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Future of Sri Lanka's peace process

by Prof. Gamini Keerawella

Jaffna town; where the ceasefire has brought some relief

What would be the future direction of the peace process in Sri Lanka? It should be discussed against the background of the present impasse of the peace process which was to a larger extent a consequence of an absence of a clear strategy on the part of the UNF government on how to deal with the LTTE and linking the peace process to its political survival.

As a result the process set in motion by the UNF government in early 2002 with much media hype had got stuck in a serious crisis by April 2003.

Almost all the joint structures and institutions established in the process of negotiations to carry out various functions related to the peace process were defunct.

The GOSL has lost by default any independent initiative of its own and the LTTE had been given the opportunity to decide the agenda unilaterally in line with its political objective.

The area of meanoeuverability of the Sri Lankan State has been curtailed drastically as a result of the failure of the UNF government to safeguard the vital security interests of the state.

Without any clear direction just harping on the process ended up in disarray of the peace process, losing another opportunity that history might never offer us again. This situation requires a redirection of the peace process urgently.

Even though the LTTE has not moved from its earlier separatist plank they are now ready to pursue their objectives in a political-constitutional sphere. It is a positive development.

The rules and norms of behaviour relevant and the competencies required in the politico-constitutional spheres are quite different from those relevant and required in the politico-military sphere.

Therefore, the LTTE is compelled to modify its modus operandi. In order to utilize this change to push the LTTE towards a positive direction further and drive them into the democratic political process it is essential for the Sri Lankan Government to have a clear vision and a proper strategy.

By the time the UNF assumed power in 2002 the LTTE had been compelled to change its strategy from the politico-military front to politico-constitutional front. It was partly due to the strategies carried out by the earlier People's Alliance regime and also partly due to the changed international and domestic situation.

According to Chris Smith six main issues are relevant to understand the shift in the LTTE strategy. The second generation of Tamil expatriates have become less and less interested in the ideology of Eelam and consequently the reduction of remittances.

The stalemate of the war created a no-win situation for the both parties and the Tamil population became extremely war-weary.

In addition, in Chris Smith's words, 'the global concern over the proliferation of illegal SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons) may yet come to have an adverse effect upon the LTTE weapons procurement programme'.

Consequent to a series of assassinations by the LTTE, the international support for the Tamil cause has been on the wane and the weight of international opinion has shifted in an unexpected but unequal way to favour the Sri Lankan State.

Further more, the global coalition against terrorism following the 9/11 would have profound implications on the behaviour of the LTTE which had been already proscribed as a terrorist organization by a number of countries.

In this context, the risk involved with the continuation of the armed struggle would entail grave dangers and serious repercussions.

The changed demography in the island in general and in the North and the East especially was a serious concern for the LTTE. 'The diaspora of Tamils has resulted in the migration of 500,000 Tamils overseas, and an additional 200,000 have relocated to the south of Sri Lanka. Overall, this has reduced the Tamils to eight percent of the population, from 12 per cent at the start of the Conflict.

Another important factor which contributed to influence the LTTE to change emphasis from the bunker to the table is the influence of the new expatriate Tamil business community and professionals who back the LTTE.

These elements operating internationally are much more sensitive to the winds and pressures in the international arena despite the fact that the 'long-distance nationalism' can be a stronger but cushioned poignancy. Whatever may be the reason or combination of reasons and conjunctures, there is a shift in the LTTE strategy.

How to utilize this shift to induce a paradigm shift in the LTTE political agenda is the responsibility of the Government. It needs a proper reading of the LTTE strategy and a clear perspective with counter-strategy.

Unfortunately, the UNF government lacked both; its penchant for the goodwill of the LTTE at any cost and over-appeasement did not create any compulsion for LTTE to change its aims and objectives.

The visible shift of emphasis in LTTE strategy may be a tactical move. But its significance cannot be overlooked at any rate. The prevailing ceasefire is one positive outcome. This is the longest ceasefire that the people are experiencing since the outbreak of the armed conflict.

It should not be forgotten that the conflict had ultimately reached a level of a frontal warfare with trenches on both sides.

The sufferings and destruction created by the war became enormous. The entire social and cultural fabric of the country was bleeding. The human tool in both sides was very high.

Higher the scale and the intensity of the conflict greater the solace brought about by the ceasefire to the people. It was in this context that the ceasefire and its continuation, with all the shortcomings, and the retaining of the LTTE in the dialogue framework can be considered a positive development.

However, the political price that the Sri Lankan State paid to maintain the ceasefire was very high. The LTTE has been allowed to gain a status almost in par with the GOSL, nationally and internationally and it has been offered openings to build their international legitimacy.

