding former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's interest in solving Sri Lanka's national issue.

Teresita Schaffer, who had very closely observed the tensions between the Tigers and the Sri Lanka Government, the peace process initiated by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga while maintaining very close contacts with principal players of the conflict when she was the American ambassador (92-95) in Colombo, and subsequently a Sri Lanka watcher in the Washington think tank as its program director for South Asia, expressed the most controversial sentiment in advocating direct contact between the United States government and the separatist LTTE taking her own country's 'anti-terrorism laws' into task somewhat hinting Washington's failed diplomacy when she says "The difficulty comes in when one tries to combine the disincentives for terrorism with positive incentives for organizations to leave its terrorist past behind."

She says that the United States government's designation of the LTTE as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" has affected U.S. diplomacy on Sri Lanka in many ways. Schaffer identifies the first obstacle as the public relations issue.

"In the post-9/11 world, and especially with the greater international exposure it has achieved during the early years of the peace process, the LTTE has become more conscious of the disadvantages of having the label "terrorist." Two years ago, the U.S. government suggested publicly that it might be able to consider that designation if the LTTE would stop killing Tamils who pursued policies contrary to theirs.

The U.S. government is right to take this position, despite the resentment it generates in the LTTE circles. As long as the U.S. government maintains a list of terrorist organizations, it need to be even-handed in the way they are interpreted, and cannot treat Tamil deaths more lightly than deaths of people from other communities," Ambassador Schaffer notes.

Then she turns to U.S. terrorism law to advocate her most controversial sentiment: "The effect of U.S. terrorism law and of the terrorist organizations list has been a problem for U.S. diplomacy, and one that has not always wisely handled. I refer to the U.S. policy forbidding most kind of contact between the U.S. government and representatives of organizations on the list. When the peace process is actually functioning, those working for peace, including in the U.S. government, need to be able to communicate directly with the LTTE and to strengthen its motivations to leave terrorism behind.

Given the importance the LTTE attaches to being treated on a par with the Government, this makes it important to avoid occasions where LTTE peace negotiators are unnecessarily kept out of peace-related gatherings on account of (US) terrorism policy. This may mean that meetings where the LTTE has a logical claim to participate should not be held in the United States, or in other countries with similar policies. Perhaps some kind of step-by-step policy in which contacts are expanded based on specific improvements in behaviour could help."

She was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. Schaffer has devoted most of her career to South Asia, on which she was one of the State Department's principal experts at that time. Her earlier postings include New Delhi, Islamabad, Dhaka and Tel Aviv.

(Asian Tribune)