Archives

by Dr. Chandra Dolawatte

Continued from February 12

One of the chief criticisms of the multi-member constituency system is that thereunder there is no particular elected member with individual responsibility for a specific area in the constituency.

The seriousness of this lacuna has been intensified under the prevailing politico-administrative milieu whereby an MP's intervention has become virtually indispensable for constituents in their personal dealings with the administrative machinery of the State ranging from securing a public sector job to getting a child admitted to a government school.

Elective Function and constituency

Questions that confront citizens in a polity are of two types. The first type comprises questions relating to economic, social and other matters of national importance.

The Second type consists of questions that more particularly relate to specific individuals and localities. During Parliamentary elections, the voters' attention gets specially focussed on questions of the first type.

On such questions the voters' views get fuller expression under a multi-member constituency system than even under a single member system based on the single transferable vote, leave alone a first-past-the-post single-member system.

The particular type of voter activity involved here can be characterized as the "elective function" in politics.

On the other hand, during the relatively prolonged inter-election periods, questions that require solution are mostly of the second type. These latter can best be dealt by members of the legislature, each giving close attention to a geographically limited area or section of the multi-member constituency and for which such individual member has been assigned especial responsibility.

The particular activity involved here may best be characterized as the "Constituency nursing function," for discharging which the ideal terrain would be a single member constituency system.

The perpetual single member Vs. multi-member debate that has been endemic in representative democracies would thus be seen to have its origin in the above delineated basic divergence in character between the elective and constituency nursing functions.

It is also relevant to note that single member systems generally favour big political parities, at the expense of small ones, while multi-member system through facilitating party-size-neutral proportional representation, serve to redress this inequity.

The inference cannot therefore be avoided that neither single-member nor multi-member systems can by themselves alone be relied upon to discharge both of the above-mentioned political functions. How can this dilemma be solved?

Fortunately, a way out of this dilemma is afforded by the wealth of statistics that is generated at an election and which at present is only partially utilized. A workable method, for resolving the above conflict in a rather costless manner is my proposal for a two-fold constituency system.

"Elective units" and " operational units"

To make briefly way above proposal, each multi-member constituency should continue be as the electoral unit returning members to the legislature, at an election, under the system of proportional representation, much as now though with modifications suggested.

However, for purposes of constituency nursing the entire area covered by an electoral unit, i.e. (reduced) multi-member constituency should be divided into "operational units," which partake of the character of single-member constituencies.

Subsequent to the holding of an election, the voting statistics generated by polls in the respective areas covered by the different 'operational units' would tell us with sufficient accuracy in which and which operational units, any given political party or organized group has gathered most of its votes.

Such operational units would then become the special responsibility of that party or group during the period that lasts from the time of that particular election to the time of the succeeding one or, in other words the inter-election period," as it may be called. In other words, the constituency nursing function relating to those particular operational units would generally devolve on that party or group.

For satisfying the voters' inter-election needs, this is a necessary first step. But it is not a sufficient step, the reason being that a group of successful candidate, even if they belong to the same political party, is not the best apparatus for the performance of this function.

Individual responsibility is much more effective than group, or collective, responsibility in this regard.

It therefore becomes necessary to assign only one particular winning candidate of the party or group for each single operational unit which has become the general responsibility of the party or group.

For the implementation of this second step, statistics relating to numbers of preferences cast in favour of each successful candidate of that particular party or group by voters in that particular operational unit, becomes the most relevant criterion.

The preference distribution would, thus, serve to identify the particular winning candidate of the party or group in question who should be assigned the task of nursing that electoral unit diring the ensuing inter-election period.

That particular winning candidate of the party concerned would, for his part, then have not only the obligation but also the incentive to nurse the operational unit thus assigned to him, since it would be he who would stand to reap the individual political rewards of his own endeavours in this regard.

Recent advances in information technology and computer science have tremendously advanced the feasibility of this proposal for a dual constituency system which harness the best features of both single-member and multi-member constituency systems while leaving out their objectionable features.

Casting of preferences

Integrally related, as a complement to the proposal (c) to scale down the size of multi-member constituencies is my proposal to allow a voter, if he or she desires, to cast all the three preferences to a single candidate at national and provincial elections.

This would enable a candidate to concentrate his electioneering as well as his inter-election nursing activities in a particular locality of (even the geographically reduced) multi-member constituency, thereby significantly curtailing his needs for campaign funds (which need is well-known to be a prolific conduit for the flow of corruption into politics and governance).

Cut off system

The existing cut-off system tends, in effect, to negate the expressed political will of a section of the population in the country.

The obverse of this cut-off is that a few of the seats in a multi-member constituency would initially remain unallocated to a party, which seats would then, under the existing laws, fall to the lap of the most successful parties as bonus seats at an election.

There is potently no logical basis for this discriminatory provision against small parties and groups in the election law, since it is a fundamental principle of democracy that the vote for every citizen is of equal value.

No voter or a group of voters should be relegated to the ranks of second class citizens. But this is exactly what happens under the 'cut-off' and the bonus seat system which, therefore, are here proposed to be eliminated from the election law.

The impracticability of giving fractional shares of a Parliamentary seat to a small party or group does pose a problem (though not one which is inseperable) to the full implementation of the proportionality principle.

However, responding to this obstacle by brazenly distorting the voter intentions and artificially modifying the electoral result is no logical or justifiable solution thereto. This, in fact, is a stock case of a cure worse than the disease.

The upshot of the existing law is that while, on the one hand, small parties or groups get discriminated against, those voting for them, on the other hand, would lose any chance of exercising their due influence on the electoral outcome.

I have therefore, proposed as an alternative to the existing system, a scheme of countrywide vote aggregation and proportionalization for such small parties and groups.

Under this proposed scheme the basic democratic principle of the equality of the vote of every citizen gets effectively recognized in practice and every voter would be enabled to exert his due first preferential impact on the overall electoral outcome.

Moreover, each political party or group, under the proposed scheme would get only its due proportionate share of seats in the legislature and nothing more or nothing less.

National lists

I have also proposed the elimination of the existing system of nominating nearly 1/10 of the Membership of Parliament outside the normal electoral process, by the leaderships of the individual political parties and groups in proportions reflective of their respective shares in the aggregate poll at an election.

This provision in the existing electoral law, though sporting the rather enticing and innocuous name, "National Lists" possesses a totally undemocratic character in that, under this dispensation, a handful of political party leaders enjoy a civic right, not enjoyed by other citizens of the country, in direct contravention of the basic "one-voter one vote" principle of democracy, by virtue of the power accorded to them of deciding in their absolute discretion, how a substantial percentage of the total membership of Parliament should be composed of, the ordinary voting public having absolutely no say, or at least a firm prior intimation on that matter. This is tantamount to a derogation from the fundamental right of citizens of a democracy to choose directly their legislation.

Special talent or experience in the ranks of a political party can, of course, be utilized for national benefit in other ways than offering them fully fledged parliamentary membership e.g. in advisorial capacities.

Moreover, Parliaments, standing orders may even be amended to permit such persons to address its sittings, on specific matters, under invitations initiated by party leaderships.

I have also argued that electoral manifesto of political parties as well as coalition agreements between parties should be accorded the status of legal documents.

"It is the fervent hope of this writer that the rather hasty moves at electoral reform that are presently afoot do not end up as a conspiracy of politicians against the ordinary voters and that the "baby will not be thrown out with the bath water".

(Concluded)

www.ceylincoproperties.com

www.ppilk.com

www.crescat.com

News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security
Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries

Produced by Lake House
Copyright © 2003 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager