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| Saturday, 2 October 2004 |
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Opinion: The LTTE and Lanka's politics - part 2 by B. Raman (Continued from yesterday, October 01) So far, no thought would seem to have been given in the government of India to the question of the political and national security implications of an LTTE government headed by Prabakaran one day coming to power in the Tamil-majority provinces and also to the question as to what would be the options available to India and how to get over this dilemma. One possible option for both India and Sri Lanka would have been to work towards bringing into existence an LTTE leadership minus Prabakaran. Karuna's revolt Karuna's revolt provided the possibility of working towards such an option, but the two governments watched without even a proforma protest as Prabakaran went about crushing the Eastern revolt in violation of the cease-fire accord and re-establishing his authority. Faced with continuing acts of violence in the Eastern Province, the LTTE has alleged the complicity of the SL Army in encouraging the revolt by Karuna, but there is no reliable evidence in support of this. Emergence of JVP The second complicating factor is the emergence of the JVP as an important component of the present ruling coalition. The JVP reflects the extremist Sinhalese views on the demands of the LTTE. It is believed that it is strongly opposed to the LTTE's proposals for a powerful ISGA and is disinclined to accept anything other than a devolution of powers to the Tamils. Chandrika Kumaratunga's effectiveness as an interlocutor of the LTTE, if the talks are resumed, would depend on the extent to which she and her party would be able to carry on the JVP with them. The indicators in this regard till now are not very promising. Turning point The difficulties inherent in the search for a political compromise in Sri Lanka arise from the circumstances under which the search for a political compromise started more than two years ago. India had faced similar insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram in its North-East. The turning point, which led to a political compromise through negotiations, came in the 1970s in Nagaland and in the 1980s in Mizoram because the Indian State was able to enforce its will on the insurgent groups and their leaders and make them realise that violence was not an option for them. The enforcement of the will of the State on the insurgent organisations led to their agreeing to disband their so-called armies and surrender their weapons as part of the final political solution. In Sri Lanka, the move towards a political process came not because the State was able to enforce its will against the LTTE and convince it that violence was not an option, but because the State realised that it was not in a position to enforce its will against the LTTE and that, hence, continued counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism could be counter-productive. The LTTE's agreeing to the start of the political process could not be attributed to any weakening of its capability to keep fighting against the State. It came about because of its realisation that in the post-9/11 world, continuing terrorism, however effective, could be self-defeating. Study of developments A study of the developments since the coming into force of the cease-fire makes it clear that the kind of federal set-up the LTTE has in mind is one in which Sri Lanka would be one nation with two States, two Armies and two Navies, with the LTTE exercising total responsibility for internal as well as external security in the two Tamil majority provinces and with powers of independent interactions with foreign countries and organisations in matters relating to their economic development. It is doubtful whether the majority Sinhalese population would accept such an arrangement. (Concluded) |
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