The LTTE has been provided with the space to acquire the paraphernalia of a state in every aspect in the North and the East and it was allowed to extend its weight on the civil administration of the state.

Now it is high time to come to grips with the realities of the present peace process. After twenty months of ceasefire and six rounds of peace talks it failed to force the LTTE to alter its political objectives. Nevertheless, the Government was able to retain the LTTE within the ceasefire framework.

There is a long way to go in order to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the LTTE. Such an agreement must be acceptable to all the stakeholders to the conflict.

Present priorities

The maintaining of the ceasefire regime is an immediate priority despite its serious flaws. Many of them are emanating mainly from the shortcomings of the Ceasefire Agreement signed between the GOSL and the LTTE in February 2002 which provided the basis for the present ceasefire regime.

The Ceasefire Agreement was unbalanced and structurally flawed. It granted many unwanted concessions to the LTTE without being reciprocated. It marginalised other Tamil political parties operating in the North and East rendering them vulnerable to attack by the LTTE.

The role of the people, their forums, religious and other civil society organisations are a missing element in the present ceasefire arrangement. It must be emphasised that the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement and unilateral withdrawal from the ceasefire will not be a solution to any of these limitations and shortcomings.

The price has already been paid. The new Freedom Alliance government also assured its commitment to the ceasefire and its determination to continue it.

The ceasefire should not be considered as an end in itself. In most of the countries with records of successful peace processes, such as in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Nicaragua, no ceasefire was in place before the settlement and fighting continued while the parties negotiated.

Sri Lankan situation is different as a ceasefire is already in place. How to minimise the damage caused by the adverse clauses of the Ceasefire Agreement is a difficult issue. Any revision of the clauses in the agreement needs the consent of the LTTE.

In case of LTTE reluctance to any such change of the present Ceasefire Agreement, a way out is the shortening of the period of the ceasefire regime by expediting discussions on core-political issues relating to the settlement and corresponding interim arrangement.

How to induce the LTTE to change its objectives to settle with a mutually acceptable political solution is the formidable challenge. As the LTTE had not abandoned its military strategy simply because it entered into a ceasefire agreement, it has not abandoned its separatist plank simply because it had presented its political objectives in a constitutional sphere.

In order to force LTTE to change its separatist planks it is necessary for the Sri Lankan Government to be ready, firstly, with a viable political construct for post-conflict constitutional arrangement as an alternative to the separatist political project and, secondly, with a proper negotiation strategy to deal with the LTTE. Separatism is primarily a political challenge and it should be first defeated on the political plane.

The proposed alternative, a political construct, must invest power with the people in the region to manage their regional affairs, to sustain and promote their ethno-national identities without any adverse effects on the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of the State.

Instead of going alone with labels what is required is to identify a political construct which is capable of addressing the challenges that the country confronts in an era marked by ethno-political mobilisations.

A system of two-tier government similar to the Indian model has proved to be successful in accommodating ethno-political mobilisations in a multiethnic set-up.

However, in addition to the dispersal of ethnic plurality throughout the country, the geo-strategic unity of the island, the central mountain range and the pattern of water resources and the distribution of natural resources demand strong center also.

Therefore, a two-tiered political system, with some form of power sharing at the center, between the center and the regions and also within the region itself could be a viable solution to the challenge of the separatist political project.

If the parties to the conflict agree on principle to such a political construct as a solution, an interim arrangement can be worked out in line with the agreed framework.

(To be continued)

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The trail of misery the war left behind

by W. T. J. S. Kaviratne - Ambalangoda special correspondent

Some of the widows and parents of persons who disappeared during the war who took part in a picketing campaign opposite the Office of the Human Rights Commission in Jaffna recently.

On analysing the human costs of two decades of war it has been revealed that nearly 65,000 persons died and half of the victims happen to be civilians.

It was estimated that 17,648 LTTE cadres and 14,790 members of the government forces were also among the dead.

According to the statistics in the 'Annual Report - 2003' published by FORUT, 380,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have not been able to return to their villages in North - East Sri Lanka. Similarly, another 66,000 refugees are living in 102 refugee camps in India.

Nearly 40,000 refugees are living outside among the local people in India. Over 200,000 refugees found asylum in Europe, North America and Australia.

In addition, according to the statistics gathered by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, more than 9,000 personnel of the Government Forces became the victims of war-related trauma.

Publications of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reveal that women and children comprise 75% of the displaced population in Sri Lanka as a direct result of North-East war.

On July 23, 1983 an LTTE landmine killed 13 government soldiers in Jaffna. This monument was erected in their memory by their comrades at the spot where the killings took place.

In Jaffna alone there are 18,000 widows and of the families living in welfare centres of the North and East, 20% are families headed by women. More than 30,000 persons became physically handicapped and more than 10,000 children lost their parents.

