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The invocation of the Pressler amendment against Pakistan's nuclear programme by the US brought home to Lahore, the post-Cold War realities. At the same time there is a marked improvement of the US relations with India and the mutual accommodation of interests by India and the United States in South Asia has become the tempo of the Indo-US relations.
During the last one and a half decades, the strategic thinking of Indian defence policy-makers has undergone a noticeable change.
The Indian strategic thinking in the 1970s and '80s was overwhelmed by the perceptions of dominance of India in South Asia. These perceptions were translated in the realm of relations with her smaller neighbours in the form of an assertive and interventionist policy.
In tracing the strategic perceptions of this strand of thinking, Bharat Wariavwall observed that "Regional primacy has been our (Indian) unstated but clearly pursued objective since we freed ourselves from the British rule but not the British conception of security....
By primacy we (Indians) mean what British meant: management of security affairs of South Asia, or the Indian subcontinent as the British called it, from delhi.
Since 1947 it was our clear policy to insist on our neighbours to shun security ties with powers outside the region." The more assertive policy vis-a-vis India's neighbours was more apparent under the later phase of the premiership of Indira Gandhi which was spelt out in the Indira Doctrine.
India's interference and the coercive diplomacy against Sri Lanka using the dissident Tamil militant groups as surrogates in the late 1970s and early 1980s and its constant deadlock of relations with Nepal and Bangladesh in the face of India's intransigence can be cited as examples for that policy.
The primary signals of change in its earlier assertive policy came to appear at the end of the decade of 1980s after the Janata Dal government under V. P. Singh came to power in December 1989.
It appeared that the Indian policy-makers had now come to grips with the realities of vulnerabilities linked with India's self-appointed role of the custodian of peace and stability in South Asia, if not the role of a regional policeman, after its unpleasant experience in Sri Lanka in the main and suspicions aroused in other countries over its military operations in the Maldives.
The new Indian approach to South Asian regional security was clearly spelt out later by the Janata Dal Prime Minister I. K. Gujral which is known as the Gujral Doctrine.
On January 20 in his address in Colombo 1997, Prime Minister Gujral himself outlined the key elements of the Gujral Doctrine: "I have had occasion in the recent past to talk about my view of inter-state relations especially in India's immediate neighbourhood.
This is a view based on five points with the inherently simple premise of non-interference in the affairs of our neighbours and respect for their sovereignty. The "Gujral Doctrine", if I may call it so, states that, first, with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India does not ask for reciprocity but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust.
Second, we believe that no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another.
Fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations."
The Gujral doctrine paved the way for India to develop more healthy relations with her neighbours. In line with new policy orientation, many new initiatives were taken to address many issues that soured bi-lateral relations for years between India's and her neighbours.
The Ganges Accord with Bangladesh over sharing lean season flow below Farakka made many concessions on the part of India but it paid back in settling other issues such as transit to end the isolation of the North-East. India's relations with Nepal also witnessed a marked improvement after the Mahakali agreement between India and Nepal which helped to settle the Tanakpur dispute.
One Indian analyst observed that "The Gujral doctrine postulates that reciprocity among asymmetrical partners in South Asia needs to be ensure equity rather than absolute equality in terms of any quid fro quo, certainly initially.....it may not pay to insist on strict parity on all things at all times. The smaller partner must feel emboldened to accept a fuller relationship at a pace and level at comfort that may be allowed to determine."
As a result, the security threat perceived by the smaller states as regards to the India's regional hegemonic security designs reduced drastically in the post Cold War situation, in the uni-polar world situation is not favourable for regional powers to execute their hegemonic strategic designs.
At the same time, external powers, especially the United States recognised India's pre-eminent position in South Asia in its policy framework. In this context, India's smaller neighbours seem to have realised that it is no longer viable to use extra-regional linkages to balance the India's position in the South Asian regional subsystem.
Crisis in Afghanistan
From very early historical times Afghanistan is crucially important to the security of South Asia. In the 19th century, the British East of Suez policy in the context of 'Pax Britannica' in the Indian Ocean pursued a parallel land-based strategy aiming at maintaining neutrality of Afghanistan as a buffer state for 'the Indian Subcontinent'.
Accordingly, the British Raj was able to bolt the Kibar and Bolan passes to ensure security to its Indian colonial possessions. Afghanistan once again came to cast its impact directly on the security situation in South Asia with the collapse of the archaic Afghan monarchy and continuing crisis after the Soviet-backed Saur Revolution in 1978.
As an immediate southern neighbour, Pakistan felt the impact of the crisis in Afghanistan in many ways. The influx of Afghan refugees to Pakistan following the Saur revolution and especially after the Soviet military intervention created a severe economic strain and social crisis in Pakistan.
At the same time, Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States was enhanced because Pakistan provided the convenient armed supply base to the anti-Soviet Afghan 'freedom fighters' which was backed by the United States politically, financially and militarily. After the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 Pakistan became a 'front line-state'.
As a result, the US soon lifted the military sanctions which were in force against Pakistan for violating the Symington Amendment. Islam religion played a key role in the Afghan resistant movement. Many of the freedom fighters were from Pashtun ethnicity.
In ethnically divided Afghanistan, Pashtuns constitute some 38% of its total population. The Durand Line divided the Pashtun belt in mid-19th century and rest lived in North Western Frontier and Balochistan Provinces in present Pakistan.
In addition to compulsions arising out of the Pakistani military-strategic alliance with the United States, its religious and ethnic links got Pakistan involved highly in the Afghan resistance movement. Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency played a key role in organizing and channelling funds and arms to the Afghan fighters-Mujahideens.
Pakistan also used the Afghan crisis for its own advantage. The Pakistan ruler at the time General Zia-ul-Haq was in a position to refuse the offer of $ 400 million by the Carter administration and bargained with the Reagan administration to obtain economic and military assistance of $ 3.2 billion stretching over five years.
The Middle-Eastern countries expressed their anger against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim country. The Pakistan military regime utilized the Pakistan's pre-eminent position as a front which is checking the invasion of the Islamic world by the Communist superpower to win over the recognition and legitimacy in the Middle-East.
The Islam factor played a key role in the establishment of Pakistan State in 1947. However, it was military ruler Zia-ul-Haq who launched the systematic policy of Islamization of Pakistan state emphasizing the Islamic criminal code.
In this policy two institutions acquired importance in the politics of Pakistan. First was Jama at-e-Islami (JI) consisting of Sunni Wahabi followers. In this context, it became the most important and well-organized fundamentalist organization in Pakistan as its influence was very strong in the Pakistan military, particularly in the all powerful ISI agency.
The second institution operating in Pakistan was Jamiat ul Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) which was influenced by the Deobandi school. JUI is active mainly in the rural areas, North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces.
While JI with the assistance of ISI provided military training to Afghan fighters, in many JUI operated madrassahs they received religious education. It was often claimed Pakistan used the arrangements and facilities set up to sustain Afghan resistance to train and equip militants in the disputed Kashmir against India.
India was nervous over the US military assistance to Pakistan despite many assurances on the part of US administration that their military assistance would not tilt the South Asian military balance against India. At the beginning the adverse political and security implications of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan resistance was not apparent.
However, it militarized the already fragile society and polity with an unprecedented scale. The Islamization process creates a situation where the military came under the influence of fundamentalist organizations, mainly of the JI. At the same time, Arms black-market was thieving creating serious internal security.
With the growth of Taliban movement the situation began to deteriorate further. Most of the young Taliban members, many of them were the sons of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, received their religious education and training in madrassahs operated by JUI in Pakistan. They were in the forefront of the Islamic resistance of holy war-jihad.
(To be continued)
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