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| Saturday, 31 July 2004 |
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The spread of fire in the East The eight men gunned down at Kottawa in the Western Province was the best proof so far of the crisis in the East. To many a political analyst it was always clear that the solution to the ethnic crisis lay in the East, which is vital to the LTTE's goal of an Eelam to be a viable entity. At the same time the East was always volatile, due to the presence of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese in almost equal numbers, and the Muslims and Sinhalese outnumbering the Tamils. Karuna's break with the Vanni leadership may have been a long time coming, but it was an inevitability for which the Vanni strategists obviously had no immediate counter plans. It has shattered the monolithic structure of the LTTE, and makes light of its insistence on being considered the sole representatives of the Tamils. The fact that the situation now appears somewhat beyond the control of the military strategists in the Vanni is becoming increasingly obvious with the LTTE's repeated demands that the Government bring the rebel cadres under control, and the charges that the Karuna faction is being supported by the Sri Lanka Army and/or Government, in the face of the most clear denials of any such involvement by the President herself. If not for the fact of showing the reality of its Eastern flank being exposed, it seems strange that the LTTE now wants the Government to intervene to bring under control what it earlier described as an internal affair that could be solved by the Vanni leadership. Although the Vanni cadres sent to humble Karuna and his rebels did succeed initially in their military confrontation, the quick withdrawal by Karuna and the ostensible disbanding of his cadres took much of the sting away from the Vanni attack. It is in this situation that the LTTE seeks the Government to do its own work in reining in Karuna and his loyalists, while at the same time threatening a resumption of hostilities if this is not done. It adds more weight to the threat of war by the repeated allegation that Karuna is being supported by the Government. All this apparently is part of what the LTTE very conveniently sees as the Government's hidden agenda of war, despite its repeated statements of a commitment to a negotiated peace and search for a suitable agenda for the resumption of talks with the LTTE. Significantly just like in the incident of the suicide bomber who targeted the EPDP leader and UPFA Cabinet Minister, Douglas Devananda, one has still to read a condemnation of the Kottawa killings by the UNP. All it would do is to point an accusing finger at the Government, stating that it's dragging the country towards war. The US Embassy in Colombo saw the hallmark of the LTTE in the failed attack on Douglas Devananda, but the UNP has not seen it at Kollupitiya and does not see it at Kottawa too. It is a blissful silence in the hope that the country would somehow be embroiled in war again, to show themselves as the great peace builders. In an interesting twist of interpretation of the MoU, the TNA Batticaloa District MP Mr. Senathirajah Jeyanandamoorthy said in parliament that the Tamil journalist Nadesan "was murdered because the Sri Lankan government did not disarm paramilitary groups working with the military as it agreed to do under the cease-fire agreement". According to him "a paramilitary group in Batticaloa killed Nadesan and is threatening other independent journalists with death. This group cannot roam Batticaloa with weapons and intimidate and murder journalists without the military's permission", he added during the adjournment debate in parliament (July 20) on the behaviour of the Media. This is an extension of the wholly unjust provision in the MoU included by the UNP and the behest of the LTTE to disarm the EPDP, PLOTE and EPRLF (Perumal) groups that were carrying state issued arms to defend themselves from the LTTE. The new strategy enunciated by TNA MP Jeyanandamoorthy is to extend the operation of this clause to the activities of the Karuna faction, too. The simple logic behind this is that no one other than the LTTE dare carry arms in the North & East, and that no one should pose any threat to the LTTE and the activities of its armed cadres in these areas. This is once again an interesting ploy to hide the LTTE's inability to curb its own rebels who have turned against it on issues of regionalism and discrimination, and has also deprived the Vanni leadership of a rich recruiting ground for future armed cadres. It is in the face of this inability of the LTTE to defend itself that it now keeps talking more and more of its military might while at the same time making a plea clothed as a demand, that the Government save it from the threat of Karuna. These are the diversionary tactics the LTTE is adopting in its attempt to evade coming to the negotiating table for as long as possible, unless it is able to compel the Government to agree to its ISGA proposals. What it seeks is not the discussion of the ISGA proposals but conceding all what they seek, which they very well know the government is unable to do. Unfortunately, neither the Norwegian facilitators nor other members of the international community interested in peace in this country do not take up a more firm position with the LTTE, by stating as the US has done, that the ISGA proposals go beyond what any elected government can accede to. The Round Table The President's proposal for a round table discussion by all political parties represented in Parliament and other stakeholders in this crisis is welcome as such a meeting could hopefully arrive at a common negotiating stance, and also make known the exact position of other parties, especially the UNP about the ISGA. No sooner the ISGA proposals were unveiled, the UNP said it had some fundamental differences with some of the proposals, but has remained silent on what these disagreements were. The Round Table is an opportunity to understand these differences and work out the consensus that the LTTE keeps asking for, and also what many in the South keep seek too. Round table discussions on the ethnic crisis have been held before. Good proposals have emerged from them, but political rivalries have led to the failure of these laudable efforts. One can only hope that under circumstances that are very much different, taking note of the fire in the East too, there would be a more pragmatic approach by all parties on this occasion. |
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