In addition to the human costs of war, social, political and economic costs affected the nation. Direct expenditure on defence was 372.78 billion rupees, additional expenditure on public order & safety was 63.12 billion rupees, expenditure on needs of refugees and displaced was around 53 billion, loss of tourism and foreign investment amounted to 366 billion rupees, loss of output in North and East 413 billion and loss of income due to migration of professionals 191.37 billion.

Since the inception of peace negotiations with Norwegian facilitation, numerous programmes, including workshop-seminars have been conducted throughout the country on the importance of ethnic harmony, tolerance of diversity, confidence building and awareness programmes for civil society leaders by several NGOs.

All those civil society leaders who represented North, East and South of Sri Lanka agreed on a negotiated solution for the ethnic conflict while they eschewed communalism.

During these gatherings of community leaders, several guidelines were also drafted on 'Good Governance' to be sent to all political leaders of the country.

All the participants of these workshop-seminars on 'Inter-ethnic Harmony', 'Conflict Transformation' and 'On Good Governance' unanimously agreed to reject politicians engaged in electioneering using thuggery and violence.

Similarly irrespective of party, politicians who make irresponsible statements that might ignite racial hatred and affect ethnic harmony were the other factors identified to be rejected by the participants.

During my numerous visits to conflict affected areas in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Chavakachcheri, Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Mannar and Trincomalee I was able to gather first hand information on how two decades of war had affected the lives of the civilians.

In addition a cross section of the Southern widows of the fallen soldiers interviewed revealed that lasting peace could be achieved only through negotiations.

In the present prevailing 'no war', 'no peace' situation in the country all peace loving citizens including the politicians should refrain from behaving in ways which ignite racial hatred which could pave the way for the escalation of hostilities.

During the prevailing volatile backdrop, civil society leaders and peace activists have a key role to play on the prevention of escalation of hostilities between the conflicting parties.

Neither the Sri Lankan Government nor the LTTE can afford another war. The ethnic conflict should not be allowed to be a tool to gain political mileage for politicians.

At this juncture all politicians should consider the ethnic conflict as a national issue. If politicians are genuinely interested in seeking a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict they have to shed communalism.

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Namalwatta rises from the ashes of conflict

In the 1950s the Government initiated several integrated ethnic community development schemes across Sri Lanka. One of the areas they chose was Namalwatta, an extremely fertile area, approximately eight kilometres from Morewewa in the jungle.

They began by renovating the tank in 1958 and shortly afterwards the first Tamil families moved to the area followed in 1962 by ninety Muslim families.

Most of the Sinhala families settled on the other side of the canal although there were a few who lived amongst the other two ethnic communities. Each family was given three acres of paddy land and one acre of highland.

Through hard work and perseverance they established themselves permanently in the area and lived off the proceeds from their paddy fields and other crops such as coconuts, mangoes and papayas.

Over the next few years approximately 600 families settled close to the tank. Children attended schools within the community, medical clinics and dispensaries were operational. Water was readily available, and everyone lived harmoniously for approximately 20 years. The community thrived, rich with both food and quality of life.

In the early 1980s a small family conflict took place between two of the ethnic groups. It is highly possible that if it has occurred at another time in history it would have been resolved between the families.

Unfortunately racial tension was already high in Sri Lanka and the conflict in Namalwatta escalated. With the involvement of the outsiders the situation quickly became extremely serious and community members found themselves caught up in a much larger war. In order to save their lives the whole community fled the area in late 1985.

Over the next 18 years many of the Muslim and Sinhala families lived in welfare camps in the Trincomalee district, while the Tamil families left for India for approximately five years also lived in the welfare camps. It was a time of great suffering and extreme poverty. No one was able to permanently establish themselves elsewhere, their lives were on hold.

In 2003 the government announced that the families could return to their original lands and homes in Namalwatta area. Almost to the day in October 2003 the first of the families returned to their lands to try and rebuild their lives and their communities for the second time in their lives.

At this point only sixty-five Muslim families, two Sinhala families and twenty five Tamil families have moved back to the Namalwatta area. They are all living either in semipermanent huts or tents with plastic roofing or in the shells of their original homes.

They are without water or any of the other basic facilities. It is a far cry from the rich community life they enjoyed as much has been destroyed.

The families who spent their first years building their community, their middle years living in abject poverty, now they really want to spend their remaining years reconstructing their lives and creating a strong healthy community for their children and grandchildren.

The community is also still incomplete as many families who now have young children are choosing to remain in the welfare centers to ensure that their children receive education and medical attention when needed. These facilities and transport must also be brought back to the area.

(International War related Trauma and Humanitarian Intervention Trust.)

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